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Abstract 
Microinsurance services have been operating in Ghana for the last decade, but the question 
whether they have enhanced the welfare of low-income households, mostly in the informal sector, 
is largely unresearched. In particular the study asks: does microinsurance improve the welfare of 
households through asset retention, consumption smoothing and inequality reduction? This 
question has been examined through the use of the 2010 FINSCOPE survey which contains in-
depth information on 3 642 households across the rural and urban settings of the country. In order 
to control for selection bias and endogeneity bias, Heckman sample selection, instrumental 
variable and treatment effect models were employed for the evaluation. The results of the 
assessment have been compiled into four empirical essays.  
The first essay investigates the impact of microinsurance on household asset accumulation. The 
findings show that microinsurance has a positive welfare impact in terms of household asset 
accumulation. This suggests that microinsurance prevents asset pawning and liquidation of 
essential household assets at ‘give away’ prices. By absorbing the risk of low-income households, 
insurance equips them to cope effectively with risk, empowers them to escape poverty and 
sustains the welfare gains achieved.   
The second essay examines the impact of microinsurance on consumption smoothing. It delves 
into the capacity of microinsurance to enable households to avoid costly risk-coping methods 
which are detrimental to health and well-being. The results reveal that insured households are less 
likely to reduce the daily intake of meals, which is an indication that microinsurance is a better 
option for managing consumption smoothing among low-income households.  
The third essay investigates the effect of microinsurance on households’ asset inequality. The 
findings indicate that the asset inequality of insured households is less than that of uninsured 
households. Insured female-headed households have much lower asset inequality than male-
headed households, but uninsured female-headed households are worse off than both uninsured 
and insured male-headed households. The regional trend reveals that developmental gaps impede 
the capacity of microinsurance to bridge the asset inequality gap.  
The fourth essay asks: Does microcredit improve the well-being of low-income households in the 
absence of microinsurance? The findings show a weak influence of microcredit on household 
welfare. However households using microcredit in combination with microinsurance derive 
significant gains in terms of welfare improvement. Microcredit may be good, but its real benefits to 
the poor is best realised if the poverty trapping risks are covered with microinsurance. To this 
extent, combining microcredit with microinsurance will empower the poor to make a sustainable 
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exit from poverty. The findings of this thesis have pertinent policy implications for the government, 
the development community and stakeholders in the insurance industry. Microinsurance is a good 
instrument for improving the welfare of households and thus this research recommends its 
integration into the poverty reduction strategy of Ghana and a greater insurance inclusion for the 
lower end of the market. 
Key words: Microinsurance; Welfare; Asset, Households; Ghana 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1. BACKGROUND OF THE STUDY 
Exposure to risks such as fire, floods, sickness, disability and death of a breadwinner can have 
adverse effect on the welfare of an entire household1. Again, bad weather conditions (eg. severe 
drought) and lack of a ready market for the produce of smallholder farmers impact negatively on 
the capacity of rural households to deal with poverty traps. These risks do not only impede the 
economic capacity of the poor from breaking the vicious cycle of poverty (Guha-Khasnobis & 
Ahuja, 2004), but they also reinforce households’ vulnerability to income shocks in an escalating 
downward spiral (Churchill, 2007). 
Indeed the failure of most sub-Saharan Africa countries to reduce extreme poverty by half as 
stipulated by the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) has largely been attributed to uninsured 
risks (Loewe, 2006). The International Labour Organization (ILO, 2014) has also estimated that 75 
countries do not have any social protection for households and that in developing countries 18 000 
children die daily mainly due to lack of sufficient social protection. So can microinsurance be used 
to address such life-cycle and business risks associated with low-income households and enhance 
their standard of living?  
The theoretical framework based on Von Neumann and Morgenstern (1944) expected utility theory 
indicates that microinsurance may reduce vulnerability as low-income households replace the 
uncertainty of incurring huge losses with the certainty of making small, regular premium payments 
(Brown & Churchill, 1999). By insuring households against future welfare losses, microinsurance 
helps in the reduction of vulnerability and poverty. A poverty reduction strategy needs to address 
not only those currently experiencing poverty, but those who may also be vulnerable to it over the 
longer term. Thus, the use of microinsurance in addressing poverty becomes very important. 
Vulnerability and poverty go hand in hand, but microinsurance can break a part of the cycle that 
ties them together. According to Dercon (2003), insurance removes the risk of worsening poverty 
or poverty traps. 
Microinsurance also serves as an effective tool for the separation of fluctuations in consumption 
from fluctuations in earnings and wealth (consumption smoothing) (Arun & Steiner, 2008). The 
presence of uninsured risk results in welfare losses. This may lead to substantial hardships for the 
low-income earners (Dercon, 2003). Microinsurance prevents welfare losses as low-income 
                                               
1
 Low-income households, the poor and informal sectors workers are used interchangeable throughout this 
study. 
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households are indemnified by insurers against events that may force them to sink below the 
poverty line.  
Microinsurance as a social protection tool can also reduce the incidence of child labour by 
eliminating economic vulnerability of households, enabling children to access education 
(Chakrabarty, 2012; ILO, 2014). Many social protection stakeholders such as the ILO regard 
microinsurance as a priceless tool for the improvement in the welfare of millions of people in the 
informal economy worldwide.  
Despite the strong theoretical foundation, the empirical literature is limited in depth and 
inconclusive in evidence. Whereas some studies discovered that microinsurance leads to 
counterintuitive tendencies such as moral hazard, adverse selection and inertia in investment 
among households and microenterprises (Gine & Yang, 2009; Giesbert et al., 2011), others such 
as Guha-Khasnobis and Ahuja (2004) and Nicola (2011) argued that microinsurance facilitates 
households’ and microenterprises’ investments into high yielding projects which improve their 
productivity and welfare. A third group of authors (Gumber, 2001; Smith & Sulzbach, 2008; 
Wagstaff et al., 2009; Lei & Lin, 2009; Dercon et al., 2012) report of either mixed results or no 
effect at all.  
Also the experience of Europe and America shows a positive relationship between insurance, 
savings levels and economic well-being (Starr-McCluer, 1996; Guariglia & Rossi, 2004), but that of 
some Asian countries is said to be negative (Cheung & Padieu, 2011; Hsu et al., 2011). The 
inconclusive empirical evidence from the various regions of the world and the many gaps in the 
existing literature calls for a very rigorous country-specific study that will test the real impacts of 
microinsurance on households’ welfare. 
1.2. THE MOTIVATION 
The global microinsurance industry has since 2000 recorded increasing market activity with rapid 
growth observed in almost all regional markets (Swiss Re, 2010). The potential global coverage of 
the market is estimated at 4 billion low-income persons with the likelihood of generating US$40 
billion (Swiss Re, 2010). Out of the estimated market of 4 billion people only 78 million were 
covered in 2007 (Roth et al., 2007). This has however grown quite remarkable to 174 million lives 
in India, 44.4 million in Africa and 45 million in Latin America (McCord et al., 2012; ILO, 2013). The 
African market in particular has experienced fast growth in covered lives and value of premiums. It 
insured 14.7 million lives and collected US$257 million as premium income in 2010 (Matul et al., 
2010). This coverage has grown tremendously from 0.3 percent of Africa’s population in 2007 to 
4.4 percent in 2012 translating into 44.4 million policyholders (Roth et al., 2007; McCord et al., 
2012). In Ghana the private microinsurance market covers about 1.26 million policyholders and 
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generates premium income of about GHS11.70 million (US$6.09 million) (Buabeng & Gruijters, 
2012). The government health insurance scheme also covers about 4.5 million low-income 
households living and working in the informal sector (NHIS, 2010).  
In spite of the impressive growth in the market size, empirical research into the African experience 
has been limited. The case of Ghana has seen some studies mostly in the area of access to 
microinsurance. For instances, in assessing low-income earners access to microinsurance 
Giesbert (2008) delved into the demand for microinsurance by Ghana’s rural folks. Similarly Arun 
and Steiner (2008), Bendig et al (2009) and Giesbert and Steiner (2011) have all researched into 
how access to microinsurance services by low-income earners can be made flexible and 
affordable. The focus of these researchers and the attention of practitioners as well as regulators 
have tended to be on how access to microinsurance can be increased. However no impact study 
exists on the link between microinsurance and welfare in Ghana. More importantly when 
juxtaposed with the poverty situation in Ghana, it is imperative to ascertain whether the intervention 
of microinsurance schemes have improved on household welfare through proper consumption 
smoothing and asset retention. 
Practically, microinsurance could lead to different outcomes. It could have counterintuitive effects 
due to adverse selection and moral hazards. Adverse selection describes a state of affairs where 
those who have a high probability of being negatively affected by a risky event are the ones who 
purchase insurance (Brown & Churchill, 1999; McConnell & Brue, 2008; Roth & McCord, 2008). 
Adverse selection can have a destabilizing effect on an insurance system, because the mechanism 
of risk-pooling will not function effectively if only those adversely affected by a risky event buy the 
insurance product.  
Moral hazard is the situation where the indemnity enjoyed under insurance creates an incentive for 
a policyholder to act in an irresponsible manner. That is, due to their protection under the 
insurance contract, they behave carelessly and this generates greater likelihood of the insured 
event occurring. For instance, households’ savings behaviour might change for the worse due to 
the uptake of microinsurance products such as life and disability products. Microenterprises may 
be less aggressive in undertaking new investments with the uptake of microinsurance. For 
example, agro-based microenterprises that have taken animal insurance policies might be less 
proactive in undertaking new investments such as the immunization of their animals.  
Another counterintuitive debate about microinsurance is its possible crowding-out effect of existing 
informal social protection mechanisms such as the extended family support and mutual funeral 
contributions (Dercon et al., 2008). These are counterintuitive arguments which may or may not 
make microinsurance have a positive impact on households’ welfare. There is therefore a need to 
investigate the real benefits or otherwise of microinsurance schemes. 
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This study provides new evidence by examining the impact of microinsurance on the welfare of 
low-income households in Ghana. Indeed the effect of microinsurance on consumption smoothing, 
asset accumulation and asset inequality are important for the design of microinsurance and welfare 
schemes. This study therefore fills the apparent empirical gap by assessing the impact of 
microinsurance schemes in Ghana on the welfare of poor households. The study is organized 
around four stand-alone essays each of which unwinds a particular empirical labyrinth.  
1.3. OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The primary objective of the study is to analyse the effect of microinsurance on household welfare. 
This objective is specified under the following areas: 
1. Determine the impact of microinsurance on households’ asset accumulation. 
2. Evaluate the impact of microinsurance on households’ consumption smoothing. 
3. Explore the effect of microinsurance on asset inequality among low-income households. 
4. Determine whether there is a positive synergy between microinsurance and microcredit in 
enhancing households’ welfare. 
1.4. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
1. What is the impact of microinsurance on households’ assets accumulation? 
2. How does microinsurance impact on households’ consumption smoothing? 
3. What is the impact of microinsurance on asset inequality? 
4. How does the synergy between microinsurance and microcredit improve on households’ 
welfare? 
1.5. RATIONAL FOR EACH ESSAY 
As noted earlier four stand-alone essays have been put together to answer the research questions. 
First, it is expected that microinsurance will indemnify households against risks such as fire, crop 
failure, flood, illness and theft. This indemnity cover is expected to influence the ex-ante investment 
outlook of households by giving them “a peace of mind” and encouragement to engage in 
productive activities that can increase asset accumulation. Similarly the pay-out that households 
receive if an insurable loss occurs has the potential to reduce the use of costly coping strategies 
such as the disposal of productive assets. This dual role of microinsurance is expected to equip 
households to accumulate essential assets necessary for welfare improvements. Thus the first 
essay examines whether the uptake of microinsurance has been beneficial to households in terms 
of asset accumulation. 
Low-income households have diverse strategies for coping with risks. Among such mechanisms 
for coping with income shocks is the reduction in daily food intake. However reduction in daily 
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meals can lead to malnourishment with pernicious health conditions. Children are particularly very 
vulnerable since reduced nutrition can lead to irreversible impairment in health such as stunted 
growth, slower cognitive and motor development and high morbidity rates (Ray, 1998; Martorell, 
1999). As a risk management tool, microinsurance is expected to facilitate proper consumption 
smoothing by separating shocks in current earnings from current consumption. Therefore the 
second essay examines the strength of microinsurance as a viable alternative for smoothing 
consumption among low-income households.  
It is also argued that the level of asset inequality between the poor and the non-poor keeps on 
widening partly due to insufficient economic opportunities for the poor and their inability to deal with 
risks associated with household and or productive assets. All other things being equal, uninsured 
risks can increase the level of asset inequality among groups of people. This is more so since 
assets may have to be sold off to raise money to address emergency shocks. Hence, asset 
pawning, asset poverty and asset inequality move in tandem, but microinsurance can break a part 
of the cycle that ties them together. By insuring households against asset loss, microinsurance is 
expected to close the asset gap between the poor and the non-poor. Hence the third essay 
explores the asset inequality levels within and between insured and uninsured households as 
separate cohorts. 
Another important factor that can improve upon the welfare of low-income households and 
microenterprises is access to affordable credit. However, most low-income households have 
limited access to bank credit due to their perceived high levels of default risks. Some of these risks 
can be eliminated through microinsurance products. Through microinsurance products such as 
credit life the rate of default among low-income households and microenterprises can be minimized 
and this will facilitates the release of more credits to low-income households. It is also argued that 
the trap of poverty is not only the lack of credit, but also life-cycle and economic risks that threaten 
the very survival of the poor. Therefore combining microcredit with microinsurance as a financing 
package will empower them to make sustainable exit from chronic poverty. The fourth essay thus 
simulates a discussion into how the synergy between microinsurance and microcredit can be 
explored to improve upon the welfare of low-income households. 
1.6. AN OVERVIEW OF WELFARE IN GHANA  
The last three decades has seen increasing economic growth in Ghana. Her gross domestic 
product (GDP) for a period of 15 years grew by 4.65 percent between 1991 and 1999, and by 4.98 
during the 1999-2006 periods (GSS, 2007). Her average annual GDP growth rate for the period 
2005 to 2013 was 7.8 percent (GSS, 2014). This is 68 percent greater than the average for the 
1991-1999 periods. The Africa Development Bank (2012) has also reported that since 2003 the 
economy of Ghana has been growing faster than the growth rate of the entire African continent.  
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This remarkable growth has translated into drastic reduction of both extreme poverty2 and 
moderate poverty by more than 50 percent each over the last two decades. For instance the 
incidence of extreme poverty has declined from 36.5 percent in 1991/92 to 18.2 percent in 2005/06 
and further down to 8.4 percent in 2012/13 (GSS, 2007, 2008 & 2014). The level of moderate 
poverty has also reduced from a staggering rate of 51.7 percent in 1991/92 to 28.5 in 2005/06 and 
to 24.2 in 2012/13 (GSS, 2007, 2008 & 2014). Despite this progress, poverty is still widespread in 
Ghana and is a predominately a rural phenomenon.  
The welfare situation incorporates income levels, health, education and access to basic social 
amenities. These dimensions of poverty interact to consign households to lower welfare levels or 
standards of living (GSS, 2007). In this regard we examine the trend in these key indicators in 
Ghana. The geographical dimension of poverty shows a persistent of extreme poverty in the rural 
areas. As at 2006, as high as 86 percent of the population considered poor were residing in rural 
communities (GSS, 2007). This has however declined by 8 percentage points in 2012/13 to 78 
percent.  
The distribution of poverty incidence by main economic activity also indicates that farmers, private 
informal sector wage employees and the non-farm self-employed are the poorest segments of the 
population (GSS, 2007 & 2014). The latest nation-wide living standards survey, GLSS VI, reports 
that “household heads who are farmers are not just the poorest in Ghana, but they contribute the 
most to Ghana’s poverty” (GSS, 2014:25). A major reason underlying the poverty situation of this 
population segment is their investment in low risk production at the expense of higher returns. The 
concept of microinsurance can be used as a catalyst to empower these economically active, but 
poor people to make a sustainable exit from poverty. The indemnity cover under microinsurance 
can be used to encourage these people to invest in high risk high yielding economic activities. That 
is the indemnity provision which serves as a guaranteed safety net and thus eliminates the anxiety 
about future economic shocks, can empower this segment to engage in high yielding productions. 
For example, smallholder farmers are likely to increase their scale of production if they are covered 
under an agricultural microinsurance against crop failure. In addition to microinsurance, 
government programs that address the challenges of post-harvest losses along the agricultural 
value chain can equip farmers to overcome poverty. It is also argued that providing a guarantee 
market for the goods of smallholder farmers at competitive prices can lifts them up from poverty.  
                                               
2
 According to the Ghana Statistical Service (2014:12), extreme poverty refers to “those whose standard of 
living is insufficient to meet their basic nutritional requirements even if they devoted their entire consumption 
budget to food”. The extreme poverty line is living on GHS792.05 per year (approximately US$1.10 a day). 
The moderate poverty refers to individuals who are “able to purchase enough food to meet their nutritional 
requirements and their basic non-food needs” (GSS, 2014:7). The moderate poverty line is at GHS1 314.00 
per year (US$1.83 a day).  
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In terms of the degree of access to essential services such as electricity, potable water and 
hygienic toilet facilities, access of rural households to potable water has increased substantially 
with about three-quarters having access to good drinking water in 2005/06 (GSS, 2007). The last 
two decades has recorded increasing investment in the water sub-sector resulting in 122 
percentage improvement in the rural areas (World Bank, 2011). This has reduced the rural-urban 
disparity in access to safe water very significantly (GSS, 2007). However development in sanitation 
facilities has been minimal. Households in the urban areas, on the other hand, witnessed sharp 
increases in improved toilet facilities from 1991 to 2006 (GSS, 2007). Indeed, since 1990 the 
average sanitation facilities in the urban dwellings have consistently been two and three times 
more than the national and rural average respectively (World Bank, 2011). Similarly access to 
electricity in the urban centres is about three times that of rural dwellers. Despite the gap, efforts by 
the central government through the rural electrification program are expected to improve access to 
electricity in the rural areas.   
With regard to health issues the trend of key health indicators points to marked improvement in 
general health outcomes, however some issues relating to children and women health care are still 
undesirable. Between 2003 and 2008, 57 percent of births took place in recognized health facilities 
(GSS et al., 2009). Professionally assisted delivery has also increased from 47 percent in 2003 to 
59 percent in 2008 (GSS et al., 2009). Although this performance is good, it is quite lower than the 
global average of 56 percent in 1990 to 68 percent in 2012 (UN, 2014). Quite disturbingly 41 
percent deliveries occurred without a professional medical assistance and a sizable minority of 11 
percent used relatives or no assistance at all during delivery (GSS et al., 2009). Deliveries without 
professional medical assistance can increase the rate of child and maternal mortality. To this 
extent expansion of professional health facilities especially into rural areas will be very critical for 
the reduction of maternal mortality by three quarters as specified in the MDGs. Although the 
government offers free health insurance to pregnant women, access to this facility is very limited in 
the rural areas.   
Globally child mortality has reduced by 48 percent from 12.6 million in 1990 to 6.6 million in 2012 
(UN, 2014). Notwithstanding this global progress, sub-Saharan Africa and Southern Asia have high 
levels of child mortality. These two regions account for four out of every five child deaths worldwide 
(UN, 2014). The case of Ghana is relatively better than both the sub-Saharan Africa and the global 
performance. For example, childhood mortality has decreased quite substantially from 111 per 
1 000 live births in 2003 to 80 per 1 000 live births in 2008. This means “one in every thirteen 
children dies before reaching the age of five. Over two-thirds of these deaths occur in the first year 
of life” (GSS et al., 2009:24). Though this is lower than the average of sub-Saharan African, 
improved access to reproductive health care such as early visits to clinics for antenatal and 
postnatal care as well as maternal education can eliminate child mortality. 
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The well-being of households can also be gauged from the consumption of food containing the 
required amount of nutrients. Nutrient deficiency especially iron deficiency poses significant threat 
to the health of children and nursing mothers. The Ghana Demographic and Health Survey 
(GDHS) report an increase in the rate of anaemia in children from 76 percent in 2003 to 78 percent 
in 2008. It further indicates that 23 percent, 48 percent and 7 percent are mildly, moderately and 
severely anaemic respectively. The level of iron deficiency among women also increased sharply 
from 45 percent in 2003 to 59 percent in 2008. The Upper East region has the lowest percentage 
of anaemic women (48 percent) while the Western region has the highest level of 71 percent (GSS 
et al., 2009). 
Such levels of nutrient deficiency can lead to weakness in bodily growth and development 
especially in children. For example, 28 percent of children below the age of five are stunted and 10 
percent are severely stunted. A further 9 percent and 14 percent are wasted and underweight 
respectively (GSS et al., 2009). This situation can disrupt not only the bodily growth of children, but 
more importantly their emotional and cognitive faculties. Microinsurance can be used as part of 
policy interventions to address the nutrient deficiencies through proper consumption smoothing. 
This will ensures that even during periods of income shocks, households’ food consumption at 
required calories is not compromised by lack of sufficient funds.  
1.7. CHAPTER ORGANIZATIONS 
The thesis is organized around four main themes under household welfare: asset accumulation, 
consumption smoothing, asset inequality and welfare synergy between microinsurance and 
microcredit. Each theme has been developed into a stand-alone essay. The first chapter 
introduces the research and highlights some of the debates surrounding the impact of 
microinsurance on welfare. 
The second chapter reviews past and current issues in the Ghanaian microinsurance sector and 
discusses the major market trends and patterns of the formal insurance markets. The third chapter 
begins the empirical investigation by evaluating the impact of microinsurance on household asset 
accumulation. The fourth chapter assesses the impact of microinsurance on consumption 
smoothing among low-income households.  
The fifth chapter explores the effect of microinsurance on asset inequality among low-income 
households. Chapter 6 investigates the synergy between microinsurance and microcredit in the 
improvement of households’ welfare. The thesis ends with chapter seven which summarises the 
conclusions and policy recommendations. 
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CHAPTER 2  
OVERVIEW OF THE MICROINSURANCE SECTOR IN GHANA 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter reviews the market patterns and trends of the microinsurance sector in Ghana. Since 
the microinsurance sector is embedded in the mainstream insurance industry, a general overview 
of the insurance market is provided so as to situate the institutional arrangements in which 
microinsurance companies operate. 
2.2. DEVELOPMENTS IN THE FORMAL INSURANCE SECTOR 
Formal insurance market operations started in Ghana in the 1920s with a foreign-owned insurance 
company, Guardian Royal Exchange Assurance (Gh) Limited now known as Enterprise Insurance 
Company, as the first insurance firm to be established in 1924. In 1955 the first local insurance 
firm, the Gold Coast Insurance Company, was also started to insure life business (Ansah-Adu et 
al., 2012). The State Insurance Corporation (SIC) was also established by the government of 
Ghana in 1962. It was granted statutory monopoly over the underwriting of all government 
businesses. In 1972 Ghana Reinsurance Organization (Ghana Re) was set up as a subsidiary of 
SIC to provide reinsurance services to all insurers operating in the country. All insurers were 
required by law to cede not less than 20 percent of all general businesses written locally and 5 
percent of international non-life policies to Ghana Re (Ansah-Adu et al., 2012).  
During the last two decades regulatory reforms have been initiated which have transformed the 
industry from a state-led monopoly to a market-driven industry. Now the industry operates under a 
new law, Insurance Acts 724 (2006), which has aligned the sector’s operations to the core 
principles of the International Association of Insurance Supervisors. In order to promote sound risk 
management and actuarial practices, accountability and effective corporate governance, the new 
insurance law prohibits composite insurance businesses. Thus all insurance companies have been 
separated into life and non-life businesses. The law has not only empowered the National 
Insurance Commission (NIC) to provide effective regulatory supervision of the industry, but it has 
also enhanced the entry of many foreign-owned insurers unto the market.  
The regulatory and institutional reforms have increased market activity which has resulted in the 
increase of licensed insurance entities3 (see Table 2.1) by 31 percent from 74 in 2007 to 97 in 
2011 (NIC, 2007 and 2011).  This has engendered keen competition among the various insurers in 
both the life and non-life businesses. Although SIC is the dominant insurer in both subsectors, its 
performance has been declining while Enterprise Insurance Ltd has seen continuous growth at an 
                                               
3
 This is excluding agents 
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average of 2 percent since 2003. The market shares measured by premiums underwritten by the 
industry leaders in both the life and non-life subsectors are presented in Tables 2.2 and 2.3.  
Table 2.1: Licensed insurance entities as at December, 2011 
Insurance Entity Number Licensed 
Non-Life companies 24 
Life companies 18 
Reinsurance companies 2 
Insurance brokers 51 
Reinsurance brokers 1 
Loss adjusters 1 
Agents 1 200 
 
 
Table 2.2: Market Shares of Life Companies 
Company 
Percentage of market share (%) 
 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
State Insurance Company Ltd 22 24 26 29 32 30 28 26 
Gemini Life Insurance Company Ltd 18 16 15 14 16 13 14 11 
Enterprise Life Assurance Ltd 8 10 12 13 15 17 19 21 
Star Life Company 13 10 10 7 8 9 10 10 
Metropolitan Life Insurance Ltd 14 10 9 7 7 7 6 6 
Vanguard Life Insurance Ltd 6 8 4 9 6 6 7 9 
Others 19 22 24 21 16 18 16 17 
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: NIC, 2007, 2010. 
Table 2.3: Market Shares of Non-life Companies 
Company 
                  Percentage of market share (%) 
   2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
State Insurance Company Ltd   38 37 40 39 37 
Enterprise Insurance Company Ltd   16 14 15 12 12 
Metropolitan Insurance Company Ltd   12 10 10 10   9 
Vanguard Insurance Company Ltd     8   9   8   9   8 
Star Insurance Company Ltd     5   7   7   7   7 
Ghana Union Insurance Company Ltd      5   5   5   4   4 
Others   16 18 15 19 23 
Total    100 100 100 100 100 
Source: NIC, 2007, 2010. 
Source: NIC, 2009, 2010, 2011. 
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In 2001 the industry recorded an annual gross premium income of GHS32.254 million, accounting 
for 0.85 percent of Ghana’s gross domestic product. This was quite low compared with 17.34 
percent for South Africa. However, since 2001 the sector has recorded an increase of about 20 
times in gross premiums, reaching GHS628.53 million in 2011. The non-life subsector, which 
generates much of the total industry premiums, has total assets of GHS651 million while the life 
sector has GHS492 million (NIC, 2011). The key indicators of both the life and non-life subsectors 
are illustrated in Table 2.4. The growth in the industry and the premiums mobilized by both sectors 
of the industry has long-term positive effects on the economic growth of Ghana (Alhassan & 
Fiador, 2014). 
Table 2.4: Key Indicators of the Life and Non-life Sectors, 2011 
         Indicators           2011 (GHS million)     2010 (GHS million)             Growth (%) 
                  Life Companies 
Total Assets   492   367    34 
Total Investments  371   273    36 
Actuarial Liabilities  346   243    42 
Total Capitalization 104     90    17 
 
                 Non-life Companies 
Total Assets   651   582    12 
Total Investments  309   301      3 
Actuarial Liabilities  184   140    31 
Total Capitalization 324   313      4 
Source: NIC, 2011. 
 
The increased market activity and the growing competition have exposed the industry to 
operational abuses such as price undercutting, unethical underwriting and marketing practices and 
over-reliance on credit (NIC, 2010). The industry is also plagued with a growing number of 
complaints by policyholders against almost every insurer. Since 2005 the Complaints and 
Settlements Bureau (CSB)5 has received a staggering total of 1 981 complaints from policyholders 
against various insurance companies for reasons such as: 
1. Disparity between benefits promised by insurers verbally from stated benefits in policy 
documents;  
2. Unauthorised deductions of premiums from a policyholder’s bank account even after policy 
has been surrendered; 
                                               
4
 This amounts to US$32.25 million in 2006, using the then exchange rate between the GHS and the US$ 
5
 The CSB is the arbitration arm of the NIC. 
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3. Disagreements regarding claims settlement, quantum of claims and payments (NIC, 2010 & 
2008). 
 
The many complaints and the reasons underlying them have adverse effects on the confidence of 
the public about the trustworthiness of insurance firms, and this can reduce the already low levels 
of insurance penetration in the country. It is therefore not surprising that the level of insurance 
penetration has reduced from 1.89 percent in 2010 to 1.06 percent in 2011 as against 14.8 percent 
in South Africa, 7.3 percent in Namibia, 2.8 percent in Kenya and 4.8 percent in Malaysia (Swiss 
Re, 2010a). The level of insurance penetration for the past ten years is presented in Table 2.5. 
In terms of risk management and cost efficiency, Ansah-Adu et al. (2012) indicated that out of 30 
insurers 25 have inconsistent efficiency scores and 2 have retrogressive efficiency scores. Their 
findings suggest that non-life firms are less efficient in the management of their cost structures. 
The presence of cost inefficiencies in risk management may impede effective underwriting 
regarding what risk to absorb, what to avoid and what to transfer to a reinsurer. 
Table 2.5: Premium Growth and Insurance Penetration 
              Year           Premiums (GHS)           Growth (%)         Penetration (%GDP) 
2001            32 251 600   26.0   0.85 
2002            47 205 989   46.3   0.95 
2003            71 283 978   51.0   1.08 
2004            92 583 146   29.8   1.16 
2005            122 925 795   24.7   1.26 
2006            164 207 266   33.5   1.40 
2007            209 457 409   27.5   1.49 
2008            276 494 733   32.0   1.58 
2009            343 072 874   23.2   1.58 
2010            458 694 769   33.0   1.89 
2011            628 528 775   37.2   1.06 
Source: NIC, 2005, 2007, 2011. 
2.3. THE MICROINSURANCE SECTOR 
2.3.1. Clients’ Characteristics  
The clients of microinsurance scheme are mostly households living and working in the informal 
sector. The economically active ones are smallholder farmers, fruits and vegetables sellers, 
fishmongers, dressmakers and tailors, carpenters, truck pushers, “head-porters”, chop-bar6 
                                               
6
 Local restaurant 
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operators and provisions7 sellers. The income flow of these workers is mostly seasonal in timing 
and uneven in amount. For instance farmers may record significant increase in income during the 
harvesting period, but can face drastic decline in income during the planting season. This is why 
most successful microinsurance schemes structure the insurance premium payments according to 
the cash flow of the clients.  
With regard to the level of income, microinsurance clients have been classified into two levels by 
Swiss Re (2010b). These are: (1) persons living above US$1.258 per day up to US$4 per day, and 
(2) those whose daily consumption is below US$1.25. Those in the first category are the 
economically active persons and represent the target market for commercial viable microinsurance 
(Swiss Re, 2010b). Almost all the microinsurance products on the Ghanaian market fall within this 
category. Examples of such products are: Anidaso, Edwadifu ahobanbo, Sika plan, Abusua 
nkyemfa, and Tigo family care. Table 2.7 provides more examples and details of these products.  
The second category however consists of the extremely poor with little or no earnings to meet the 
basic necessities of life. Providing market-based microinsurance to this category may not be viable 
and sustainable (Swiss Re, 2010b). Nevertheless, the extremely poor can be insured through 
government sponsored schemes such as providing country-wide social protection policy such as 
health insurance and unemployment insurance (Swiss Re, 2010b). An example of such a policy is 
the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) of Ghana which has relieved the poor of out-of-
pocket health care costs. Governments can also enter into a public private partnership (PPP) 
agreement for the provision of microinsurance to the extremely poor at subsidised premiums by 
government (Swiss Re, 2010b). An example of microinsurance PPP agreement is the current 
partnership between the government and the Ghana Insurers Association (GIA) under the Ghana 
Agricultural Insurance Programme (GAIP) for the provision of microinsurance services to farmers 
at subsidised premiums. 
The global market size of microinsurance for the economically active clients (US$2 to US$4 per 
day) is estimated to be 2.6 billion people with the capacity to generate premium income of US$33 
billion while that of the extremely poor is 1.4 billion people, generating premium income of US$7 
billion (Swiss Re, 2010b). Figure 2.1 illustrates the market potential of the global microinsurance 
market. 
 
  
                                               
7
 Sellers of household consumables, textile etc 
8
 This is based on 2005 international purchasing power parity 
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                       Medium to   Conventional insurance   
                          high income   market  
 
    US$2 – 4/day 
 Microinsurance market  2.6 billion people 
 (commercially viable)  US$33 billion market 
 
                  US$1.25/day   
    Microinsurance through  1.4 billion people  
        aid/government support  (US$7 billion market 
   
Figure 2.1: Poverty Line and Size of the Microinsurance Market 
Source: Swiss Re (2010b); Chen and Ravallion (2010); http://iresearch.worldbank.org/PovcalNet. 
The market in Ghana though in a nascent stage has witnessed impressive growth in the number of 
firms, policyholders and underwriting activities. The National Insurance Commission uses the 
concept of down-scaling to promote the extension of insurance services to the lower end of the 
market. Its policy document on microinsurance states that “insurers cannot designate a product as 
microinsurance unless it considers that the product satisfied the following criteria: (1) target at low-
income households; (2) affordable for low-income households and (3) accessible to low-income 
households” (NIC, 2011:3). It also requires insurers to make microinsurance contract very simple 
to understand with less legalese and no or few exceptions. It further requires claims to be dealt 
with expeditiously within 7 to 10 days (NIC, 2011). The operational definition of microinsurance in 
this study takes from both Churchill (2007) and NIC (2011). 
From the early 2000s, the NIC begun to address the institutional and market barriers relating to the 
demand for and supply of microinsurance. The demand barriers have been identified as negative 
perception about insurers, lack of knowledge about how insurance works and affordability (Bendig 
et al., 2009; Steiner & Giesbert, 2010; Finmark Trust, 2010; Owusu et al., 2012; Ackah & Owusu, 
2012). The NIC together with other stakeholders has instituted a national insurance literacy 
campaign to resolve some of these barriers to the uptake of microinsurance services.  
On the supply side, the Commission has reviewed its microinsurance policy by removing certain 
restrictions in order to incentivize formal insurance companies to enter the microinsurance market. 
For instance, formal insurance firms do not need approval before rolling out a microinsurance 
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product, but the product needs to be filed with the Commission (NIC, 2011). This is intended to 
reduce the time and cost that formal insurers incur in getting product approval. It is also intended to 
encourage insurers to direct attention to the lower end of the market. In addition the NIC, with 
technical support from the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), has 
trained insurers on the benefits of the microinsurance market and how to adopt cost effective ways 
to enter and stay profitable in the microinsurance market.  
Through such policy facilitations many commercial insurers have shown increased interest in 
getting further involved in microinsurance provision (Buabeng & Gruijters, 2012). As at July 2012 
11 insurers comprising 8 life and 3 non-life insurance companies have rolled out 16 microinsurance 
schemes across the rural and urban areas of the country (NIC & GIZ, 2012; Buabeng & Gruijters, 
2012). These schemes covered a total of 66 241 policyholders in 2010 and 1 259 055 in 2011, 
indicating a whopping percentage growth of more than 1 800 percent (Buabeng & Gruijters, 2012). 
The product portfolio of the market is dominated by health, savings-linked and funeral/term life 
policies. Other policies are drought index, credit-linked and property policies. Term life, also called 
a funeral policy, is the most patronized product with a total of 319 244 policies covering more than 
half a million policyholders. Credit-linked products, which indemnify a borrower against an 
outstanding loan amount, are the second most patronized schemes, with coverage of more than 
400 000 policyholders. Though the country is predominantly agrarian, the agricultural schemes 
have the lowest number of policies covering a little more than 3 000 farmers.  
In 2011, the microinsurance sector’s annual premium stood at GHS11 703 488. The savings-linked 
or endowment products have about 80 percent share of the premiums paid, making it the largest 
scheme in terms of financial value. This may be explained by the scheme’s features which allow 
the insurable loss to be covered and also provide a savings component for the insured. More than 
GHS4 million valid claims were paid to various policyholders most of whom were traders whose 
goods were destroyed by fire in some market centres in the country. Table 2.6 presents the types 
of microinsurance products on the market, the number of policies, number of insured persons, 
premiums and claims paid.  
Table 2.6: Market Indicators of the Microinsurance Sector, 2011 
Product No. of  No. of No. of Premiums Claims 
 Products Policies Policyholders (GHS)  (GHS)  
Funeral/Term Life 4 319 244 626 582  903 169  269 121  
Savings-linked/endow 7 106 461 130 346  9 255 396  3 935 629 
Credit-linked 3 257 507 497 197 1 206 135 158 341 
Agricultural 1 10 3 073 36 209  0 
Property 1 1 857 1 857 302 579 58 403 
Total 16 685 078 1 259 055 11 703 488 4 421 494 
Source: Buabeng and Gruijters, 2012; NIC and GIZ, 2012. 
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2.3.2. Examples of Microinsurance Providers 
This section provides a review of the major providers of microinsurance services and their 
products. Examples of the major providers are: Gemini Life Insurance Company (GLICO), 
MicroEnsure, SIC Life, Star Life, Ghana Agricultural Insurance Program (GAIP) (see Table 2.7).  
GLICO’s Anidaso9 Policy10 
The Anidaso insurance policy was developed by Gemini Life Insurance Company (GLICO) with 
technical assistance from CARE International in 2003 to meet the insurance needs of low-income 
earners. The policy is a term insurance plan and it is offered as a joint product with the Edwa 
Nkosuo11 product. The Anidaso policy and the Edwa Nkosuo product together provide a savings 
avenue and insurance protection for low-income households and SMEs at very affordable 
premiums.  
Table 2.7: Microinsurance Products 
 Insurer Microinsurance Product Class of Policy 
GLICO Anidaso Life, Family Life, Endowment,  
  Hospital Cash, Children’s Education 
Donewell Insurance Edwadifu Life, Savings-linked 
 Ahobanbo 
SIC Life Sika Plan Life, Savings-linked, Funeral 
Star Life Assurance Various Life, Health, Funeral, Property 
Vanguard Insurance Shop Owner’s Property, Goods in Transit 
 Policy 
Ghana Agricultural Drought-Index Crop insurance, Food Chain Policy  
Insurance Pool 
Credit Unions Life Savings Life 
  
 
The Anidaso Policy can be taken out as a stand-alone policy or together with the savings benefit. It 
covers the life of the policyholder and his/her immediate dependents such as a spouse. Other 
benefits of the policy include hospitalization income, accident and disability benefit. The product is 
sold by GLICO in partnership with 26 rural and community banks (RCBs) and a number of 
microfinance firms in five administrative regions of Ghana. The distribution partnership with RCBs 
and MFIs has helped the company to increase the number of its policyholders by 471 percent, from 
14 000 in 2005 to 80 000 in 2009.  
                                               
9
 Anidaso means hope. 
10
 http://www.glicolife.com 
11
 Edwa Nkosuo means successful market.  
Source: Adapted from Wiedmaier-Pfister and McCord, 2009. 
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MicroEnsure Products12 
MicroEnsure is a USA based microinsurance intermediary which has partnered certain local 
insurers to provide affordable insurance services to SMEs and low-income households. 
Established in 2005, it is now operating in Ghana, Kenya and Tanzania. Among others it offers the 
Obra Pa, Tigo Family Care, savings-linked and Package policies. The Obra Pa policy covers credit 
life, fire, flood and property loss. The Tigo Family Care policy extends free life cover to subscribers 
of Tigo13 depending on the amount of airtime used within a month.  
In addition to the airtime usage, policyholders desiring to enjoy extra benefits under the life cover 
are required to pay GHS1 per month as insurance premiums. The savings-linked policy provides 
free life cover to a depositor who saves a minimum of US$25 per month in designated banks or 
microfinance firms. The life cover benefit increases with the level of savings made over a specified 
period. The Package policy combines a number of products to meet a specific need. It covers all 
the benefits under the Obra Pa policy in addition to funeral, health and disability into a single ‘care’ 
policy. This reduces clients’ subscription cost and facilitates easier administration. 
The Star Microinsurance Products 
Star Life Assurance has established a subsidiary called Star Microinsurance Services Limited 
which is dedicated to the provision of only microinsurance services to the informal sector and low-
income households. It offers investment and funeral policy, micro-health plan, childcare plan, 
abusua nkyemfa14, banc assurance, uni-mobile, savings-linked and credit protection plan. The uni-
mobile is a life policy sold in partnership with a commercial bank (Unibank Limited) and a mobile 
phone company (Airtel Limited). It is an innovative product that allows clients to use mobile phones 
to pay insurance premiums, make bank deposits, transfer money and top-up mobile phone credit15. 
Star Microinsurance Services Limited distributes its products in partnership with 25 rural banks, 6 
microfinance companies, 35 savings and loans companies, 11 direct market agencies and on the 
extensive platform of Ghana Post Company. It has also partnered the Ghana Cooperative of Susu 
Collectors Association (GCSCA) to provide microinsurance products to GCSCA’s members16. 
The Drought Index Product 
This product indemnifies crop farmers and other entities in the crop production chain against crop 
failure due to drought experienced during a cropping cycle. It is intended to empower smallholder 
farmers to overcome crop failure and financial consequences of drought and erratic rainfall 
patterns (Appenteng-Mensah & Gille, 2012). The product was introduced in 2011 by the Ghana 
Agricultural Insurance Programme (GAIP) for maize farmers in the three northern regions of 
                                               
12
 http://www.microensure.com 
13
 Tigo is a mobile telecommunications provider. 
14
 Abusua nkyemfa is a local parlance which translates as contribution for the wellbeing of the family  
15
 (www.starmicroinsurance.gh.com) 
16
 (www.starmicroinsurance.gh.com) 
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Ghana. Since drought is a covariant risk, it can destroy several hectares of crops owned by many 
farmers. This widespread impact of drought makes it financially difficult for a single insurer to 
insure farmers against drought. In order to overcome this, GAIP put together a pool of 19 non-life 
insurers to underwrite this product. The underwriters group, known as the Technical Management 
Unit (TMU), operates under the auspices of the Ghana Insurers Association (GIA) to underwrite the 
drought index product (NIC, 2011).  
As at the end of 2011, over 3 000 farmers with a total crop area of 5 045 acres had been insured 
under the drought index scheme (Appenteng-Mensah & Gille, 2012). In all a total premium of 
GHS36 000, translating into a total sum assured of GHS0.58 million, has been paid (Appenteng-
Mensah & Gille, 2012). The GAIP has expanded coverage of the product to the farming 
communities in six regions: Northern, Upper East, Upper West, Brong Ahafo, Ashanti and Eastern.  
The drought index product uses the level of rainfall measured at Ghana Meteorological Agency’s 
(GMet) weather stations as the basis to trigger claims pay-outs. As explained by Appenteng-
Mensah and Gille (2012) and GlobalAgRisk (2006), claims pay-outs are triggered if during the 
contract period there is a shortfall of the calibrated rainfall below a pre-determined threshold. For 
instance, from May to September 2012, the weather stations at Tamale and Pong Tamale 
recorded rainfalls which were below the contractual pre-defined thresholds (i.e. less than 2.5mm 
per day). This triggered a pay-out to 136 maize farmers in the Northern, Upper East and Upper 
West regions of the country (GNA, 2012).  
The area yield index insurance (AYII) is another agricultural microinsurance product which the 
GAIP is currently piloting in three districts in the Upper West region (Stutley, 2012). The AYII uses 
the average yield of a defined geographical area to indemnify the shortfall in crop yields (Stutley, 
2012). Unlike the drought index, the AYII provides extensive coverage of weather-related risks 
such as drought, excess rainfall or flooding, windstorms, pest and diseases as well as risks that 
affect crop yield at a district level (Appenteng-Mensah & Gille, 2012).       
The National Health Insurance Scheme17 
The National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) was started in 2003 by the government of Ghana to 
provide health insurance to all Ghanaians. It operates through 145 district mutual health insurance 
schemes. Each district distributes its scheme at designated places in rural and urban areas 
through registered agents and scheme officers who call at homes and work places to register and 
collect premiums from policyholders. It has over 5 000 service providers which are drawn from 
public and private hospitals, clinics and pharmacies. For beneficiaries to access health care they 
                                               
17
 According to the operational definition of microinsurance by the NIC and as adopted in this study, only the 
information on the informal sector clients of the NHIS is covered in this study.  
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are required to follow the “gate-keeper system”, that is, to first report to a primary care facility, and 
subsequently to the second and third levels of health care by way of referral (NHIA, 2010).  
The scheme is funded by a combination of VAT levy and compulsory monthly premiums from the 
social security contributions of formal sector workers. This entitles formal sector workers access to 
the scheme upon registration. Informal sector workers are however not bound to join the scheme, 
but may do so voluntarily after paying the required premiums which range from GHS12 to GHS15 
(US$6 to US$7.5) per person yearly (Matul et al., 2010). Currently, about 66 percent of the 
population has signed up for this scheme, of which 29.2 percent (4.5 million) are from the informal 
sector (NHIS, 2010). Persons below 18 years, the aged (above 70 years), pensioners under the 
Social Security and National Insurance Trust (SSNIT) and indigents are exempted from paying 
premiums under the scheme, but they are required to pay a registration fee of GHS5.00 (US$2.00) 
per annum. Tables 2.8 and 2.9 provide summary statistics of the scheme.  
With increasing coverage, health services utilization has also grown, averaging two visits per head 
per year for insured persons, compared to the national level estimated at 0.5 (Matul et al., 2010). 
Indeed, by removing the out-of-pocket expenditures on health, the NHIS has improved access to 
professional health care facilities and skilled birth attendants.  
Table 2.8: Summary Statistics of the NHIS, 2010 
Members/Items Numbers 
Schemes in Operation 145 
Total Registered Members (% of Population) 66.4% 
Active Members as % of Total Registered Members 80.6% 
Medical Conditions Covered 95% 
Number of Service Providers Over 5 000 
Source: The Ghana National Health Insurance Authority, 2010. 
Table 2.9: Groups and Percentage of Registered Members, 2010 
Category Number Registered Percentage (%) 
Informal Adult 4 546 059 29.2 
Aged (≥70 years) 1 006 529  6.5 
Under 18 years 7 604 324 48.9 
SSNIT Contributors    915 924   5.9 
SSNIT Pensioners      81 604   0.5 
Indigents    350 035   2.3 
Expectant Mothers 1 051 41   6.7 
Source: The Ghana National Health Insurance Authority, 2010. 
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2.3.3. Microinsurance Distribution Model 
The most significant issue for the achievement of sustainable expansion in microinsurance 
services is proper distribution which ensures that microinsurance products reach the target market 
in a cost effective manner (McCord, 2012). Microinsurance distribution is not just sales, but careful 
management of clients’ trust and expectation levels, and delivery of products that meet the specific 
socio-economic circumstances of the clients. As noted by Helms (2006), the distribution model 
must address (1) scale – increasing financial access to a greater percentage of the population; (2) 
depth – reaching both the urban and rural poor in remote locations; (3) cost – lowering transaction 
costs through technology. In addition, claims must be assessed, approved if valid and paid very 
timeously (Steinmann, 2012).  
Achieving scale, depth and cost effectiveness by selling many “tiny” policies to millions of 
prospective clients spread across large geographical areas is mostly beyond the existing branch 
network and cost structures of most traditional insurance firms (Steinmann, 2012). In order to 
overcome this hurdle most insurers have adopted four main models for the distribution of 
microinsurance products: partner-agent model, nodal societies, direct sales agents and telecom 
operators.  
Under the partner-agent model, commercial insurers enter into partnerships with rural and 
community banks as well as microfinance institutions for the delivery of microinsurance products to 
the target communities (McCord, 2006). The benefits to an insurer under this model include easy 
access to an existing client base otherwise difficult to reach, easy access to infrastructure such as 
a client information database, and increased access points and physical footprint (Angove et al., 
2012). The delivery partner is usually responsible for the day-to-day business activities such as 
sales, premium collections, claims processing and settlement and timely communication with 
policyholders (Steinmann, 2012). The partner-agent model is the most widely used distribution 
channel in Ghana with more than 300 000 policies currently being managed under it. Some 
providers who are using this model have increased their market shares and are beginning to reap 
the benefits of economies of scale.  
Under the nodal societies model insurers deliver the microinsurance services through mutual 
organizations such as churches, market women associations and civil societies such as 
community-based organizations (CBOs) and NGOs (Guha-Khasnobis & Ahuja (2004). Being 
member-based, nodal societies exert peer influence and group monitoring which are essential for 
the reduction of moral hazards, adverse selection and fraud associated with microinsurance 
demand. Nodal societies also help to reduce transaction costs by making bulk payments of 
premiums on behalf of members as well as the speedy determination and settlement of valid 
claims.  
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The direct sales agents are a specialized staff of insurers who have set up sales points at various 
destinations, especially in market centres, to market microinsurance products. These micro-agents 
deal directly with the clients in all stages of the distribution such as product delivery, premium 
collections and claims settlements. The susu concept is the usual mode of collecting the insurance 
premiums.  
Another model in practice and which can be referred to as “mobile microinsurance”, is where 
mobile telecommunication organisations partner insurance firms to make microinsurance 
accessible to their subscribers. This relatively new model has revolutionized the distribution of 
microinsurance by increasing access in a very quick manner, and this has boosted the efforts of 
stakeholders to increase microinsurance access. The technology allows insurers to sell, collect 
premiums and effect claims payments.  This has reduced the high overhead costs usually 
associated with the underwriting of several thousands of small policies. For example, Tigo and 
Airtel mobile telecommunications are in partnership with MicroEnsure and Star Microinsurance 
respectively to reach low-income households. Figure 2.1 illustrates the conceptual framework of 
the distribution models in Ghana, and Table 2.10 presents the different distribution channels of 
microinsurance companies in Ghana and the level of outreach in terms of policies sold. 
 
Figure 2.2: Microinsurance Distribution Models 
Source: Author’s Design. 
 
microinsurance company 
Partner-agent, eg. RCBs, MFIs customers 
Nodal societies eg. churches mutual members 
Telecoms eg. Tigo, Airtel subscribers 
Direct Sales Agents policyholders  
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Table 2.10: Distribution Models and Policies Sold, 2011 
Distribution Models Total Policies Distributed 
Direct Sales (Company Agents)  24 668 
RCBs and MFIs 343 243 
Telecoms Providers 302 194 
Nodal Societies: 
 Churches 13 116 
 Others  1 857 
Source: Buabeng and Gruijters, 2012; NIC, 2012. 
2.3.4. Challenges of the Microinsurance Sector 
The NIC’s microinsurance strategy being implemented through the down-scaling concept has 
increased the scale and outreach of microinsurance to more than 1 million lives, nevertheless, the 
down-scaling concept does not promote policyholders’ input into product design nor their 
involvement in the governance and risk management structures of the schemes. This situation may 
create mistrust in insurers by prospective policyholders.  
Another challenge of the sector is lack of sufficient knowledge about how the risk pooling concept 
of microinsurance works. Difficulty in understanding this concept and its implications creates the 
misconception that microinsurance and bank savings are the same. This situation, which can 
obscure the true value of microinsurance, according to Baidoo and Buss (2012:90) “is further 
exacerbated by the inability of some agents to explain policy terms and conditions to prospective 
clients”. Indeed the 2010 FINSCOPE Household Survey of Ghana reports the obstacles to the 
demand for insurance services as lack of knowledge about how insurance works, the perception 
that risks are by providence and lack of trust in insurers (Finmark Trust, 2010). 
Currently the sector is not covered by the Insurance Law, Act 724 (2006). This lack of legislative 
backing has restricted the entry of more insurers into the microinsurance market. It is however 
noteworthy that the NIC has prepared a transitional framework and market guidelines to streamline 
the activities of the sector. It has also incorporated it in the proposed amendments to the insurance 
law. 
The sector is also challenged by certain market abuses such as moral hazards, adverse selection 
and fraud. These abuses can render an insurer insolvent and destroy the already low confidence 
that the public has in insurance services. Adverse selection and moral hazards can be controlled 
through due diligence and screening during the underwriting process, co-payments and 
deductibles and waiting periods (Roth & McCord, 2008). 
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2.4. CONCLUSION 
This review has highlighted some stylized facts and current trends of the Ghanaian insurance 
industry with particular focus on the microinsurance sector. The review shows that although the 
microinsurance sector is at the teething stage, it has recorded impressive growth with about one 
million lives insured under different policies. Recognizing its immense potential to facilitate 
insurance inclusiveness to the informal economy, the NIC has initiated a policy amendment to 
provide legislative backing to it.  
The major challenges of the microinsurance sector are how to achieve large scale expansion in a 
cost effective manner, low levels of insurance literacy, the negative perception that risks are by 
fate, and lack of trust in insurers.  
Challenges surrounding the determination and payments of valid claims on time have also 
undermined the growth of the microinsurance sector. Microinsurance can add more to household 
welfare if the delicate issues concerning claims determination and payment are handled very 
timeously as stipulated in the market guidelines by the NIC. Judging from the economic 
background of the policyholders, every single pesewa is valued dearly, hence any administrative 
process that unduly delays the settlement of valid claims may undermine the positive impacts of 
microinsurance on welfare. For example, in an emergency situation, microinsurance can prevent 
asset loss and emergency borrowing if valid claims are paid expeditiously.  
Addressing the thorny issues surrounding insurance claims will also correct the negative 
perception that the public has about insurers. Appropriate market education targeted at the 
informal economy and risk-based supervision of insurers by the NIC can help to resolve some of 
these challenges. 
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CHAPTER 3  
THE IMPACT OF MICROINSURANCE ON HOUSEHOLD ASSET 
ACCUMULATION IN GHANA: AN ASSET INDEX APPROACH18 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
The first of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) is to halve extreme poverty and famine 
across the world by the year 2015 (UN, 2010). Although the target period is just one year many 
developing nations are far off-track in achieving this objective. One major cause for this is that 
millions of the citizens of such countries do not have sufficient insurance cover and thus are very 
susceptible to the financial consequences of manifold risks such as illness, unemployment and old 
age (Loewe, 2006; Binnendijk et al., 2012).  
Risks impede the capacity of poor people from breaking the vicious cycle of poverty (Guha-
Khasnobis & Ahuja, 2004). According to Churchill (2007:402), “poverty and vulnerability reinforce 
each other in an escalating downward spiral”. Microinsurance can help the poor to deal with risk 
effectively by reducing uncertainties associated with losses (Brown and Churchill, 1999). It fulfills 
the needs of those previously excluded from formal insurance coverage by protecting them against 
the financial consequences of life-cycle risks (Dror & Jacquier, 1999). By insuring households 
against future welfare losses, microinsurance helps in the reduction of vulnerability and poverty.  
According to Dercon (2003), insurance removes the risk of worsening poverty or poverty traps. 
Unlike bank credit, microinsurance may not necessarily lead to the direct acquisitions of more 
assets, however, in the absence of microinsurance households may lose critical assets to risks. 
Thus one may assume that microinsurance facilitates stability and steady growth of household 
assets through the prevention of asset loss and the release of available savings for the acquisition 
of essential assets.  
However the available evidence about the impact of microinsurance on household asset retention 
and accumulation is inconclusive. Whereas some studies discovered that microinsurance leads to 
counterintuitive tendencies such as moral hazard and adverse selection among microenterprises 
(Giné & Yang, 2009; Giesbert et al., 2011), others argue that microinsurance facilitates 
microenterprises’ investments into high yielding projects which improve their productivity and 
welfare (Nicola, 2011). Also the experience of Europe and America shows a positive relationship 
between insurance, savings levels and economic well-being (Starr-McCluer, 1996; Guariglia & 
                                               
18
 This paper has been published in the Geneva Papers on Risk and Insurance-Issues and Practice, (2014) 
39, 304–321. doi:10.1057/gpp.2014.6. An extract from this paper was also presented at the Economic 
Society of South Africa Biennial Conference, 25-27 September, 2013, University of the Free State, 
Bloemfontein, South Africa. 
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Rossi, 2004), but that of some Asian countries is said to be negative (Cheung & Padieu, 2011; Hsu 
et al., 2011). The inconclusive empirical evidence from the various regions of the world and the 
many gaps in the existing literature calls for a very rigorous country-specific study that will test the 
real impacts of microinsurance on households’ welfare.  
This study provides new evidence by examining the impact of microinsurance on asset 
accumulation of low-income households in Ghana. In particular we ask: can microinsurance 
prevent asset loss and thus lead to asset accumulation among low-income households? Some 
microinsurance services have been operating in Ghana for the last decade, but the question of 
whether they have led to asset accumulation and enhanced welfare gains of households 
concerned, mostly in the informal sector, is largely unresearched. More importantly, when 
juxtaposed with the poverty situation in Ghana, it is imperative to ascertain whether the intervention 
of microinsurance schemes have helped in increasing welfare of beneficiaries. In this study we 
show that microinsurance can have a positive influence on households’ asset accumulation and 
hence improves welfare. 
We examine this research question by creating a composite asset index as a measure of 
household welfare. The use of the asset-index is not a novelty, it has been used quite extensively 
in the mainstream poverty or welfare literature to measure country-level poverty reduction efforts 
(e.g. see Sahn & Stifel, 2000; Booysen et al., 2008; Njong & Ningaye, 2008; Echevin, 2011; Filmer 
& Scott, 2012; Harttgen et al., 2013). The missing link in both the microinsurance and the 
mainstream welfare literature is this: the microinsurance literature has so far not used asset index 
as a measure of households’ welfare19 and the mainstream welfare literature has not assessed the 
effects of microinsurance usage on households’ asset index. Practically, using household assets 
instead of income or expenditure to measure welfare levels is more accurate and reliable. The 
measurement of the income of households in the informal sector is hindered by seasonality, recall 
bias and households’ reluctance to divulge sensitive information concerning their income and 
expenditure levels. Yet it is much easier for households to provide correct answers on asset 
ownership questions such as whether the household has radio, television, piped water, electricity 
etc. Thus the use of assets to measure welfare helps us to overcome the challenges associated 
with accurate measurement of income and expenditure.   
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: the relevant literature is reviewed in section 3.1; 
section 3.2 provides a brief overview of the microinsurance industry in Ghana; section 3.3 
describes the methodology; section 3.4 discusses the results and section 3.5 provides conclusions 
and policy recommendations. 
                                               
19
 Janzen and Carter (2013) created a non-livestock index and used it as an independent variable to 
estimate the impact of microinsurance on risk coping strategies of households in Kenya. The difference is 
that we are using the asset index as the dependent variable in our analysis.  
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3.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
3.2.1. The Theory of Insurance 
The economic theory of insurance is based on the expected utility theory advanced by Von 
Neumann-Morgenstern. This theory assumes that the utility of a person is a concave function of 
wealth. This implies that risk averse individuals have a diminishing marginal utility of wealth (Frank, 
2004) and so they buy insurance product in order to replace the uncertainty of incurring large 
financial loss (in the event of a shock) with the certainty of making regular premium payments 
(Mossin, 1968; Brown & Churchill, 1999). Thus insurance enables individuals to transfer risk from a 
state of uncertainty to another state of certainty.  
It is however argued by psychologists that the risk transfer principle of insurance does not reflect 
actual behaviour because individuals actually seek for the risk of no loss at all, instead of the 
certainty of paying insurance premiums (Nyman, 1998). Therefore the reason people buy 
insurance is not to transfer risk, but as argued by Nyman (1998) to obtain extra income if the 
insurable loss occurs. 
Despite the seemingly disagreements regarding the motive for insurance demand, the end effect of 
the two strands of the insurance theory indicates that insurance can increase welfare by preventing 
asset loss. The implication of these theories for low-income households – the target market of 
microinsurance – is that they may benefit from insurance in two ways: (1) by replacing the 
uncertainty of future loss with the certainty of paying small premiums; and (2) make a claim on 
additional income when the insurable risk occurs. As to whether this theoretical implication 
manifest in the lives of insured households is a matter of an empirical test.    
3.2.2. Empirical Literature 
The growth and development of the microinsurance market is still at the nascent stage with very 
little research into its impact on households’ welfare. The few empirical studies about the 
microinsurance market in Ghana have tended to focus mainly on access to microinsurance rather 
than on the financial impact of microinsurance services. The evidence from other countries largely 
focused on micro health insurance (see Dong et al., 1999; Gruber & Yelowitz, 1999; Gumber, 
2001; Chou et al., 2004; Wagstaff & Pradhan, 2005; Dror et al., 2006).  
Summaries of the available literature have been compiled by De Bock and Ontiveros (2013) and 
Dercon et al. (2008). De Bock and Ontiveros’s compilation reveals three strands of literature about 
the impact of microinsurance on poor households. Whereas one group of researchers (Aggarwal, 
2010; Fitzpatrick et al., 2011; Mahal et al., 2013; Binagwaho et al., 2012) provides evidence of 
improved health and beneficial socio-economic impacts of microinsurance on poor households, 
others such as Gnawali et al. (2009) indicate otherwise. The third group of authors (Gumber, 2001; 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
35 
 
 
Smith & Sulzbach, 2008; Wagstaff et al., 2009; Lei & Lin, 2009; Dercon et al., 2012) report either 
mixed results or no effect at all.  
Dercon et al. (2008) explained that microinsurance services have a direct impact on the ex-post 
and ex-ante behaviours and decisions of households. Its positive effects on ex-post risk coping 
strategies enables individuals and small business entities to maintain a stable consumption pattern 
and avoid asset loss. Dercon et al. (2008:8) further assert that “the impact of microinsurance on 
consumption, assets or other dimensions of welfare (such as health, nutrition, school enrolment) is 
a useful indicator to investigate the role of microinsurance in allowing individuals to avoid further 
poverty and hardship”. 
Wagstaff and Pradhan (2005) investigated the impact of health insurance on health outcomes, 
health care utilization and non-medical consumption expenditure for households in Vietnam. The 
results of their study revealed a positive influence of health insurance on height-for-age and 
weight-for-age of young school children. They also showed that micro health insurance has led to a 
rise in households’ consumption of non-medical services and goods. The study further indicates a 
decrease in precautionary savings meant for out-of-pocket health expenditures. 
Janzen and Carter (2013) employed difference-in-difference, matching, Heckman sample selection 
and instrumental variables techniques to evaluate the impacts of microinsurance on households’ 
asset accumulation and human capital investments in Kenya. Their findings indicate: (1) insured 
households are about 50 percent less likely to sell off livestock to cope with severe drought; (2) the 
insured households are about 36 percent less likely to forgo food as a coping strategy. This 
reduces the incidence of malnourishment among insured households; and (3) insured households 
are about 50 percent less dependent on food aid and external support. They concluded that 
microinsurance protects households against the liquidation of productive assets and reduction of 
meals. Thus microinsurance reduces the tendency of engaging in harmful behaviours which have 
long-term adverse consequences on wealth and human capital development. 
Mosley (2009) reports that microinsurance improves clients’ loan repayment rates and has a direct 
impact on physical and human capital expenditures. That is, since the microinsured rely less on 
emergency borrowing, their expenditure levels are more predictable and reliable. Evidence 
provided by Levine and Polimeni (2012) and Dercon et al. (2008) confirm Mosley’s findings that 
microinsurance reduces emergency borrowing.        
With the aid of ordinal probit regression, Morsink et al. (2011) analysed the impact of 
microinsurance on 215 households in the Philippines. Their findings indicate that microinsurance 
reduces vulnerability and lowers the households’ probability of falling into a poverty trap. Similarly, 
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Hamid et al. (2010) argue that microinsurance has a significant impact on household food 
sufficiency.  
As a result of the stability in income flow and expenditure alluded to by Mosley, clients of (micro) 
insurance are theoretically expected to save more than those without coverage. Although Hsu et 
al. (2011) agree to this theoretical foundation of a positive impact of insurance on saving, they 
disagree with it on the basis of contrary empirical evidence. Specifically, Hsu et al. (2011) argued 
that in countries where the social welfare system is small, households covered by insurance save 
less than those without coverage.  
Another study from the Asian region, specifically on China by Cheung and Padieu (2011) confirms 
the results of Hsu et al (2011). In particular, Cheung and Padieu (2011) posit that even though 
health insurance may facilitate household consumption, it reduces savings. They also claim that 
health insurance does not have a significant impact on poverty reduction.  
However, other empirical studies from the West, especially in the USA and UK, have provided 
evidence which contradicts that of the Asian region. For instance, Starr-McCluer (1996) showed 
that households in the USA who have taken health insurance policies save more than those 
without coverage. This finding has been supported by Guariglia and Rossi (2004) in a similar study 
of the UK insurance market. 
Even though the literature suggests that microinsurance may have positive impacts on low-income 
households, there are clearly significant gaps in the existing literature. Important questions have 
not been answered, especially questions regarding how microinsurance is used by low-income 
earners to protect their assets against financial shocks have not been dealt with. 
3.3. OVERVIEW OF THE MICROINSURANCE INDUSTRY OF GHANA 
Ghana has performed relatively well in the fight against extreme poverty. The percentage of people 
living on less than US$1.25 a day declined from 51.7 percent in 1991 to 28.5 percent in 2006 
(GSS, 2008). The most recent living standards survey reports of a further decline in the poverty 
rate to 24.2 percent (GSS, 2014). Nevertheless, poverty is still widespread, with an estimated 10.6 
percent of urban and 37.9 percent of rural dwellers living below the poverty line (GSS, 2014; 
UNDP, 2011). Also, the rates of poverty of the three northern regions and rural areas within the 
savannah belt are above the national average.  
Among the efforts to accelerate the reduction of poverty to the minimum level is the rolling out of 
microinsurance schemes by the government and private insurers. Microinsurance is the provision 
of insurance services to low-income households mostly living and working in the informal sector. It 
covers low-income persons against specific risks in exchange for premium payments. Most of the 
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microinsurance schemes on the Ghanaian markets are provided by subsidiaries/agencies of 
commercial insurance companies in partnership with microfinance institutions to low-income 
households. The difference between the microinsurance schemes and the “formal” insurance 
services is the structure of the premium payments, levels of premiums, distribution channels and 
the target market. The premium payment is structured according to the traditional susu20 
mechanism, under which the insurance agents undertake regular visits (say three times a week) to 
the work place or house of the policyholders to collect the premiums.  Although the premiums are 
in proportion to the probability and cost of the risk involved, they are relatively affordable, ranging 
from GHS1.00 to GHS10.00 (US$0.33 to US$3.33) per month. Another unique feature of the 
microinsurance schemes is its community based distributions channels through nodal agencies 
such as local churches, microfinance institutions, community or rural banks, NGOs and market 
women associations. The flexibility in the distribution and the premium payments is the backbone 
of the extension of microinsurance to low-income households. Table 3.1 presents the different 
distribution channels of microinsurance companies in Ghana and the level of outreach in terms of 
policies sold (Buabeng & Gruijters, 2012). 
Table 3.1: Distribution Models and Policies Sold, 2011 
Distribution Models Total Policies Distributed 
Direct Sales (Company Agents) 24 668 
RCBs and MFIs 343 243 
Telecoms Providers 302 194 
Nodal Societies: 
 Churches  13 116 
 Others 1 857 
Source: Buabeng and Gruijters, 2012; NIC and GIZ, 2012. 
3.3.1. Examples of Private Microinsurance Schemes 
Through policy facilitation by the National Insurance Commission, many commercial insurers have 
shown increased interest in getting further involved in microinsurance provision. Some providers 
who have been able to partner with rural banks to provide the microinsurance services at the 
grassroots have increased their market shares and are beginning to reap the benefits of 
economies of scale. For instance, Gemini Life Insurance Company’s (GLICO) Anidaso21 Policy, 
which is distributed through 26 rural banks, has been able to expand its operations to five of the 
ten regions of Ghana. This has helped the company to increase the number of its policyholders by 
471 percent from 14 000 in 2005 to 80 000 in 2009.  
                                               
20 The regular contribution of smaller amounts of money towards a specified target. 
21
 Anidaso means hope. 
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The Anidaso Policy was developed by GLICO with technical assistance from CARE International in 
2003 to meet the insurance needs of low income earners. It is a term insurance plan and is offered 
as a joint product with the Edwa Nkosuo22 product. The Anidaso policy and the Edwa Nkosuo 
product together provide a savings avenue and insurance protection for low-income households 
and SMEs at very affordable premiums. The Anidaso Policy can be taken out as a stand-alone 
policy or together with the savings benefit. It covers the life of the policyholder and his/her 
immediate dependants such as spouse. Other benefits of the policy include hospitalization income, 
accident and disability benefits.  
MicroEnsure is acting as an agent of commercial insurance companies to provide microinsurance 
services to SMEs and the poor. Its main products are Obra Pa, Tigo Family Care and savings-
linked policies. The Obra Pa policy covers credit life, fire, flood and property loss. The Tigo23 
Family Care policy extends life microinsurance cover to subscribers of Tigo depending on the 
amount of airtime used within a month. In addition to the airtime usage, policyholders are required 
to pay GHS1 (US$0.33) per month for (optional) life cover. The savings-linked provides life cover 
to a depositor who saves a minimum of US$25 per month in specified banks/microfinance firms. 
The life cover benefits increases with the level of savings made over a specified period 
(www.microensure.com).  
The schemes which have been included in this study fall within at least two areas of our 
operational definition of microinsurance. That is, (1) the premiums are structured to meet the 
seasonal cash-flow of low-income households; (2) cost of premiums range from less than GHS1.00 
to GHS10.00 (UD$0.33 to UDS$3.33) per month; (3) the scheme is distributed very widely at the 
grassroots by churches, microfinance firms, NGOs and registered agents. 
3.4. THE METHODOLOGY 
3.4.1. The Data 
The nation-wide household data collected by Finmark Trust (FINSCOPE)24 with support from the 
World Bank and UKAid in 2010 was used for this study. One of the objectives of the survey is to 
aid researchers to undertake impact evaluation of financial services on the Ghanaian market 
(Finmark Trust, 2010). Stratified multi-stage random sampling comprising geographically 
enumerated areas (regions, urban and rural) and households were used by the survey. The survey 
adopted face-to-face interviews and questionnaires to gather the data from 3 643 households in 
Ghana. The survey collected comprehensive data about households’ demographic features, asset 
ownership, economic conditions, social backgrounds, access to public infrastructure, financial 
                                               
22
 Edwa Nkosuo means successful market.  
23
 Tigo is a mobile telecommunication company. 
24
 A plausible dataset would have been the GLSS, however the GLSS (as at the time of the research) did not 
have information on private microinsurance  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
39 
 
 
status, financial knowledge and risk management, perception about financial institutions and usage 
of financial products and remittances.  
In terms of access to financial services, the dataset can broadly be classified into three sectors: (1) 
access to formal financial services – notably commercial banks, stock market etc.; (2) access to 
other formal and informal financial services – microfinance, savings club, susu schemes, insurance 
companies, retail credit providers, remittance service providers; and (3) no access at all. For the 
purpose of this study we extracted the dataset concerning households in the informal and other 
formal sectors for the analysis. As a result 682 observations comprising 438 insured and 244 
uninsured households were extracted for the study. The 438 insured households is an aggregate 
of the products presented in Table 3.2. The ideal situation is to treat each microinsurance product 
separately in the regression estimation. However none of the products has the required 
observations to aid regression analysis appropriately. Nevertheless, the aggregation has no 
adverse effect on our analysis because the focus of the study is not on specific products, but rather 
on the comparison between insured and uninsured cohorts. 
Table 3.2: The Number of Insured Households 
Microinsurance Product  No. Observations 
Life  73 
Property 62 
Funeral and others 26 
Education 23 
Retirement and investment 19 
Health (private) 28 
Health (public; NHIS) 368 
Total* 599 
 
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2010 FINSCOPE Data of Ghana. 
 
3.4.2. The Profile and Characteristics of Households 
In order to be sure that we are dealing with households with relatively similar characteristics we 
present a chi-square test25 on the socio-economic characteristics for both insured and uninsured 
households. Whereas the insured has more access to the credit market, the uninsured receives 
more remittances. Also the insured appears to have a larger family size and has attained 
secondary educational level. Apart from these (credit, remittances, education), the trend observed 
                                               
25
 The chi-square test was used for the categorical variables while the t-test was used for the continuous 
variables.  
Note*: The total is more than the 438 insured households because some 
clients have more than one product.   
. 
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across the variables suggests that the insured and uninsured households are not significantly 
different from each other in terms of their characteristics, living conditions, economic activities and 
income levels. 
Table 3.3: Chi-Square Test on the Profile of Insured and Uninsured Households 
Variable Uninsured HH (%)
C
   Insured HH (%)
C
 Chi-Square (χ
2
.050) 
Resp. Age
T
 (mean years) 38.02 39.81  -1.7918 (0.0652) 
Resp. Gender            0.1014 (0.750)   
Male 47.13 48.40 
Female 52.87 51.60 
Resp. Marital Status          2.2049 (0.138) 
Married 51.65 57.57 
Others 48.35 42.43 
Resp. Education Level          8.4240 (0.015)** 
No formal Education 13.17 7.78 
Primary Education 45.27 40.96 
Secondary and above 41.56 51.26 
Household Income                                                                                    0.4930 (0.782) 
0 – GHS400 69.31 66.36 
GHS401 – GHS1000 24.87 26.97 
Above GHS1000 5.82 6.67 
HH Size
T
 (mean size) 3.418 4.004       -0.586 (0.0034)*** 
House Ownership           0.2135 (0.899) 
Rented 32.79 34.47 
Family Owned     48.36 46.80 
Occupied without payment 18.85 18.72 
Location             0.0023 (0.962) 
Urban 68.44 68.26 
Rural 31.56 31.74 
Economic Activity           0.3053 (0.581) 
Farming Enterprise 29.92 31.96 
Non-Farming Enterprises 70.08 68.04 
Proximity to Financial Inst          0.1176 (0.732) 
10 – 30 min. walk   69.23 67.62 
Above 30 min. walk 30.77 32.38 
Access to Credit            5.1651 (0.023)** 
Never borrowed 54.51 45.43 
Have Borrowed 45.49 54.57 
Remittances              7.4542 (0.006)*** 
Do not Receive Remittance 52.92 63.68 
Receives Remittances 47.08 36.32 
Note: *** and ** indicate 1 and 5 percent significance levels respectively; 
C 
indicates that the addition for each variable 
is by columns; 
T
 indicates T-test instead of Chi-square.  
 Source: Author’s computation based on the 2010 FINSCOPE Data of Ghana 
 
3.4.3. The Estimation Techniques 
The ideal empirical technique is to draw a comparison between a group of households’ assigned 
microinsurance “treatment” randomly and a control group lacking access to it (Janzen & Carter, 
2013). However microinsurance services are now ubiquitous in Ghana. Thus the fact that 
microinsurance products were not assigned randomly and their widespread nature limit our option 
of using a pure control group to evaluate the impact of microinsurance on households’ asset 
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accumulation. So the empirical framework in this study is confined to a sample population in which 
all households have access to microinsurance services, but where some households decided not 
to take up these services. The option to take up these services creates self-selection and 
endogeneity problems which can blur the actual impact of microinsurance, hence the estimation is 
done to account for selection bias issues by estimating Heckman sample selection and treatment 
effect models. 
3.4.3.1. The Heckman Sample Selection Model 
Heckman’s (1974, 1978 and 1979) model for sample selection has made essential contributions to 
the estimation of impact evaluations. The model which is designed for evaluating nonrandomized 
programs uses a two-step estimation approach to correct for participants’ self-selection bias and 
selection bias due to program placement (Heckman, 1979). These two-step equations are the 
selection equation and the outcome (regression) equation.   
In the first stage (the selection equation), we run a probit model for microinsurance on factors that 
determine the uptake of microinsurance. The probit function for microinsurance is a dummy 
variable which takes the value of one (1) if household i has taken up microinsurance and zero (0) 
otherwise. This is given as follows: 
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 =  {
1 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒                  
0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖 𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑎𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒    
     
                      3.1 
 
The first-step equation or the selection equation is thus given as:  
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖𝛿 +  𝜇𝑖                                                              3.2 
 
Where   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 = 1|𝑧𝑖) = Φ(𝑧𝑖𝛿)   and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 = 0|𝑧𝑖) = 1 − Φ(𝑧𝑖𝛿)    
 
Where 𝑧𝑖 is a vector of exogenous variables determining treatment (the uptake of microinsurance) 
and 𝚽(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function and 𝜇𝑖 is the error term. The 
inverse Mills ratio is then constructed from the estimated coefficients of the probit model. The 
inverse Mills ratio, also referred to as ‘hazard lambda’ or ‘control function’, controls for selection 
bias and accounts for the omitted variables or the unexplained variations in the error term. The 
inverse Mills ratio is given as:  
𝜆𝑖 =
𝜙(𝑧𝑖?̂?)
𝛷(𝑧𝑖?̂?)
                 3.3 
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Where 𝝀𝒊 is the inverse Mills ratio, 𝝓 is standard normal density function, and 𝚽 is as defined in the 
probit model above. In the second step, the outcome equation (that is, the impact of 
microinsurance on asset accumulation) is then estimated with the inverse Mills ratio as an 
additional independent variable (Lin, 2007; Janzen & Carter, 2013). 
𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 +  𝛽2𝜆𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖                                    3.4 
 
Where 𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 is the asset index, the error terms (µi and 𝜺𝒊) of both the selection and the outcome 
equations are bivariate normal with mean zero. 
3.4.3.2. The Treatment Effect Model 
In the treatment effect model a binary variable representing the treatment condition INSUREi that is 
INSUREi = 1 if household i is insured (received “treatment”) and INSUREi = 0 if household i is 
uninsured (not “treated”) is directly captured in the outcome equation and thus the outcome 
variable – the asset index – is observed for both the treated and the untreated. The selection and 
outcome models are specified in equations (5) and (6) respectively.  
𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖
∗ = 𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖 , 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒     3.5 
𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 +  𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖            3.6 
 
Where 𝜇𝑖 and 𝜀𝑖  are the error terms which are bivariate normal with zero mean. Since 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖, is 
an endogenous binary variable and given the assumption of sample selection, the impact 
evaluation under this model uses the observed features of households to estimate the parameters 
of β and also to account for selection bias due to non-ignorable placement of the insurance 
service. In order to obtain the regression models for the two regimes, the treated and the 
untreated, we substitute INSUREi in equation (3.6) with equation (3.5) as follows: 
When    𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 = 1: 𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + (𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖)𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖        3.7 
And when     𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖
∗ ≤ 0, 𝐼𝑁𝑆𝑈𝑅𝐸𝑖 = 0: 𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖            3.8 
 
This implies that for treated households the outcome equation is 𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + (𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖)𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 and 
for the untreated households the outcome equation is 𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖. These two equations are 
estimated in a two-step approach just like the Heckman model.   
3.4.3.3. The Instrumental Variable Model 
Although the Heckman sample selection and the treatment effects models may help us to control 
for selection bias, the uptake of microinsurance service may be influenced by certain unobserved 
features such as fear, motivation or entrepreneurial skills (Janzen & Carter, 2013). Hence we use 
instrumental variable (IV) model not only to capture the unobserved variables, but also to check the 
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consistency and the rigor of our estimates. As noted by Janzen and Carter (2013:10), the IV 
accounts for “endogenous insurance participation”. 
To address the challenge of endogeneity bias, the IV model demands the usage of an observed 
variable that is (1) correlated with the uptake of microinsurance; and (2) uncorrelated with the error 
term or the unobserved factors influencing asset accumulation. We selected three instruments, 
namely insurance identity card, proximity to insurance company and whether or not one has heard 
of an insurance product. The uptake of microinsurance is highly correlated with one’s knowledge 
about insurance (e.g. see Akotey et al., 2011) and the proximity to an insurance firm has the 
potential of reinforcing households’ awareness of microinsurance services. The insurance identity 
card is also a pre-requisite for all households intending to take up insurance, especially the health 
insurance scheme. Thus these three instruments have direct and substantial correlation with a 
decision to buy microinsurance, but with little or no association with asset accumulation.  
Following the theoretical exposition of Wooldridge (2002) about IV, we used these instruments to 
estimate the local average treatment effect of microinsurance on households’ asset index. Similar 
steps of the treatment effect model above and the IV’s two-stage least squares were used to obtain 
the estimations of the IV model.  
It is noteworthy that the analysis of impact evaluation involves the estimation of several models 
such as OLS, Heckman sample selection, treatment effect model and instrumental variables 
(direct-2SLS, IVprobit and probit_2SLS). However some of these have problems with bias and 
consistency. For instance, the OLS does not address the problems of selection and endogeneity 
biases. Though the instrumental variable model can deal with the problems of endogeneity bias, 
the IVprobit (a variant of the IV model) is designed to fit a model with a binary dependent variable 
and a continuous endogenous variable which is not the case in this study. Hence the estimates of 
the IVprobit were dropped. Therefore only the models that yield the most consistent and robust 
results have been reported. These are Heckman sample selection, treatment effect model and 
instrumental variable modelling (direct-2SLS and probit-2SLS)26 have been reported.   
3.4.4. The Construction of the Asset Index 
An asset index is a welfare composite indicator constructed from specific underlying households’ 
assets (Johnston & Abreu, 2013; Booysen et al., 2008). Hence, an asset index ASTi is a function of 
specific underlying variables (properties) Pij, such that Pij represents household i’s ownership or 
lack of asset/property j.  
𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 𝑓{𝑃𝑖𝑗}             3.9 
                                               
26
 The direct-2SLS was used to estimate the results of Chapters 3 and 6 while the probit-2SLS was used to 
estimate the results of Chapter 4. 
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This is expanded as: 𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖1 + 𝑃𝑖2 +  … + 𝑃𝑖𝑚             3.10 
 
Where Pij is a binary or categorical variable and takes the value 1 if household i owns asset j, and 
0 if otherwise. Following the methods of Benzecri (1973), van Kerm (1998), Booysen et al. (2008), 
Asselin (2009) and Echevin (2011), the weights of the individual assets were then computed using 
multiple correspondence analysis (MCA). The basic form of the asset index is given as: 
𝑎𝑖 =  ∑ 𝐹1𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 𝑑𝑘𝑖           3.11 
 
The ith household asset index is αi, dki is the kth value of the categorical variables (with k=1,…, K) 
indicating the households’ assets variables included in the index construction. F1k is the MCA 
weights generated for the analysis. The extended form of the asset index for this study is given as: 
𝐴𝑆𝑇𝑖 =  𝑃𝑖1𝑊1 + 𝑃𝑖2𝑊2 + ⋯ 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑊𝑗           3.12 
 
Where ASTi is the welfare composite index of household i, the response of household i to 
category/asset j is represented by Pij and Wj is the MCA weight for dimension one applied to 
category j (Booysen et al., 2008).  
3.4.5. Justification of the Control Variables 
3.4.5.1. Household Characteristics 
Personal characteristics of a household head and the living conditions of the household can 
influence the demand for microinsurance. In particular age is an important determining factor for 
the uptake of micro life insurance policies. As observed by Arun et al. (2012), older households 
increase their demand for life insurance in order to indemnify their family in the event of death. The 
effect of age on other types of microinsurance is however mixed. For instance, whereas Gaurav et 
al. (2011), Dercon (2011) and Jehu-Appiah (2011) have indicated that older persons are more 
likely to increase their demand for insurance schemes, Cole et al. (2013) found mixed results for 
selected villages in India. So we expect the age of the household head to have either a direct or 
indirect correlation with the uptake of microinsurance.  
Gender is also reported to have mixed effect on the demand for microinsurance. Jehu-Appiah et al. 
(2011) and Owusu et al. (2012) report from studies on Ghana that females are most likely to buy 
microinsurance products. This may be due to the fact that pregnancy and childbearing exposes 
females to more risks than males (Banthia et al., 2009). However, Schneider and Diop (2004), De 
Allegri et al. (2006) and Bonan et al. (2011) have indicated that males are more likely to demand 
microinsurance than females. Marriage has also been found to exert a positive influence on the 
demand for microinsurance as married couples tend to cover their children against socio-economic 
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risks. In addition the size of a household has been shown to increase the uptake of microinsurance 
(Chankova et al., 2008; Nketiah-Amponsah, 2009). 
Many empirical works have reported a positive link between level of education and microinsurance 
demand especially health insurance (Chankova et al. 2009; Brugiavini & Pace, 2011; Jehu-Appiah 
et al., 2011). However, Akotey et al. (2011) provide evidence that the level of education do not 
have a significant effect on microinsurance demand. They argue that one’s years of schooling is 
not enough to lead to the purchase of microinsurance, but rather one’s knowledge or awareness 
about microinsurance is the most vital factor for microinsurance demand. 
An individual’s level of income and wealth is expected to enhance the likelihood for microinsurance 
demand. For instance, Akotey et al. (2011) report that income has a positive significant influence 
on the demand for microinsurance. Similarly Bhat and Jain (2006), Hwang and Gao (2003), Jehu-
Appiah et al. (2011) and Nketiah-Amponsah (2009) have shown that income and wealth have 
positive correlation with insurance demand. 
In terms of asset accumulation, these personal characteristics: age, education, income and being 
married, are expected to have a positive correlation with increase stock of household assets. 
However, household size may lead to lower asset build up if many of the household members are 
dependents (especially children and elderly persons) and thus do not earn income. 
3.4.5.2. Risk Profiles  
According to the expected utility theory, the aversion for uncertain outcomes induce risk averse 
individuals to buy insurance to protect themselves against the uncertainty of incurring future 
financial losses. We thus expect the risk profiles of households to have a positive association with 
microinsurance demand. 
3.4.5.3. Interaction with the Financial Institutions 
Under this we look at the interactions between households and financial institutions especially 
insurance companies and how such interactions influence the demand for microinsurance. For 
instance, the proximity of households to a financial institution can enhance their awareness and 
knowledge about microinsurance schemes. This may thus lead to the take up of microinsurance 
services. Prospective policyholders are also required to provide certain documents as part of the 
conditions for buying microinsurance. The nature of such documentation and legal requirements 
can either enhance or discourage the demand for microinsurance. According to Dror and Jacquier 
(1999), the simplicity of the procedure for joining a microinsurance scheme and for making claims 
can enhance the purchase of microinsurance. Due to this the market guidelines of NIC (2011) 
requires microinsurance providers to make microinsurance contract very simple to understand with 
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less legalese and no or few exceptions. It further requires claims to be dealt with expeditiously 
within 7 to 10 days. 
Trust is also another interactive variable that can influence the perception of households about the 
ability of insurers to pay valid claims when the need arises. The trust that policyholders have in 
insurers, in the product itself and in peers (Patt et al., 2009) can have a great deal of influence on 
the uptake of microinsurance (De Allegri et al., 2006; Bhat & Jain, 2006; McCord, 2008; Akotey et 
al., 2011; Cole et al., 2011; Dercon et al., 2011). 
The price of microinsurance products is the most important variable that influences the decision of 
many low-income households to buy microinsurance. It has also been argued by several studies 
that the crucial aspects of price as far as microinsurance is concerned are affordability of premiums 
in terms of absolute levels and periodicity of payments (Dror & Jacquier, 1999; Churchill, 2007; 
Akotey et al., 2011). Therefore aligning insurance premiums payments with the uneven cash flow 
and relatively low income levels of households living and working in the informal sector can lead to 
high demand for microinsurance products.  
3.4.5.4. Trade Credit and Microcredit  
Trade credit allows households owning small enterprises such as petty traders and smallholder 
farmers to buy certain items including household assets on credit. On the other hand, microcredit is 
small loans given to households by microfinance institutions for the financing of household assets, 
consumption smoothing and for productive purposes. It is therefore expected that trade credit and 
microcredit can lead to the accumulation of more assets.  
3.4.5.5. Economic Activity 
The economic activities of low-income households can be categorised into farm-based and non-
farm based enterprises. The farm-based include smallholder farmers, fishmongers, fruits and 
vegetables sellers while the non-farm enterprises consist of dressmakers and tailors, carpenters, 
truck pushers, “head-porters”, chop-bar operators and provisions sellers. 
The GLSS VI (GSS, 2014) reports that the incidence of poverty is highest among households 
engaged in farm-based enterprises while those involved in non-farm businesses are less likely to 
be poor. It is thus expected that households engaged in farm-based enterprises may accumulate 
less assets than those involved in non-farm enterprises. They may however be able to achieve 
better food consumption smoothing since they are involved in subsistence farming. 
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3.4.5.6. Rural and Urban Locations 
Both the GLSS V and VI Reports (GSS, 2008 & 2014) indicate that poverty in Ghana is still a 
disproportionately rural phenomenon. It has also been argued severally that rural dwellers are 
unambiguously disadvantaged in terms of acquisition of critical assets for welfare enhancement 
(see e.g. Sahn & Stifel, 2003; Ravallion et al., 2007; Booysen et al., 2008; Echevin, 2011). It is 
therefore expected that rural households may have low level of assets, high asset inequality and 
poor smoothing of consumption. 
3.5. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS 
3.5.1. Test for Multicollinearity: Correlation Analysis 
The strength of relationship among the explanatory variables can influence the validity of the 
estimations. A correlation matrix is thus estimated to test for multicollinearity and the robustness of 
the regression results. The correlation matrix presented in Table 3.4 shows strong multicollinearity 
of 82 percent between private microinsurance and government microinsurance. Hence we have 
dropped the government microinsurance from the empirical analysis.  
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Table 3.4: Correlation Matrix 
Variables  AST  P.MI  G.MI  Marital   Age Gender   Edu    HH.Siz   HH.Siz≥15yrs   Income   Non-Farm   Tradecredit   Credit   Rural 
AST 1.00 
Private MI 0.10 1.00 
Gov’t MI 0.02 0.82 1.00 
Marital 0.07   -0.05   -0.05 1.00 
Age -0.11 0.09 0.06   -0.19  1.00 
Gender 0.05 0.02 0.04 0.09   -0.03 1.00 
Education 0.52 0.15 0.11 0.09   -0.19  -0.16 1.00 
HH.Siz   -0.22 0.11 0.11   -0.14  0.03 0.03  -0.19 1.00 
HH.Siz≥15yr    -0.03 0.06 0.04  -0.08  0.07 0.00  -0.09 0.71 1.00 
Income 0.12   -0.07    -0.09 0.17  -0.14 0.13 0.01 0.04 0.08  1.00 
Non-Farm 0.44    -0.06    -0.07 0.17  -0.20 0.17 0.22  -0.18  -0.08  0.14 1.00 
Tradecredit 0.13  -0.05   -0.09 0.05  -0.05 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.08  0.08 0.10 1.00 
Credit access  -0.01 0.10      0.11    -0.06      0.03       -0.08 0.06 0.03 0.01                              -0.11 -0.04  -0.26 1.00 
Rural -0.52 0.01      0.04    -0.07     -0.03       -0.07       -0.19 0.14  -0.01   -0.11 -0.34  -0.05  -0.07 1.00 
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2010 FINSCOPE data of Ghana 
Note: AST = Asset index; Private MI (P.MI) = Private micro-insurance; Gov’t MI (G.MI) = Government micro-insurance; Edu = education; HH.Siz = Household size.  
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3.5.2. The Summary Statistics 
Tables 3.5 and 3.6 respectively report the descriptive statistics and percentile distributions of the 
asset index. Although the uninsured households have higher maximum assets, their average asset 
holding (mean) is lower than that of insured households. Both households have a negatively 
skewed asset distribution, an indication that majority of the households have assets worth insuring. 
However, one group of households (the uninsured) chose not to take up the microinsurance 
policies offered. Some of the reasons underlying their inability to buy microinsurance policies (as 
captured by the survey) are: (1) inability to afford the premium payments; (2) lack of knowledge 
about how insurance functions; (3) no need for insurance since risk are destined by providence; 
and (4) lack of trust in insurers. 
Table 3.5: Descriptive Statistics of the Asset Index 
Statistic Insured Households  Uninsured Households  
Mean Asset Holdings
27
     2.8629 2.6777 
Skewness   -0.5783  -0.3953 
Kurtosis 2.6130 2.3310 
Standard Deviation 0.9774 1.0321 
Minimum  0.3197  0.0026 
Maximum  4.3930  4.4946 
Observations  438  244 
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2010 FINSCOPE dataset of Ghana. 
The percentile distribution indicates that the insured households at the bottom percentile levels 
(1% to 25%) have relatively more assets than the uninsured households. Both households’ asset 
holdings however converge at the top from the 90th to 99th percentile. 
Table 3.6: Percentile Distribution of the Asset Index 
Percentile   Insured Households  Uninsured Households  
Bottom Percentiles 
1%     0.5459  0.3714 
5%    0.9520 0.9027 
10% 1.2998 1.0402 
25% 2.2846 1.9644 
Medium Percentile 
50%     3.0253 2.8569 
Top Percentiles 
75%   3.5449 3.4357 
90%   4.0808 3.9559 
95% 4.2464 4.2464 
99% 4.3343 4.3343 
Source: Author’s computation using the 2010 FINSCOPE data of Ghana 
                                               
27
 The mean is the average units of physical assets owned by a household.  
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3.5.3. The Empirical Results  
The first step estimation to obtain the estimates for the inverse Mills ratio for the correction of 
sample bias is outlined in Table 3.7. The education level of the household head and family size has 
a significant positive effect on the uptake of microinsurance. A large family size may induce 
microinsurance uptake in order to avoid the tendency of drawing down on scarce savings to meet 
hospital bills and cope with other risks. Similarly, the two risk profile variables – threat to income 
and death of breadwinner – are positive and significant. This may imply that households who have 
experienced these risks in the past are most likely to take up microinsurance cover. Among the 
three potential instruments, proximity to financial institution (including insurance) is not statistically 
significant. It was therefore dropped, and insurance ID card and knowledge about insurance will be 
used for the IV estimation.     
Table 3.7: The Results of the Probit Model 
Microinsurance Coeff  Std. Error  P-Value 
HH Characteristics 
Marital -0.1517 0.1309 0.247 
HH Size 0.0783 0.0406  0.054* 
Age -0.0070 0.0233 0.765 
Age Square 0.0001 0.0002 0.759 
Male -0.0948 0.1256 0.451 
HH Income   0.0028 0.0015  0.062* 
Edu_Ref_No Formal Edu 
Primary Education                  -0.0826 0.2372 0.727 
Secondary Education 0.1078 0.2657 0.685 
Tertiary Education 0.4791 0.2674  0.073* 
Location_Ref_Urban 
Rural  -0.0551  0.1348 0.682 
Risk Profile 
Threat_Income  0.0207 0.0075     0.006*** 
Death_Breadwinner  0.0869 0.0328     0.008*** 
Interactions with 
Financial Institutions 
Knowledge_Insurance  0.4523 0.1413     0.001*** 
Insurance ID Card  1.9181 0.1361     0.000*** 
Cost (Premiums) -0.0432 0.0208    0.038** 
Requirement_Financial_Inst  0.0174 0.0229 0.446 
Proximity_Fin_Inst.  0.0105 0.0078  0.180 
Trust_Financial_Inst  0.0336 0.0328 0.305 
Constant -2.6937 0.7916     0.001*** 
Observations                            676 
Prob >Chi2                              0.000    Pseudo R-Sq.= 0.35 
Note: ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10 significance levels respectively. 
Source: Author’s computation based on 2010 FINSCOPE data of Ghana. 
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The detailed results of the three estimation techniques are presented in Table 3.8. Each model 
makes a unique contribution to the whole impact evaluation. They do not necessarily address the 
same issues, however their combined effects facilitate impact outcomes which are rigorous and 
resilient. For instance, the Heckman model resolves the problems of selection bias by using the 
observed variables of only the treatment group for the estimation. The treatment effect model 
moves the Heckman model further in two ways: (1) it accounts for selection bias through the 
inverse Mills ratio (hazard lambda); and (2) it undertakes the estimation for both the treatment and 
control groups simultaneously. The results show a statistically insignificant inverse Mills ratio 
(hazard lambda): an indication that the sample size does not suffer from selection bias. The result 
of the treatment effect model indicates a significant positive impact of microinsurance on 
household asset accumulation. This suggests that microinsurance may equip low-income 
households to prevent asset loss and thus accumulate more assets.  
Even though selection bias, as reported by the inverse Mills ratio (hazard lambda), is not 
associated with our sample and thus may not blur the findings, we still have cause for concern 
about crucial unobserved variables such as motivation, risk appetite and entrepreneurial passion 
which may influence the demand for microinsurance and its subsequent impacts. However, the 
Heckman and treatment effect models are not able to account for such situations. The IV corrects 
this shortcoming by capturing the essential unobserved variables and account for the endogeneity 
bias inherent in microinsurance uptake. The IV results indicate that microinsurance has a positive 
impact at the 5 percent significance level on households’ asset accumulation. That is, the insured 
households stand a better chance of preventing asset loss and thus increase their asset holdings 
by about 19 percent. 
All together these findings imply that having microinsurance cover reduces asset loss and 
enhances welfare. This is in line with the assumption that microinsurance prevents asset loss and 
promotes households’ asset growth and stability due to the indemnity under the insurance cover. 
As noted by Smith (1998), depletion of accumulated assets is the most likely first step to cope with 
life-cycle risks by people without insurance. However, under microinsurance cover, assets 
depletion is minimized or eliminated entirely. More importantly, microinsurance that covers the 
healthcare cost of households prevents asset pawning and liquidation of essential household 
assets at ‘give away’ prices. In other words, insurance policies, especially medical insurance, 
reduce the tendency of disposing off important household assets to raise money for medical 
treatment and care. Although this result confirms the findings of Janzen and Carter (2013), Morsink 
et al. (2011), Mosley (2009) and Wagstaff and Pradhan (2005), it contradicts that of Cheung and 
Padieu (2011). 
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Table 3.8: The Empirical Results
28
  
Variables     Heckman      Treatment     IV 
Microinsurance 0.0712 0.1843 0.1899 
 (0.338)  (0.048) ** (0.050)** 
Microcredit -0.0035  -0.0019 -0.0082 
 (0.951) (0.972) (0.887) 
Inv.Mills ratio  -0.0589 -0.0619 
 (0.333) (0.350) 
Not Married   -0.0938   -0.0981 -0.0935 
 (0.118)  (0.098)* (0.119) 
Education 0.1772  0.1775  0.1772 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
T_HH_Size -0.0605 -0.0610  -0.0614 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
HH Size≥15 0.0706  0.0731  0.0712 
 (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)***  
Resp.Age  -0.0076 -0.0078  -0.0072 
 (0.495) (0.482) (0.520) 
Resp.Age Sq 0.0001 0.0000   0.0001 
 (0.446) (0.430) (0.469) 
Male 0.0786  0.0743 0.0772 
 (0.166) (0.188) (0.175) 
Income  0.0666  0.0727 0.0732 
 (0.398) (0.353) (0.356) 
Tradecredit 0.1895 0.1911 0.1927 
 (0.009)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** 
Rural -0.7700  -0.7721  -0.7703 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Non-Farming     0.4313 0.4331  0.4318 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 1.1240 1.009 1.3547 
 (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** 
Observations  667 667 667 
Adj. R-Squ.  0.51         0.51 
P>F   0.000   P>Chi2=0.000 P>F=0.000 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2010 FINSCOPE data of Ghana 
 
                                               
28
 In order to ensure consistency of results and heteroskedastic consistent estimates, robust standard errors have been 
performed on the variables. The results of the robust standard errors do not statistically differ from what is reported here. 
See Table A.1 in appendix A for the results of the robust standard errors. 
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3.6. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATION 
The study has assessed the strength of microinsurance services in reducing the risk of insured 
households to have to resort to asset loss to pay for risks that are not insured and to accumulate 
assets. Three empirical techniques, namely Heckman sample selection, treatment effects and 
instrumental variable models, were employed for the impact assessment. In line with theoretical 
and empirical postulations the results show that microinsurance schemes enable households to 
reduce asset loss and even increase their asset holdings.  
In the event of substantial negative shocks such as fire, motor accidents, severe illness or even 
death, households without the necessary insurance cover liquidate essential assets in order to 
raise money for the mitigation of the risky event. Some of these assets, which are mostly liquidated 
below market prices, might have taken low-income households a considerable number of years to 
accumulate. Such a situation has the tendency to worsen the economic status of uninsured 
households. This underscores the need to integrate this financial package into private and public 
welfare interventions directed at low-income households. To the extent that microinsurance is 
inextricably linked to households’ livelihood, integrating it into the various poverty interventions for 
low-income households will empower them to make steady asset build-up in order to escape 
poverty and sustain the welfare gains achieved. Indeed, microinsurance can equip households to 
break the interconnection between risks, vulnerability and asset loss, and turn the vicious-cycle of 
poverty into a virtuous cycle of well-being.  
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CHAPTER 4  
RISK COPING STRATEGIES AND CONSUMPTION SMOOTHING AMONG 
LOW-INCOME HOUSEHOLDS IN GHANA: DOES MICROINSURANCE 
MATTER? 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
Low-income households employ a diversity of strategies to smooth consumption because the 
welfare consequences of consumption shocks are usually very high. These diverse risk coping 
mechanisms range from the disposal of productive assets, withdrawal of children from school, and 
child labour to a reduction in meals. However the empirical evidence from various developing 
countries suggests that these risk coping mechanisms are not good smoothers and do not improve 
the long term survival and well-being of households. Rather they almost always disrupt the growth 
path of low-income households, impoverish them and set them back into transient and chronic 
poverty. For instance, reducing meals may lead to malnourishment with pernicious health 
conditions, while withdrawing children from school and child labour may disrupt human capital 
development (Janzen & Carter, 2013a; Chakrabarty, 2012; Morsink et al., 2011).  
Microinsurance has been proposed as a better alternative for empowering low-income households 
to cope with risks effectively. It is a risk management tool that uses the concept of risk pooling to 
indemnify low-income persons against specific risks in exchange for affordable premiums which 
are mostly paid at irregular times and in uneven amounts. A substantive body of insurance 
literature has recognized microinsurance as a risk transfer instrument which does not only reduces 
the usage of detrimental coping strategies, but also empowers the poor to manage risks effectively 
and make a sustainable exit from poverty (e.g. see Janzen & Carter, 2013a; Morsink et al., 2011; 
Dercon et al., 2008; Barnett et al., 2008; Cohen et al., 2005; Churchill, 2002; Siegel et al., 2001). 
The microinsurance pay-out received in the event that an insurable risk occurs, prevents asset 
pawning and emergency borrowing and, as noted by Giesbert (2010), equips low-income 
households to avoid using insufficient and costly alternative ways of coping with shocks. 
The international development community (especially ILO, GIZ and USAID)29 has also recognized 
microinsurance as a welfare enhancing tool. This has motivated some governments in sub-
Saharan Africa to initiate financial reforms to encourage greater insurance inclusion for households 
living and working in the informal sector. Some of these reforms have led to the rolling out of 
                                               
29ILO is International Labour Organization; GIZ is Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit; 
USAID is United States Agency for International Development.  
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
62 
 
 
microinsurance to cover health risks and rural farmers in Kenya, Senegal, Malawi, South Africa, 
Uganda and Ghana.  
Ghana in particular has witnessed the rolling out of both public and private microinsurance 
schemes for more than a decade. However there has been little or no empirical investigation into 
their impacts on consumption smoothing. Since the inception of formal30 microinsurance schemes 
in 2003, the number of policies has grown quite impressively with about one million policies written 
as at 2011 (NIC & GIZ, 2012). Against this backdrop, it will be very interesting to ascertain whether 
microinsurance has reduced clients’ dependence on costly coping strategies which undermine 
proper human capital development. Hence the current study undertakes an investigation into 
whether microinsurance facilitates consumption smoothing necessary for improved health and 
human capital growth. In particular we ask: can microinsurance empower low-income households 
to eliminate the reduction in meals as a coping strategy?  
We use data from the 2010 FINSCOPE Survey which has very rich and in-depth information on 
3 642 households’ usage of financial services, risk management tools and shock coping strategies. 
The survey was conducted, among other things, to aid financial practitioners and analysts 
investigation into the impact of various financial products on households’ welfare. This study is one 
of the first attempts to understand the effects of microinsurance on coping strategies from the 
perspective of Ghana.  
The National Insurance Commission (NIC) has indicated its intention to upgrade its policy on 
microinsurance in order to make it more accessible and responsive to the needs of low-income 
households. The findings of this study will inform this policy upgrade by providing timely and 
invaluable grass root information about how microinsurance influences the choice of costly risk-
coping strategies in Ghana.  
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: the literature review is captured in Section 4.1, 
Section 4.2 provides the patterns and trends of consumption poverty and an overview of 
microinsurance in Ghana, the methodology is in Section 4.3, the results are presented in Section 
4.4 and the conclusion and policy recommendations are presented in Section 4.5. 
4.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
4.2.1. Theoretical Literature 
4.2.1.1. The Life Cycle Theory 
This theory argues that the maximization of personal utility is achieved through the allocation and 
balancing of current and future earnings with a lifelong pattern of consumption (Modigliani & 
                                               
30
 The susu type of microinsurance begun in the 1980s but folded up due to operational challenges.  
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Brumberg, 1954; Modigliani & Ando, 1957; Ando & Modigliani, 1963). It assumes that individuals’ 
earnings and consumption expenditure follow a pattern of accumulation stage, consolidation stage, 
spending stage and gifting stage (Reilly & Norton, 1999). The implication is that the younger 
population saves less, because much of their current earnings are used to accumulate assets and 
pay off their car, college and housing loans. Hence the net worth of the younger population is 
smaller. The middle class on the hand consolidates and saves more because they may have paid 
off much of their loans and also may be earning more income. The older population is assumed to 
be in the spending and gifting stage and thus dissave. For individuals to achieve consumption 
smoothing, the theory suggests that savings at the different stages of life should be align with life 
cycle consumption patterns. Savings in this sense can be categorised into contractual and 
discretionary savings (Prinsloo, 2000). The contractual savings entails the subscription to 
insurance policies or retirement plans (pensions) for the management of risks and future 
consumption smoothing. Insurance as an aspect of savings may ensures that the consumption 
pattern of individuals at different stages of their lives is not disrupted by risk and inadequate current 
earnings. 
4.2.1.2. The Permanent Income Theory 
The permanent income hypothesis (PIH) was developed by Milton Friedman in 1957. It states that 
the average individual does not allow consumption to swing with income fluctuations in the short 
run. This is because an individual’s consumption at a point in time does not necessarily depend on 
their current earnings, but mostly importantly on future income. Thus consumption smoothing is 
driven by changes in the lifetime income – permanent income – but not on the transitory or current 
income. This theory has practical implications for the insurance market.  The payments made by 
individuals into a pool of an insurance policy entitle them to a future stream of income (claims) 
which can aid them to smooth out consumption even in times of income shocks.  
4.2.2. The Empirical Literature 
Households’ consumption as noted by Morduch (1995) does not match income particularly well, 
hence a diversity of smoothing behaviours however inadequate has been developed by low-
income households to deal with consumption shocks. These diverse strategies designed to 
maintain long-term survival and welfare can broadly be decomposed into two: risk management 
tools and risk coping strategies (Morduch, 1995; Alderman & Paxson, 1992). The risk management 
tools are ex-ante instruments adapted to manage income shocks and smooth out income. They 
are steps taken by the poor to protect their livelihood from negative income shocks before they 
occur (Morduch, 1995). Such strategies range from the combination of various economic activities 
including farm and non-farm activities in order to diversify income. Others are income skewing 
operations; that is, engaging in low risk production and employment at the expense of high returns 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
64 
 
 
(Morduch, 1995; Alderman & Paxson, 1992; Rosenzweig & Binswanger, 1993; Dercon, 2002). The 
choice of these low-risk low-return economic activities can consign households to a lower level of 
well-being with adverse long run effects. Precautionary savings and investment in livestock as 
buffer against shocks have also been identified as risk management strategies among low-income 
households (Deaton, 1991; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993). 
Risk coping strategies are designed ex-post in response to the economic consequences of income 
shocks in order to achieve consumption smoothing. Examples of such strategies are assets 
disposal, informal insurance and reduction in daily meals. In Burkina Faso Fafchamps et al. (1998) 
report that income loss and consumption shocks due to drought are marginally dealt with through 
livestock sales. In contrast, Kazianga and Udry (2006) find no evidence concerning the usage of 
livestock as buffer stock to offset consumption shortfalls among households in rural Burkina Faso.  
Informal insurance is also used by extended families, village committees and trade associations to 
cope with hardships (Lund & Fafchamps, 1997; Townsend, 1994). Informal financing from family 
and friends, susu31 and ROSCAS32 are also employed to cope with the consequences of financial 
shocks (Dercon, 2002; Bouman, 1995; Besley et al., 1993; Rosenzweig, 1988). These social 
insurance networks are however only effective in dealing with idiosyncratic risks. The financial 
base of such networks is usually not sufficient for handling covariant risks.  
Certain investments and expenditures which are critical for the proper development of human 
capital are sometimes sacrificed by the poor to cope with the adverse effects of repeated exposure 
to socio-economic downturns. Sometimes children are taken out of school to engage in child 
labour in order for the family to raise money to cope with financial distress (Chakrabarty, 2012), 
and this does not only impair a family’s human capital growth, but can also have adverse trans-
generational consequences on the capacity of a household to escape the traps of chronic poverty. 
Reduction in daily meals is another coping method that can have long-term deleterious impacts on 
the physical and intellectual development of household’s members. Children are particularly very 
vulnerable since reduced nutrition can lead to irreversible impairment in health such as stunted 
growth, slower cognitive and motor development and high morbidity rates (Ray, 1998; Martorell, 
1999).  
Kochar (1995) indicated increased hours of working as critical for coping with hardships in rural 
India. Rahmato (1991) earlier reported a similar approach as well as wild fruit and firewood 
gathering as coping mechanisms adopted by the poor to cope with the severe famine that hit 
Ethiopia from 1984 to 1985. Recent evidence advanced by Berloffa and Modena (2013) suggest 
that Indonesian households use a similar mechanism to deal with crop loss in order to maintain a 
                                               
31
 The regular contribution of smaller amounts of money towards a specified target. 
32
 Rotating, savings and credit associations. 
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stable consumption path. Specifically, they report that while the non-poor smooth consumption 
through asset disposal and savings, the asset poor increase their labour supply to compensate for 
the decline in income and to overcome a drop in consumption.  
Despite the diversity of strategies adopted by low-income households to cope with the financial 
consequences of risks, majority are still poor and very vulnerable to repeated episodes of socio-
economic shocks. In the next few paragraphs we review the literature on how microinsurance can 
be a better alternative for influencing households’ ex-ante decisions and for coping with ex-post 
risks.  
Microinsurance plays a dual role in dealing with vulnerability and poverty traps: the indemnity cover 
and the pay-out in the occurrence of an insurable loss. Whereas the indemnity cover affects ex-
ante decisions, the pay-out influences the choice of ex-post coping mechanism. First, the 
indemnity cover can have a positive influence on the ex-ante behavioural patterns of the poor by 
motivating them to invest in high yield high risk ventures. Such high yielding ventures can improve 
the economic growth path of the poor by aiding them to move steadily to a higher equilibrium and 
make a sustainable exit from poverty. It can also provide an “atmosphere of peace” and a “sense 
of hope” to the poor that they need not be anxious about future economic shocks. Secondly, the 
microinsurance pay-out that households receive if an insurable loss occurs has the potential to 
reduce the use of costly coping strategies such as the disposal of productive assets, taking 
children out of school, child labour and meal reduction. The evidence in the literature to some 
extent supports this two-pronged impact of microinsurance on households’ welfare.  
On households’ ex-ante behavioural changes, Janzen et al. (2013) argue that the presence of 
microinsurance provides households with positive expectations about their future well-being and a 
positive probability of escaping the poverty trap. They further aver that households forgo 
precautionary investments in low yielding endowments as a coping strategy in order to take up 
microinsurance. This is expected to motivate low-income households to invest in higher yielding 
activities and propel them to a higher equilibrium of well-being. The findings of Janzen et al. (2013) 
corroborate an earlier work on the Malawian market by Nicola (2011) that weather insurance 
enhances the adoption of more productive farming technologies that improve farmers’ welfare.    
In India Mobarak and Rosenzweig (2012) report from a randomized study on the uptake and 
impact of rainfall index-based insurance that the risk appetite of households to invest in higher 
yielding seeds increases under formal insurance. A similar rainfall index-based insurance for 
farmers in northern Ghana was studied by Karlan et al. (2014). The findings indicate that insurance 
encourages increased investment into agriculture ventures and production choices which provide 
better returns to farmers.  
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Cai (2013) employed difference-in-difference and triple difference to evaluate the impact of 
agricultural insurance on farm production, credit financing and savings among households in rural 
China. The evidence from the study suggests that insurance (1) raises crop production by 20 
percent and lowers farmers’ tendency to diversify farm production; (2) reduces precautionary 
savings by about 30 percent and (3) increases the demand for credit by 25 percent. The crux effect 
of microinsurance on households’ ex-ante behaviours is the empowerment of households to 
engage in productive activities that increase human and physical asset accumulation necessary for 
welfare enhancement.  
The ex-post evidence is however inconclusive, ranging from positive impacts (Janzen & Carter, 
2013a, 2013b; Morsink et al., 2011; Hamid et al., 2010) to negative impacts (Gnawali et al., 2009) 
and mixed results or no impacts at all (Dercon et al., 2012; Cheung & Padieu, 2011; Hsu et al., 
2011; Wagstaff et al., 2009). The evidence on Kenya provided by Janzen and Carter (2013a and 
2013b) indicates that microinsurance pay-out promotes asset retention, reduces the tendency to 
cut down on meals and equips households to escape poverty traps. Similarly Morsink et al. (2011) 
report from the Philippines that microinsurance has a declining effect on households’ frequency of 
falling into the vulnerability – poverty vicious cycle and from Bangladesh, Hamid et al. (2010) also 
indicate that food sufficiency is greatly enhanced among insured households.  
As indicated earlier, empirical information about the African experience concerning the impact of 
microinsurance on consumption smoothing has been very limited. Apart from the work of Janzen 
and Carter (2013a and 2013b) on the Kenyan drought-index microinsurance, evidence on whether 
the growing outreach of microinsurance has improved consumption smoothing among low-income 
households is virtually non-existent in Africa.  
Besides the context-specific contribution indicated in the introduction, this study makes unique 
contribution to the empirical literature in two main ways: (1) Unlike the studies of Janzen and 
Carter which cover only northern Kenyan, this study covers rural and urban households across the 
whole of Ghana; (2) whereas the focus of most studies have been on rural farmers and weather-
index microinsurance, this study extends the coverage to both farmers and non-farmers. The 
current study also extends the analysis to other microinsurance product such as life, property and 
health schemes. 
4.3. OVERVIEW OF CONSUMPTION POVERTY AND MICROINSURANCE IN GHANA 
This section presents the trend of consumption poverty across gender and geographical locations 
in Ghana. This overview provides the context within which the effect of microinsurance on 
consumption smoothing, which has direct consequences on consumption poverty, is evaluated. 
Consumption poverty is the standard of living at which the required calories intake falls below the 
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poverty line (GSS, 2007). It defines the nutritional requirements of each household member and 
the minimum amount of money necessary to provide the defined calories. The Ghana Statistical 
Service (GSS, 2014) has set the consumption poverty line at 2,900 kilocalories per equivalent 
adult, which translates into GHS1314.00 per equivalent adult per year in the January 2013 prices 
of Greater Accra Region. In international purchasing parity terms, this is US$1.83/day which is 
slightly higher than the World Bank’s poverty benchmark of US$1.25 a day in 2008 prices.  
Using this poverty benchmark, Ghana has reduced the incidence of consumption poverty by about 
half from a staggering percentage of 51.7 in 1991 to 28.5 percent in 2006 and to 24.2 percent in 
2013 (GSS, 2008 & 2014). This indicates that Ghana may be able to achieve the first Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) of reducing the poverty rate by half by the year 2015.  
The gender dimension of consumption poverty indicates that male-headed households are on 
average much poorer than female-headed households (GSS, 2007 & 2014). This contradicts the 
perception that most women are much poorer than men. The rural-urban divide also shows that 
consumption poverty is disproportionately high in rural communities, with about 78 percent of 
households living below the poverty line residing in rural localities (GSS, 2014).  Whereas about 2 
percent of the poor population reside in urban coastal towns as high as 40 percent dwell in rural 
savannah (GSS, 2014). Though the regional distribution indicates a general decline of 
consumption poverty in all the regions, the rates of the three northern regions – Northern Region 
(50.4%), Upper East (44.4%) and Upper West (70.7%) – are above the national average.  
Many programs have been initiated by the government and private entities not only to sustain the 
gains made in reducing consumption poverty, but also to accelerate the efforts of reducing all 
forms of poverty to the barest minimum. Examples of such programs are the Livelihood 
Empowerment against Poverty (LEAP), free meals for basic school children, capitation grants for 
basic schools, free maternal health care and microinsurance services. 
The concept of microinsurance begun in Ghana in the 1980s through the traditional susu scheme. 
However it collapsed due to challenges with premium collections and other high transactional costs 
(NIC, 2008b). In the last decade the National Insurance Commission (NIC) has mounted a 
concerted campaign to overcome market and institutional barriers in order to achieve greater 
insurance inclusiveness for the lower end of the market. This led to the establishment of GLICO’s33 
Anidaso scheme and SIC’s34 Sika Plan in 2003 and Edwadifu Ahobanbo by Downwell Insurance in 
2005. Several other schemes have been established since 2005 (see Table 4.1).  
                                               
33 Gemini Life Insurance Company 
34
 State Insurance Company 
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The NIC’s campaign on microinsurance has increased the scale and outreach of microinsurance to 
more than 1 million lives, with about GHS11 703 488 (US$6 087 473) collected as premiums and 
GHS4 421 494 (US$2 299 803) paid as claims (NIC & GIZ, 2012; Buabeng & Gruijters, 2012). The 
product portfolio of the market is dominated by health, savings-linked and funeral/term life policies. 
Other products on the market are rainfall index, credit-linked and property policies. Commercial 
insurers sell these products in partnership with microfinance institutions, rural and community 
banks, post offices, telecoms, direct sales agents and nodal agencies such as trade associations 
and churches.  
The efforts of the various stakeholders to increase access to microinsurance have been boosted 
by innovations from mobile phone technology, which is used to sell, collect premiums and effect 
claims payments. This has reduced the high overhead costs usually associated with the 
underwriting of several thousands of small policies. For example, Tigo and Airtel mobile 
telecommunications are in partnership with MicroEnsure and Star Microinsurance Services Ltd. 
respectively to extend microinsurance services to low-income households.  
Although the microinsurance market has recorded increased market activity, its full potential 
remains largely untapped. The NIC has therefore initiated a new agenda to grow the 
microinsurance market and make it more proactive in addressing the needs of low-income 
households. Its proposed policy document on microinsurance states that “insurers cannot 
designate a product as microinsurance unless it considers that the product satisfied the following 
criteria: (1) target at low-income households; (2) affordable for low-income households and (3) 
accessible to low income households” (NIC, 2011:3). It also requires insurers to make 
microinsurance contracts very simple to understand with less legalese and no or few exceptions. It 
further requires claims to be dealt with expeditiously within 7 to 10 days (NIC, 2011).  
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Table 4.1: Microinsurance Products  
Insurer Microinsurance Product Class of Policy 
GLICO Anidaso Life, Family Life, Endowment,  
 Hospital Cash, Children’s Education 
Donewell Insurance Edwadifus Life, Savings-linked 
 Ahobanbo 
SIC Life Sika Plan Life, Savings-linked, Funeral 
Star Life Assurance Various Life, Health, Funeral, Property 
Vanguard Insurance Shop Owner’s Property, Goods in Transit 
 Policy 
Ghana Agricultural Drought-Index Crop insurance, Food Chain Policy  
Insurance Pool 
Credit Unions Life Savings Life 
4.4. METHODOLOGY 
4.4.1. The Data 
The study used the Ghana household survey undertaken in 2010 by Finmark Trust for the 
empirical analysis. In all 3 643 households from rural and urban settings in all ten regions of the 
country were randomly selected and interviewed. It has in-depth data on households’ 
demographics, income, economic activities, education, asset ownership, financial knowledge, 
access to financial services and risk coping strategies. The dataset is divided into three categories 
based on access to financial services: (1) access to formal financial services such as commercial 
banks; (2) access to other formal financial services such as microfinance firms, insurance firms, 
savings and loans companies, rural and community banks; informal financial services such as 
savings clubs, susu, ROSCAS; and (3) no access at all. Since this study’s focus is on low-income 
households we extracted the dataset of 800 households who use informal and other formal 
financial services for the empirical estimations. After cleaning the dataset of outliers, 682 datasets 
consisting of 438 insured and 244 uninsured households were used for the empirical analysis. The 
individual microinsurance products did not have enough observations to aid effective regression 
estimations, hence the 438 insured households is an aggregation of the following products: 
property, life, health, education, funeral, investment plan and livestock. The aggregation however 
has no negative influence on our analysis, because the focus of the study is not on individual 
microinsurance products, but rather on the comparison between insured and uninsured cohorts. 
Source: Adapted from Wiedmaier-Pfister and McCord, 2009. 
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4.4.2. The Profile and Features of the Sampled Households 
The result of a chi-square test on the degree of differences between the insured and the uninsured 
households is reported in Table 4.2. The literature on household economics indicates that the 
probability for a household to reduce meals may be influenced by the level of income. Indeed 
insufficient income can compel households to reduce the number of daily meals consumed. The 
chi-square test indicates that insured households do not significantly differ from the uninsured in 
terms of income levels. To this extent effective consumption smoothing among either the insured 
or the uninsured cannot be attributed to differences in their income levels. The test on the other 
variables of interest also shows that the two groups of households do not differ significantly from 
each other in terms of economic activities, proximity to financial services or rural-urban location, 
however they differ in terms of access to credit, remittances, education and family size. Whereas 
the insured has more access to the credit market, the uninsured receives more foreign 
remittances. 
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Table 4.2: Chi-Square Test on the Profile of Insured and Uninsured Households 
Variable Uninsured HH (%)
C
  Insured HH (%)
C
 Chi-Square (χ
2
.050) 
Resp. Age
T
 (mean years) 38.02 39.81  -1.7918 (0.0652)
T 
Resp. Gender   0.1014 (0.750)   
Male 47.13 48.40 
Female 52.87 51.60 
Resp. Marital Status   2.2049 (0.138) 
Married 51.65 57.57 
Others 48.35 42.43 
Resp. Education Level   8.4240 (0.015)** 
No formal Education 13.17  7.78 
Primary Education 45.27 40.96 
Secondary and above 41.56 51.26 
Household Income   0.4930 (0.782) 
0 – GHS400 69.31 66.36 
GHS401 – GHS1000 24.87 26.97 
Above GHS1000   5.82   6.67 
HH Size
T
 (mean size)   3.41   4.00 -0.586 (0.003)***
T 
House Ownership   0.2135 (0.899) 
Rented 32.79 34.47 
Family Owned     48.36 46.80 
Occupied without payment 18.85 18.72 
Location   0.0023 (0.962) 
Urban 68.44 68.26 
Rural 31.56 31.74 
Economic Activity   0.3053 (0.581) 
Farming Enterprise 29.92 31.96 
Non-Farming Enterprises 70.08 68.04 
Proximity to Financial Inst   0.1176 (0.732) 
10 – 30 minute walk   69.23 67.62 
Above 30 minute walk 30.77 32.38 
Access to Credit   5.1651 (0.023)** 
Never borrowed 54.51 45.43 
Have borrowed 45.49 54.57 
Remittances    7.4542 (0.006)*** 
Do not Receive Remittance 52.92 63.68 
Receives Remittances 47.08 36.32 
Note: *** and ** indicate 1 and 5 percent significance levels respectively; 
C
 indicates that the addition for each variable 
is by columns; 
T
 indicates T-test instead of Chi-square.  
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2010 FINSCOPE Data of Ghana. 
4.4.3. The Empirical Estimations 
The microinsurance products under study were not randomized. Households have free will to 
either buy or reject these products. The option to choose creates room for self-selection and 
endogeneity bias. Since selection bias and endogeneity problems can cloud effective impact 
assessment, we resolved this by employing three models for the empirical analysis: Heckman 
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sample selection, treatment effects model and instrumental variable modelling. Each of these 
models has a unique advantage in correcting selection and endogeneity bias.  
4.4.3.1. Heckman Sample Selection Model 
Heckman’s model corrects selection bias associated with participation in non-randomized 
programs. It is a two-step estimation comprising a probit model and an outcome regression 
(Heckman, 1974, 1978 and 1979). The probit model is used to estimate the demand for 
microinsurance in the following set up: 
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒               
           
 0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖 𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑎𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒
     
           4.1 
The above set up is given as: 
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖                    4.2 
Thus   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 1|𝑧𝑖) = Φ(𝑧𝑖𝛿)   and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 0|𝑧𝑖) = 1 − Φ(𝑧𝑖𝛿)   
Where zi is a vector of exogenous factors influencing the demand for microinsurance and Φ(∙) is 
the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The inverse Mills ratio or the hazard lambda 
which controls for selection bias is then calculated from the estimated co-efficients of the probit 
model and used as an additional explanatory variable in the outcome regression (Janzen and 
Carter, 2013b; Lin, 2007). The inverse Mills ratio is given as: 
𝜆𝑖 =
𝜙(𝑧𝑖?̂?)
Φ(𝑧𝑖δ̂)
                  4.3 
 
Where 𝜆𝑖 is the inverse Mills ratio, 𝜙 is the standard normal density function, and Φ is as defined in 
the probit model above. The second step equation – that is, the impact of microinsurance on food 
reduction – is then estimated with the inverse Mills ratio35 as an explanatory variable. 
𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 +  𝛽2𝜆𝑖 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖            4.4 
 
Where FORi is food reduction as a coping strategy by household i; insurei is microinsurance; 
controli is a vector of control variables such as education, age, marital status, income and 
economic activity, rural-urban setting and regional effects; and the error terms (𝜇𝑖;  𝜀𝑖) of both 
equations (2) and (4) are bivariate normal with mean zero. 
                                               
35
 The ivtreatreg STATA program designed by Cerulli (2012) estimates the inverse Mills ratio (Heckman 
correction terms) automatically from the probit model. 
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4.4.3.2. The Treatment Effect Model 
Whereas the Heckman model uses the observed variables of only the participants, the treatment 
effect model uses the observed variables of both the program participants and the non-participants 
for the estimation. It is a two-stage technique involving the selection and outcome model which can 
be estimated simultaneously. 
First stage: selection model: 
  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒   
Thus  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
∗ = 𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖 ,              4.5 
  𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 +  𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖𝛾 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖           4.6 
 
The errors terms (µi and ɛi) are bivariate normal with zero mean. To obtain the outcome models for 
both program participants and non-participants, equation (4.5) is put into equation (4.6). That is: 
When       𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 1: 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + (𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖)𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖     4.7 
And when      𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖
∗ ≤ 0, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 0: 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖          4.8 
 
Where the 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + (𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖)𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖  is the participants outcome model while the non-
participants outcome model is 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖. These are evaluated simultaneously.   
4.4.3.3. Instrumental Variable Model (IV Model)  
The demand for microinsurance is not only influenced by observed factors, but also by unobserved 
factors such as risk appetite, entrepreneurial passion, motivation or even fear. Such unobserved 
variables are however not likely to be captured by either the Heckman or the treatment effect 
models. We have therefore estimated an instrumental variable model to take account of the 
unobserved variables and also to control for endogeneity bias. The instrumental variable approach 
requires an observed variable that is (1) highly correlated with the demand for microinsurance, but 
(2) uncorrelated with the unobserved factors influencing households to use food reduction to cope 
with shocks. The assumptions of the IV model referred to as “exclusion restriction” by Khandker et 
al. (2010:88) are summarised as: 
𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒: 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝑍, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒)  ≠ 0    
𝑢𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ 𝑒𝑟𝑟𝑜𝑟 𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑚 (𝜀): 𝑐𝑜𝑣 (𝑍, 𝜀) = 0    
Where Z is the chosen instrument. We chose two nationally recognised identity cards as the 
possible instruments: the National Health Insurance Scheme’s identity card (NHIS ID) and the 
Electoral Commission’s identity card (the voter’s ID). Although the NHIS ID is issued by the 
National Insurance Authority to clients of the government health insurance scheme, private 
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insurance companies have come to accept this card as a form of identification. The voter’s ID is 
also issued by the Ghana Electoral Commission for the purpose of voting in national and local 
elections. Financial institutions including insurance companies have however adopted this card as 
a major identification of their clients. These two ID cards are major forms of identification that every 
individual intending to purchase microinsurance is expected to hold. So they are key determinants 
of the uptake of microinsurance. Any one of them is accepted as a prerequisite for the purchase of 
microinsurance. Whereas these cards influence one’s decision to purchase microinsurance, they 
do not influence the decision to skip or cut the number of meals per day.  
Wooldridge (2010) and Cerulli (2012) explain that the most efficient instrument is the predicted 
probability of getting treatment; comprising the selected instruments (in this case the ID cards) plus 
the other exogenous (control) variables influencing the outcome variable. That is the predicted 
probability of microinsurance,[𝑃(𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒̂ 𝑖|𝑥𝑖𝑧𝑖)], derived by regressing 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 on 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 is used 
as the instrument because its generates efficient and consistent estimates and in the words of 
Cerulli (2012) “is the best instrument because it generates the smallest projection error”. We have 
followed this estimation strategy under the IV approach by using an identification strategy which 
involves an imposition of an exclusion restriction, the instruments, which predict only the selection 
process, but not the outcome. This implies that selection into the program relies on the same 
factors that affect the outcome plus the instruments  𝑧𝑖 which do not affect directly the outcome, but 
indirectly through their effect on 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 (Cerulli, 2012; Awel & Azomahou, 2014).  
Under the IV approach different estimation models have been designed to evaluate programs such 
as microinsurance. Examples of such models are the IV-probit, direct-2SLS and probit-2SLS. 
Although the IV-probit is good for estimating a model with binary dependent and an endogenous 
variable – just as in this case where the dependent variable, 𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖, is binary and 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 is 
endogenous – it assumes that the endogenous variable is continuous and thus not appropriate for 
estimating a model with discrete endogenous variable36. It is therefore not suitable for the present 
study because our endogenous variable, 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖, is discrete. The direct-2SLS is also not 
appropriate because it is designed for the estimation of linear regression.  
The probit-2SLS fits properly a model where the endogenous variable is binary. First, we estimated 
a probit model of 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 on 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 to derive the predicted probability of 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖. Second, we 
used the predicted probabilities as instruments of 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 to estimate the two-stage least squares 
(2SLS) model. This approach is known to yield consistent estimates and is also more efficient than 
the direct-2SLS (Cerulli, 2012).  
                                               
36
 See Newey (1987) for the underlying theory of instrumental variables with probit modelling. 
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The probit-2SLS also allows for the determination of homogenous and heterogeneous treatments 
outcomes. It is thus very appropriate for this study. Following Cerulli (2012) and Awel and 
Azomahou (2014), we operationalised the probit-2SLS in three stages: 
1. Run a probit of   𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 on 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑧𝑖 to obtain 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒, that is the predicted probability of 
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖.   That is: 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 = 𝛾𝑍𝑖 + 𝜙𝑋𝑖 + 𝜇𝑖 
2. Estimate an OLS of   𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒𝑖 on 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑃𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 to obtain the fitted values of 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒2𝑓𝑣,𝑖. 
3. Estimate a second OLS of the outcome variable  𝐹𝑂𝑅𝑖 on 𝑥𝑖 and 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒2𝑓𝑣,𝑖.  
The parameter of 𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒2𝑓𝑣,𝑖 is the best estimate of the average treatment effect. Also this 
approach does not demand for consistency that the selection model be properly specified 
(Wooldridge, 2010; Cerulli, 2012). 
4.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
The results of all the three models in Table 4.3 show a significant inverse impact of microinsurance 
on the reduction in the number of daily food intake. In particular, the Heckman model shows that 
households accessing microinsurance services are less likely to reduce daily meals just to cope 
with risks. The treatment effects model shows a similar result. The effect of microinsurance on 
household consumption is even larger if unobserved factors are accounted for through the 
instrumental variable technique. The instrumental variable approach indicates that insured 
households are 22 percent less likely to forgo daily food just to cope with socio-economic shocks. 
This finding corroborates the Kenyan evidence adduced by Janzen and Carter (2013a and 2013b).  
The summary of the three estimations is that microinsurance improves consumption smoothing 
and food security among insured households by eliminating under-nutrition and malnourishing 
actions such as reduction in food intake. By providing households with better strategies to deal with 
risk, microinsurance does not only leads to adoption of more efficient ex-ante behaviours, it also 
plays a crucial role in improving households’ health outcomes through better smoothing of 
consumption.  
In the event of shocks low-income households are mostly compelled to sell essential asset and or 
cut meals to raise money to cope (Janzen & Carter, 2013b). In most cases household food 
consumption is the first victim to be compromised in the form of reduced meals in order to cope 
with shocks. However, the consequential effects of forgoing meals can be very damaging to the 
health of a household especially children. Thus using microinsurance to eliminate or reduce the 
usage of meals as a coping mechanism can have long-term positive implication on households’ 
welfare.  
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By facilitating proper consumption smoothing, microinsurance reduces consumption poverty. This 
implies that the inadequacy of current earnings would not force households into consumption 
poverty if such households are insured. This is in line with the life cycle theory that consumption 
can be smoothen over time and over states of nature if insurance is used as a vehicle to 
accumulate financial savings during periods of earnings to cover the possibilities of future shocks 
in earnings. It also confirms the permanent income hypothesis and the empirical findings of Hamid 
et al. (2010) and Janzen and Carter (2013a, 2013b).  
The policy implications of the current findings are quite enormous. For instance the Government of 
Ghana is running a poverty reduction program – the Livelihood Empowerment against Poverty 
(LEAP) – through which extremely poor households are given monthly cash transfers. The 
program which forms part of the National Social Protection Strategy has recognised the welfare 
value that microinsurance can add to the LEAP cash transfer. Thus free health insurance has been 
added to the social cash transfer in order to properly empower the beneficiaries to use the cash 
transfer for the necessary household consumption expenditures. Although the inclusion of the 
health insurance is good, the gains may be substantial if other microinsurance products such as 
life, crop and fire are integrated into the program. This can be done through a public private 
partnership agreement where private insurers will provide these products at subsidized premiums 
paid by the government.  
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Table 4.3: The Impact of Microinsurance on Consumption Smoothing  
Variables Heckman Treatment IV 
Financial Variables 
Microinsurance -0.2072 -0.1927 -0.2231 
 (0.006)*** (0.007)*** (0.007)*** 
Microcredit -0.0541 -0.0499 -0.0501 
 (0.241) (0.262) (0.293) 
Savings -0.0668 -0.0579 -0.0623 
 (0.214) (0.264) (0.251) 
Susu_Box (Piggy_Bank) -0.0860 -0.0862 -0.0767 
 (0.014)** (0.010)** (0.035)** 
Hide_Money_(underground) 0.0305 0.0259 0.0332 
 (0.221) (0.282) (0.212) 
Gone Without Cash -0.0074 -0.0081 -0.0072 
(5=Never) (0.039)** (0.020)** (0.010)** 
Financial Assistance -0.0029 -0.0030 -0.0030 
 (0.058)* (0.044)** (0.017)** 
Income Source -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0009 
(3=Salaries) (0.864) (0.828) (0.903) 
Barter Trade -0.0257 -0.0265 -0.0371 
 (0.248) (0.207) (0.099)* 
Assistance_Food (Goods) -0.0025 -0.0063 0.0027 
 (0.940) (0.843) (0.925) 
Trade Credit -0.0026 -0.0150 -0.0144 
 (0.960) (0.764) (0.771) 
Hire Purchase -0.0974 -0.0881 -0.0817 
 (0.163) (0.191) (0.240) 
Receive_Remittance 0.0163 0.0191 0.0180 
(1=yes)  (0.726) (0.672) (0.707) 
Household Characteristics 
Resp. Education 0.0109 0.0106 0.0096 
 (0.370) (0.366) (0.422) 
Resp. Age -0.0081 0.0050 -0.0363 
 (0.547) (0.516) (0.166) 
Resp. Age Square 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0004 
 (0.436) (0.353) (0.158) 
Female -0.1180 -0.1218 -0.1246 
 (0.011)** (0.007)*** (0.009)*** 
HH_Size 0.0227 0.0214 0.0287 
 (0.123) (0.127) (0.068) 
HH_Head 0.0299 0.0295 0.0080 
 (0.578) (0.561) (0.889) 
Marital 0.0151 0.0221 0.0218 
 (0.597) (0.207) (0.590) 
Bread Winner -0.0487 -0.0397 -0.0404 
(1=Yes) (0.127) (0.190) (0.147) 
Financing_HH_Education 0.0373 0.0385 0.0331 
 (0.108) (0.0.84)* (0.198) 
Economic Activity 0.1307 0.0953 0.1416 
 (0.138) (0.068)* (0.248) 
Illness -0.0252 -0.0265 0.0090 
 (0.472) (0.172) (0.866) 
Threat to Income 0.0048 -0.0008 0.0060 
 (0.274) (0.740) (0.320) 
Rural Areas -0.0762 -0.0508 -0.1524 
 (0.366) (0.321) (0.170) 
Household Assets 
Access to Water -0.0097 -0.0104 -0.0094 
 (0.058)* (0.035)** (0.064)* 
Access to Electricity -0.0074 0.0486 0.0682 
 (0.039)** (0.473) (0.336) 
Access to Cooking Stove (Electric) 0.0931 0.0943 0.0661 
(1=yes) (0.345) (0.320) (0.540) 
Access to Cooking Stove (Gas) 0.0645 0.0556 0.0714 
(1=yes) (0.222) (0.277) (0.198) 
Access to Microwave 0.0321 0.0316 0.0382 
(1=yes) (0.658) (0.654) (0.615) 
Inverse Mills Ratio 
_WL1 0.0179 
 (0.832) 
_WL0 -0.1047 
 (0.111) 
Hazard Lamda 0.0601 
 (0.238) 
Constant 0.7706 0.7117 1.2623 
 (0.164) (0.121) (0.069)* 
R – Square  0.13 Wald=119.49    R-Square = 0.10 
Prob>F 0.001  Prob>Chi2=0.000  Prob>F=0.000 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. P-values are in parenthesis  
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4.6. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
In the event of socio-economic shocks low-income households adopt a variety of strategies, 
including reducing the number of daily meals consumed, in order to cope. Sacrificing the quality 
and quantity of daily meals can have pernicious and irreversible consequences on the health and 
development of a household. Indeed underfeeding can lead to malnourished children and 
subsequent damage to their motor functions and cognitive skills. In this study we have delved into 
the capacity of microinsurance to equip low-income households to smooth out consumption by 
avoiding meal reduction as a risk coping strategy. In particular we have examined the effect of 
microinsurance as an alternative to costly coping mechanisms such as meals reduction which 
undermine the health and welfare of households. The empirical investigations indicate that insured 
households are less likely to forgo daily meals.  
The policy implications of these findings are enormous. The value of microinsurance is not just the 
transfer of risk, but most essentially the empowerment of low-income households to adopt effective 
consumption smoothing actions which are critical for healthy living and human capital growth. This 
has implications for financial sector policies in developing countries. In particular policies that 
promote microinsurance and access to microinsurance will have a tremendous impact on the 
government policy of reducing poverty through human development.  
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CHAPTER 5  
EXPLORING THE EFFECT OF MICROINSURANCE ON ASSET 
INEQUALITY AMONG HOUSEHOLDS IN GHANA37 
5.1. INTRODUCTION 
Unexpected events such as accidents and death can force certain households to dispose of 
essential assets to cope. By insuring households against future welfare losses, microinsurance 
helps in the reduction of asset loss, vulnerability and poverty. The indemnity enjoyed by the 
insured prevents the liquidation of essential assets at below market prices. This facilitates 
household financial stability and the steady build-up of essential assets by families. The long-term 
benefits of the avoidance of asset loss and financial stability are sustained poverty reduction and 
reduction in asset inequality among low-income households. Asset loss, poverty and inequality go 
hand in hand, but microinsurance can break a part of the cycle that ties them together.  
However the issue of whether microinsurance can reduce asset inequality is relatively new to the 
literature and evidence on it from the perspective of Africa is non-existent. Hence this study delves 
into the trends of asset inequality among households in Ghana and determines whether 
microinsurance schemes provided by the private sector and the government help to reduce asset 
inequality. In particular we ask: can microinsurance be used to bridge the asset inequality gap 
among households in Ghana?  
The level of the global household wealth was estimated at US$222.7 trillion in 2012: if shared 
equally, this translates into US$48 500 per adult of the 4.6 billion global adult population (Credit 
Suisse, 2012). The distribution of this wealth, however, reveals incredible levels of inequalities 
within and between countries. For instance, Switzerland has household wealth per adult of 
US$470 000; Australia has US$350 000; Norway has US$330 000 while India, Ghana and Burundi 
have US$4 250; US$2 009 and US$283 respectively (Credit Suisse, 2012). The continental 
dynamics indicate that Africa is second to Latin America as the most inequitable region of the 
globe. Indeed, six of the ten countries with the highest levels of inequalities are in Africa (AfDB, 
2012a).  
In Ghana the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO, 2012) reports of (1) severe economic 
inequalities and poverty in the three northern regions of the country, and (2) persistent employment 
inequalities among male and female and across the rural-urban divide. These economic and 
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employment inequalities impede the efforts of individuals and households in accumulating private 
assets. Van de Poel et al. (2008) provide evidence from a socio-economic inequality study 
involving 47 developing countries that a “queuing effect” exists in Ghana’s socio-economic 
inequality since the upper class are better off while the bottom class is expected to wait for a 
“trickle-down” effect. Similarly, the most recent living standard survey (GLSS 5) conducted by the 
Ghana Statistical Service indicates wide inequalities in per capita consumption expenditure. The 
highest quintile has an average per capita expenditure of about GHS1 261 (US$1 261)38. This is 
nine and half times higher than the per capita expenditure of households in the lowest quintile 
(GHS132.00 or US$132.00) and about two times more than the national average of GHS644.00 
(US$644.00).   
The findings of this study will not only guide the government on how to reduce these inequalities, 
but it will also fulfil the urgent need in the literature about the effect of microinsurance on asset 
inequality. It will also influence the National Insurance Commission’s (NIC) policy on the 
microinsurance industry.  
Another unique feature of this study is its focus on asset inequality instead of income inequality as 
a welfare measure. There is a debate (e.g. see Harttgen et al., 2013) about whether assets are a 
better measure of welfare than income and consumption expenditures. Several studies (see e.g. 
Moser & Felton, 2007; McKenzie, 2004) claim that household assets are practically more accurate 
and consistent in measuring poverty because assets do not suffer from the issues of recall bias, 
mis-measurement, and households’ reluctance to divulge sensitive information regarding income 
and consumption expenditures.  
However, Harttgen et al. (2013) argued that assets are not good proxies for trends in income or 
consumption and hence cannot be used to gauge poverty levels or economic improvement. We 
add a new dimension to this debate by focusing on asset inequality instead of asset poverty or 
income poverty. Also most studies do not analyse how government policy interventions have 
influenced the observed levels of inequalities. In this study we employed the Gini coefficient to 
estimate asset inequality and then proceed to determine whether both the government and private 
microinsurance schemes have had a reducing effect on levels of asset inequalities among low-
income households.       
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.1 provides a brief review of the relevant 
literature; an overview of poverty and inequalities situation in Ghana is captured in section 5.2; an 
overview of the microinsurance sector is presented in section 5.3; the methodology is outlined in 
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section 5.4; the results are presented in section 5.5 and the conclusion are presented in section 
5.6. 
5.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Ray (1998) explains inequality as a fundamental disparity which allows a person access to certain 
opportunities and material choice, but deny another person those very same opportunities. Asset 
inequality is a disparity in wealth and living standards across groups of people. It is the 
accumulation of more private assets and or access to more public assets by certain households 
while the capacity of others to own such assets is limited by socio-economic circumstances. An 
uninsurable risk is one major situation that can weaken the capacity of individuals to build a stock 
of assets, necessary for closing the asset inequality gap. In the absence of insurance, risk as 
pointed out by Smith (1997:5) “may limit the ability of households to hold onto their previously 
accumulated wealth”.  
An insurance cover facilitates asset retention and may equip individuals and economic entities to 
overcome asset disparities in a gradual manner. The following conceptual framework sheds light 
on how insurance can influence asset inequality among households. As illustrated in Figure 5.1, 
both insured and uninsured households are assumed to have begun from the same level towards 
the desired equality benchmark. After years of acquiring assets through either savings or bank 
credit, both households are assumed to have suffered from a risky event such as fire. With the aid 
of the insurance cover, the insured is restored to his original position just as it was before the fire. 
The assets of the uninsured are however lost to the fire, due to lack of insurance cover, and his 
position is possibly made worse since he may have to sell some more assets to resettle and return 
to normalcy. This tends to widen the asset build-up gap between the insured and uninsured and 
their inequality levels in relation to the equality benchmark. The end effect is that the insurance 
policy helps the insured to prevent asset loss and hence reduce the asset inequality gap in relation 
to the equality benchmark while the inequality gap of the uninsured almost always widens. 
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Figure 5.1: Effect of Microinsurance on Asset Inequality – The Conceptual Framework 
Source: Author’s Design. 
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This phenomenon regarding the effect of microinsurance on asset inequality is relatively new to the 
literature, hence empirical evidence on it is non-existent. The available literature, which is mainly 
focused on health insurance, is also diverse and inconclusive. A priori insurance may influence the 
levels of socio-economic inequalities among groups and across space. In particular employment 
fringe benefits related to health and accident insurance, which are most likely to favour skilled 
employees (the majority of whom are already in the high income bracket), may widen or sustain 
the inequality gap among groups of people (Burkhauser & Simon, 2010). However, insurance can 
close the inequality gap if tax laws require employers to pay equal insurance fringe benefits to 
employees regardless of the differences in their basic salaries (Burkhauser & Simon, 2010). Thus, 
insurance can have a double-edged sword effect on economic inequalities among groups of 
people.  
Studies on the welfare impact of insurance programs have yielded mixed results. For instance, Wu 
et al. (2004) investigated the impacts of welfare insurance programs on rural and urban inequalities 
in the United States of America. The authors employed the Atkinson welfare index, the Gini index, 
the coefficient of income variation and the relative mean deviation of income as well as panel 
regression techniques for their analysis. Their findings indicate among others that whereas 
disability insurance has a statistically significant reducing impact on both pre-tax and post-tax 
income inequality, unemployment insurance and supplementary social insurance do not reduce 
income inequality in both the pre-tax and post-tax regimes. This mixed result may be a pointer that 
even within the same national borders different insurance interventions depending upon their 
designs and the status of the recipients could have declining or no effect at all on income 
inequalities. 
Another set of mixed results was provided by Levy (2006) in a study of how wage disparities 
respond to health insurance in the USA. The finding indicates a declining effect of health insurance 
on the gender-wage differential, but a negligible impact on the race-wage disparity.  
The European evidence is as diverse and inconclusive as the American experience. For instance, 
in a household study of five European countries Jones et al. (2004) show that private health 
insurance leads to inequity in the use of specialist medical personnel. However Van Doorslaer et 
al. (2002) produce opposing findings by showing that the rate of “pro-rich” inequity declines if 
private insurance usage is controlled for. The findings of Van Doorslaer et al. (2002) and Jones et 
al. (2004) are at variance as far as the effect of private health insurance on health inequality is 
concerned.  
Other studies have shown that insurance can reduce socio-economic inequalities. Burkhauser and 
Simon (2010) report that employer health insurance reduces income inequality among American 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
89 
 
 
households. They further show that the government social health insurance schemes – Medicaid 
and Medicare – also decrease inequalities very substantially. 
The study by Burkhauser and Simon (2010) lends support to an earlier work on the Canadian 
welfare insurance done by Erksoy et al. (1995) and Countryman (1999). Erksoy et al. (1995) 
observe that tight restriction on access to unemployment insurance leads to an increase in income 
equality. Countryman (1999) combined the Gini coefficient, the mean logarithmic deviation and the 
Atkinson measure to investigate the effect of unemployment insurance on income inequality 
among households across the provinces of Canada. He reports that unemployment insurance 
reduces income inequality among households across all the provinces, an indication that 
unemployment insurance is an equality enhancing scheme, especially for low-income households. 
His findings also point to significant distributional benefits from unemployment insurance.  
At the aggregate level, asset and income inequalities have been found to be a catalyst for socio-
political unrest, macroeconomic instability and the stagnation of economic growth (see e.g. 
Benabou, 1996; Alesina & Rodrik, 1994; Persson & Tabellini, 1994). Birdsall and Londono (1997) 
investigated the effects of asset inequalities on poverty alleviation and economic growth of Latin 
America countries. In summary their findings show: (1) incomes of the very poor are highly 
sensitive to economic growth; (2) asset accumulation is the major determinant of growth in the 
income of the poor; (3) land and human capital inequalities have more severe adverse effects on 
the poor than on the rest of the population; (4) the initial threshold of asset and human capital 
inequalities impact subsequent economic growth negatively; and (5) income inequality has an 
inverse relationship with economic growth and this relationship mirrors the dynamics of asset 
accumulation and ownership in various Latin America countries. 
5.3. OVERVIEW OF POVERTY AND INEQUALITY TRENDS IN GHANA 
Ghana is one of the fastest growing economies on the Africa continent and has since 2003 been 
growing faster than the average growth rate of both West Africa and the entire continent (AfDB, 
2012b). This has resulted in the reduction of poverty from 51.7 percent in 1991 to 24.2 percent in 
2013 (GSS, 2014). Indeed, her poverty reduction rates have been acclaimed as one of the best in 
the West Africa sub-region (IFAD, 2012). In spite of this progress, poverty is still widespread in 
Ghana, although not evenly dispersed. Recent estimates indicate that about 37.9 percent of rural 
and 10.6 percent of urban population live below the poverty line (UNDP, 2011; GSS, 2014). 
Closely associated with the level of poverty are income, wealth, health and asset inequalities 
between genders and across geographical areas.  
The report of the 5th Ghana living standard survey (GLSS V) indicates improved health outcomes 
among Ghanaians. This has translated into the country recording one of the highest life 
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expectancies in sub-Saharan Africa. The life expectancy of Ghana has witnessed a consistent 
increase from 46 years in 1960 to 64 years in 2011, as against the average of 56 years for sub-
Saharan Africa (World Bank, 2011). Health expenditure per capita at purchasing power parity has 
also doubled from US$42 in 1995 to US$90 in 2011 (World Bank, 2011). Nevertheless, there are 
wide disparities in health outcomes. For instance, in Accra – the capital city – the percentage of 
children below the age of 1 year who had not been vaccinated was zero while in the rural forest 
and rural savannah the non-vaccination rates were 6.4 percent and 10.8 percent respectively 
(GSS, 2008).  
The gap between rural-urban health indicators is even more disturbing in the distribution of 
sanitation and water facilities, as shown in Table 5.1. The rural areas have much less access to 
quality sanitation and water facilities and are thus prone to cholera and water-borne diseases. 
Since 1990 the average sanitation facilities in the urban dwellings has consistently been two and 
three times more than the national and rural average access respectively. Despite the wide 
inequalities, the water sub-sector has received much investment, leading to 122 percentage 
improvement in the rural areas in the last two decades. 
Table 5.1: Access to Sanitation and Water Facilities from 1990-2010, Ghana 
Years 
Improved Sanitation Facilities Improved Water Facilities 
 Rural
a
 Urban
b
 Total
c
  Rural
a
 Urban
b
 Total
c 
 1990 4 12 7 36 84 53 
 1991 4 12 7 38 84 55 
 1992 4 13 7 40 84 57 
 1993 4 13 7 43 85 59 
 1994 5 13 8 45 85 61 
 1995 5 14 9 47 85 62 
 1996 5 14 9 49 86 64 
 1997 5 14 9 51 86 66 
 1998 5 15 9 53 87 67 
 1999 6 15 10 56 87 71 
 2000 6 16 10 58 87 71 
 2001 6 16 10 60 88 73 
 2002 6 16 11 62 88 74 
 2003 7 17 12 64 88 75 
 2004 7 17 12 66 89 77 
 2005 7 17 12 69 89 79 
 2006 7 18 12 71 89 80 
 2007 7 18 12 73 90 81 
 2008 8 19 13 75 90 82 
 2009 8 19 14 77 91 84 
 2010 8 19 14 80 91 86 
Notes:
 a
 = % of rural population with access; 
b
 = % of urban population with access and 
c
 = % of the total 
population with access.   
Source: Author’s construction based on the data of World Development Indicators, 2011. 
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It is also estimated that on average, the annual per capita consumption expenditure in Ghana is 
GHS644 (US$644), implying an overall average expenditure of about GHS2.00 (US$2.00) per 
person per day. In terms of the quintile groups, the highest quintile has an average per capita 
expenditure of about GHS1261 (US$1261). This is nine and half times higher than the per capita 
expenditure of households in the lowest quintile (GHS132.00 or US$132.00) and about two times 
more than the national average of GHS644.00 (GSS, 2008). 
The GLSS V report further indicates that about 31 percent of adults (representing a little over 4 
million people) have never been to school. A further 17 percent (representing 2.3 million people) 
attended school, but did not obtain MSLC/BECE39 certificate. It also shows a clear gender gap in 
education with almost twice as many females (2.7 million) as males (1.4 million) never attending 
school. In addition, there are fewer females (0.7 million) than males (1.1 million) with secondary or 
higher qualification. 
 
Figure 5.2: Literacy Rates of Females and Males 
Source: Author’s construction based on the data of World Development Indicators, 2011. 
According to the FAO (2012), the large gender and rural-urban education inequalities have a 
consequential impact on the labour force of the country as observed in the rural areas where as 
high as 53 percent of the labour force has no primary education. The rural-urban gap shows that 
30 percent of urban females in the workforce have secondary or higher education. The rural 
situation is alarming because only 3 percent of employed rural women have secondary or higher 
education (FAO, 2012). However, as illustrated in Figure 5.2, the literacy rate among female youth 
has improved quite remarkably: a 14 percentage increase was recorded from 2000 to 2010. This is 
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more than twice the 6 percent literacy growth of the male youth for the same period (World Bank, 
2011). A similar trend is observed for the female and male adults presented in Figure 5.2.  
The efforts made in the last decade to improve access to education, especially through free 
primary education, free distribution of school uniforms and books, and capitation grants (free meals 
for pupils) policies should be expanded to cover many more rural areas. This will not only bridge 
the inequality gap, but also develop a skilled labour force with enhanced entrepreneurial abilities to 
create and/or access better employment opportunities. This will equip them to break the grip of 
poverty and achieve sustainable prosperity. 
5.4. BRIEF OVERVIEW OF THE MICROINSURANCE INDUSTRY IN GHANA 
The microinsurance market in Ghana, although in a nascent stage has witnessed impressive 
growth in the number of firms, policyholders and underwriting activities. For example, as at the end 
of 2011, the market had about 1 259 055 microinsurance policyholders, contributed about 
GHS11 703 488 (US$6 087 473) in premiums and claims of GHS4 421 494 (US$2 299 803) have 
been paid (Buabeng & Gruijters, 2012). The microinsurance firms in Ghana are 
subsidiaries/agencies of commercial insurance companies. They provide both life and non-life 
products such as personal life cover, family life cover, accident cover, fire cover, employer life 
cover, funeral, medical cover, property, education insurance and savings-linked insurance.  
The distribution, premium collections and claims processing and payments are done by the 
commercial insurers in partnership with rural banks and microfinance institutions located in both 
the urban and rural areas of the country. What distinguishes these insurance services offered to 
the informal sector from those of the formal sector are the distribution channels and the structure of 
the premium payments. For instance, the premium payments are tailor-made to meet the seasonal 
cash flow of informal sector workers. The clients are sometimes allowed to pay premiums at 
irregular times and in uneven amounts (Tan, 2012). The insurers have agents who go to the 
market centres (or place of work) and homes of policyholders almost every week to collect the 
premiums. The claims processes are less complicated and are normally determined within 7 days 
and paid within 10 days of receipt (NIC, 2011). The flexibility in the distribution and the premium 
payments as well as the expeditious processing of claims is the backbone for the extension of 
insurance to low-income households.  
However the growth of the microinsurance industry is challenged by low levels of financial literacy, 
lack of trust in insurers and the notion that risky events are by providence (Finmark Trust, 2010). 
The industry is regulated by the same laws meant for the “formal” insurance industry. This law – 
the Insurance Act, 2006 (Act 724) – according to the insurance regulatory body40, has significant 
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 The regulatory body of the Ghanaian insurance industry is the National Insurance Commission (NIC). 
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gaps and is not abreast with the current issues in the industry (NIC, 2011). Since microinsurance is 
unique, with sector-specific features, and has new emerging characteristics (such as the bundling 
of premium payments with airtime), its regulation by the “formal” insurance laws may impede its 
rapid expansion. It is however noteworthy that the NIC has initiated steps to address some of these 
challenges.  
On the other hand the national health insurance is provided by the National Health Insurance 
Authority (NHIA). It started operations in 2003 as part of the government social intervention 
program to increase access to health care by eliminating medical payment at the point of delivery. 
It operates through 145 municipal and district mutual health insurance schemes. Each district 
distributes its scheme at designated places in rural and urban areas through registered agents and 
scheme officers who call at homes and work places to register and collect premiums from 
policyholders. It has over 5 000 service providers which are drawn from public and private 
hospitals, clinics and pharmacies. For beneficiaries to access health care they are required to 
follow the “gate-keeper system”, that is, first report to a primary care facility, and subsequently to 
the second and third levels of care by way of referral (NHIA, 2010).  
Formal sector workers pay compulsory monthly premiums to NHIA through their social security 
contributions which entitle them to the service of the health insurance scheme. Informal sector 
workers are however not bound to join the scheme. They do so voluntarily after paying the required 
premiums which range from GHS12 to GHS15 (US$8 to US$10) per person yearly. Currently, 
about 66 percent of the population has signed up for the scheme, of which 4.5 million are from the 
informal sector. It covers about 95 percent of health conditions in the country and has been 
recognized as a reliable social intervention policy for financing health care. It has increased access 
to professional medical care and skilled birth attendance, and protects policyholders, especially 
low-income households, against emergency borrowing to meet out-of-pocket expenditures. With 
increasing coverage, health services utilization has also grown, averaging two visits per head per 
year for insured persons, compared to the national level estimated at 0.5 visits (Matul et al., 2010).   
5.5. THE METHODOLOGY 
5.5.1. The Data 
The 2010 FINSCOPE national household survey on Ghana is used in the current study for the 
assessment of the influence of microinsurance policies on asset inequality among low-income 
households. The dataset contains rich information on 3 643 households’ demographics, human 
capital conditions, income and asset distributions, gender characteristics, rural-urban and regional 
dynamics, financial literacy and access to financial services, risk coping strategies among 
households, and remittances.  
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In terms of access to financial services, the dataset can broadly be classified into three categories: 
(1) access to formal financial services; (2) access to other formal and informal financial services; 
and (3) no access at all. For the purpose of this study we extracted the dataset concerning the 
informal and other formal for the analysis. As a result the dataset involving 800 households was 
extracted for the asset inequality assessment. In this study microinsurance is defined as the 
extension of insurance services to low-income households living and working in the informal 
sector. Our definition follows the microinsurance conditions outlined by the National Insurance 
Commission (NIC, 2011) which stipulates that an insurer cannot designate a product as 
microinsurance unless it is accessible, affordable and targeted at low-income households. Thus 
the dataset concerning low-income households living and working in the informal sector who are 
clients of the National Health Insurance Scheme (NHIS) and private microinsurance companies 
have been used for the analysis. 
5.5.2. The Construction of the Asset Index 
The asset index has mainly been used to investigate the dynamics and incidence of poverty 
especially in developing and emerging economies (see e.g. Sahn & Stifel, 2000; Booysen et al., 
2008; Njong & Ningaye, 2008; Echevin, 2011; Filmer & Scott, 2012; Harttgen et al., 2013). Its 
usage as an indicator of inequalities among households, which is relatively new to the empirical 
literature, has mainly been in the field of educational outcomes. For instance, McKenzie (2004) 
examined the feasibility of using an asset index to measure inequalities in the absence of reliable 
income and expenditure data. He then applied the method to Mexican data to estimate inequalities 
in school attendance among boys and girls and across geographical areas. His empirical findings 
confirm the theoretical underpinnings that asset indicators provide a better measurement of wealth 
and good proxies for inequalities in living standards.  
The same method was used earlier by Filmer and Pritchett (2001) to estimate wealth levels and 
school enrolment in India and also by Filmer and Pritchett (1999) for the evaluation of household 
wealth on educational achievement across 35 counties. McKenzie (2004) and Filmer and Pritchett 
(1999 and 2001) employed the first principal component analysis (PCA) for the creation of the 
asset indices. The challenge, however, is that the first principal component is generally appropriate 
for the estimation of continuous variables and does not assume that the underlying variables 
(assets) are normally distributed (Booysen et al., 2008). Hence instead of the PCA we have used 
multiple correspondence analyses (MCA) for the creation of the asset index.  
The MCA is a new version of the PCA and is designed for the analysis of categorical variables. Its 
ability to analyse categorical variables such as yes-no questions and asset ownership questions 
makes it very suitable for this study. Following Asselin (2009) and Echevin (2011) we created the 
asset index under this basic form: 
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𝑎𝑖 =  ∑ 𝐹1𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 𝑑𝑘𝑖              5.1 
 
The ith household asset index is αi, dki is the kth value of the categorical variables (with k=1… K) 
indicating the household’s asset variables included in the index construction, and F1k is the MCA 
weights generated for the analysis. The asset index comprises twelve (12) private households’ 
assets ranging from ownership of television or radio to refrigerator and two public utilities, access 
to water and electricity.  
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Table 5.2: Weights Generated from the MCA
41
  
 Variables Categories Weights   
Private Assets 
Mobile Phone Owns a mobile phone 0.2020 
 Does not own a mobile phone -2.7910 
Microwave Owns a microwave 2.1460 
 Does not own a microwave -0.4130 
TV Owns a TV 0.6200 
 Does not own a TV -1.2250 
Refrigerator Owns a refrigerator 1.1060 
 Does not own a fridge -1.2630 
Kitchen condition Has built-in sink 2.0060 
 No built-in sink -0.5100 
Radio Owns a radio 0.1960 
 Does not own a radio -1.2260 
DVD Player Owns a DVD player 0.9320 
 Does not own a DVD player -1.7690 
Motor Cycle Owns a motor cycle 0.1620 
 Does not own a motor cycle -0.0130 
Cooking fuel Electricity 1.8000 
 LPG gas 1.3260 
 Kerosene 1.1100 
 Charcoal/wood -2.6800 
 Others -0.1060 
Tractor Owns a tractor 2.0090 
 Does not own a tractor -0.0150 
Toilet Flush toilet 1.4660 
 Pit latrine -1.2620 
 Bush/beach/open field  -2.0520 
 Others -0.8530 
House Ownership Rented 0.3980 
 Family owned -0.3190 
 Occupied without payment 0.0780 
 Others 0.2290 
Public Facilities 
Electricity Has electricity 0.4730 
 Does not have electricity -2.7490 
Water Source Piped into house 1.9310 
 Well in house 0.7320 
 Public pipe -2.6250 
 Public well -1.7380 
 Surface water -14.240 
 Others -0.8530 
 
Source: Author’s coputation based on the 2010 FINSCOPE data of Ghana. 
The use of household assets instead of income or expenditure to measure welfare levels has been 
argued to be more theoretically appropriate and empirically reliable. For development reasons the 
asset index may capture wealth inequalities much better than income or expenditure inequalities. 
Practically data about households’ income face challenges in accuracy and measurement (Moser 
& Felton, 2007) due to recall bias, mis-measurement and the seasonal flow of income of most 
informal sector workers (McKenzie, 2004). In addition income of informal workers may be highly 
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 Since it is not possible to get negative asset (wealth), the negative asset index values were converted into 
positive values by adding a common value (2.8) across both the negative and positive asset index values. 
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variable and lumpy thus less reliable for measuring wealth inequality than workers in the formal 
sector receiving regular income (Moser & Felton, 2007). 
Using an asset index to measure welfare resolves the measurement limitations, recall bias and 
households reluctance to divulge sensitive information concerning their income or expenditure 
levels. For instance it is much easier for households to respond to yes–no questions concerning 
whether the household owns a radio or, has electricity, toilet, piped water etc., than to divulge 
information about sources and level of income or to recall consumption expenditure incurred over 
the previous month (McKenzie, 2004).   
In addition, assets are less volatile than income and consumption expenditure and hence short to 
medium-term economic changes in households’ conditions may not alter their asset levels 
substantially (Booysen et al., 2008). The build-up of assets takes longer time and therefore 
provides better insight into the long-term living standards of households than income and 
consumption expenditure (Moser & Felton, 2007). The theoretical underpinnings of using wealth 
levels or asset-based indicators to estimate physical and human capital investment and economic 
growth has also been proven in studies such as Birdsall and Londono (1997), Banerjee and 
Newman (1993), Galor and Zeira (1993), Bardhan et al. (1999) and McKenzie (2004). 
5.5.3. The Asset Inequality Estimations through the Gini Coefficient 
After the creation of the asset index through the MCA, the Gini coefficient was then used to 
estimate the asset inequality across gender and the rural-urban parity in all ten regions of Ghana. 
The calculation of the asset Gini follows the procedure for estimating the income Gini. The Gini 
index is used to calculate inequality levels among groups of people regarding the distribution of 
income, wealth, assets, land, education, food consumption, health and social class. It is calculated 
from a particular Lorenz curve (Farris, 2010) and hence is expressed visually in Figure 5.3 as the 
area between the Lorenz curve and the line of perfect equality, divided by the total area under the 
line of perfect equality (McKay, 2002). From the following Lorenz curve, the basic Gini co-efficient 
formula is given as:  
𝐺 =
𝐴
(𝐴+𝐵)
, where (𝐴 + 𝐵) = 0.5, hence, 𝐺 = 2𝐴 = 1 − 2𝐵,         5.2 
 
In the absence of a Lorenz curve, equation (5.3) can be used to determine the Gini inequality index 
(Damgaard, 2000). 
L(y) =  
∫ 𝑥
𝑦
0 𝑑𝐹(𝑥)
𝜇
              5.3 
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Figure 5.3: The Lorenz Curve 
 
The Gini index is mostly used to evaluate income inequality, and has rarely been used to 
determine asset inequality. In this study we have adopted the income Gini outlined by Dorfman 
(1979) to suit our measurement of households’ asset inequality. 
𝐺 = 1 − 1
𝜇
 ∫ (1 − 𝐹(𝑦))2𝑑𝑦
𝑦∗
0
            5.4 
 
Where 𝐹(𝑦) is the cumulative proportion of household assets; 𝜇 is the mean of the distribution and 
y* is its upper limit. The asset Gini index ranges from zero (perfect equality) to a maximum value of 
one (that is, perfect inequality, an extreme situation in which one household has all the assets).  
5.6. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
5.6.1. The Profile and Characteristics of the Sampled Households 
In order to ascertain that the households under study are relatively similar in characteristics and 
socio-economic strength, a chi-square distribution of both the insured and uninsured households is 
presented in Table 5.3. The percentage trend indicates that insured and uninsured households 
have similar living standards and socio-economic characteristics. In particular, the income of 
insured households is not significantly different from that of uninsured households. Income is noted 
in the household economics literature to be an important determinant of asset accumulation. The 
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chi-square test indicates that the income of uninsured households does not differ from that of the 
insured. To the extent that income is not statistically significant, asset inequality between the two 
groups of households may not be influenced by income. 
Table 5.3: Chi-Square Test on the Profile of Insured and Uninsured Households 
 Variable   Uninsured HH (%)
C
   Insured HH (%)
C
  Chi-Square (χ
2
.050) 
Resp. Age
T
 (mean years) 38.02 39.81  -1.7918 (0.0652)
T 
Resp. Gender   0.1014 (0.750) 
Male 47.13 48.40 
Female 52.87 51.60 
Resp. Marital Status   2.2049 (0.138) 
Married 51.65 57.57 
Others 48.35 42.43 
Resp. Education Level   8.4240 (0.015)** 
No formal Education 13.17   7.78 
Primary Education 45.27 40.96 
Secondary and above 41.56 51.26 
Household Income   0.4930 (0.782) 
0 – GHS400 69.31 66.36 
GHS401 – GHS1000 24.87 26.97 
Above GHS1000   5.82   6.67 
HH Size
T
 (mean size)   3.41   4.00 -0.586 (0.0034)***
T 
House Ownership   0.2135 (0.899) 
Rented 32.79 34.47 
Family Owned     48.36 46.80 
Occupied without payment 18.85 18.72 
Location   0.0023 (0.962) 
Urban 68.44 68.26 
Rural 31.56 31.74 
Economic Activity   0.3053 (0.581) 
Farming Enterprise 29.92 31.96 
Non-Farming Enterprises 70.08 68.04 
Proximity to Financial Inst   0.1176 (0.732) 
10 – 30 minute walk   69.23 67.62 
Above 30 minute walk 30.77 32.38 
Access to Credit   5.1651 (0.023)** 
Never borrowed 54.51 45.43 
Have borrowed 45.49 54.57 
Remittances    7.4542 (0.006)*** 
Do not Receive Remittance 52.92 63.68 
Receives Remittances 47.08 36.32 
Note: *** and ** indicate 1 and 5 percent significance levels respectively; 
C
 indicates that the addition for each variable 
is by columns; 
T
 indicates T-test instead of Chi-square.   
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2010 Finscope Data of Ghana 
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5.6.2. Tests for Selection Bias 
The demand for microinsurance can be influenced by selection bias such as self-selection, 
endogeneity and program placement bias. Without controlling for these, the actual effect of 
microinsurance on any welfare indicator can be blurred. To account for selection bias, we run a 
Heckman selection model to determine whether our sample population suffers from selection bias. 
The Heckman model uses a two-stage estimation procedure to test and control for selection bias 
(Heckman, 1979). In the first stage a probit model is estimated to capture the determinants of 
microinsurance uptake. The estimated parameters of the probit model are then used to calculate 
the inverse Mills ratio, which is used as an additional explanatory variable in the second stage 
equation (Lin, 2007; Janzen & Carter, 2013). The results indicate that selection bias as captured by 
the inverse Mills ratio is not statistically significant, which is an indication that our sample 
population does not suffer from selection bias.  The result of the test is presented in Table B.1 in 
Appendix B.  
5.6.3. Asset Inequality 
We used the Lorenz curve to graph the level of asset inequality among low-income households 
across the ten regions of Ghana. It indicates that the poorest 10 percent of the population have 2 
percent of the total household assets; the poorest 20 percent have 7 percent, while the richest 20 
and 10 percent have 75 and 85 percent of the household assets respectively.  
 
Figure 5.4: Lorenz Curve for Household Assets 
Source: Drawn by author based on the 2010 FINSCOPE Data of Ghana. 
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Table 5.4 summarizes the extent of asset inequality between gender and across localities. The 
overall asset inequality is twice as high in rural areas as in urban settings. This sharp disparity 
between the rural and urban divide is less profound in the gender ownership of assets. For 
instance, the gender inequality gap in asset holdings in the urban centres is just 1 percentage 
point, while that of rural males and females is at par. This seems to suggest that the enormous 
asset inequality in Ghana has little to do with gender issues. The real differences are however 
observed between genders across the rural-urban divide. For example, whereas male and female-
headed households in urban areas have relatively lower asset inequality rates of 13 and 14 
percent respectively, asset inequality of their counterparts in the rural areas is twice high. 
Surprisingly, male-headed households in rural areas have twice as much asset inequality as 
female-headed households in urban areas.  
Table 5.4: Asset Gini Coefficient 
 
Urban 0.14 0.13 0.14 
Rural 0.28 0.28 0.28 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on 2010 FINSCOPE Data, Ghana. 
Another useful way of understanding the large degrees of asset inequality is to draw a comparison 
across the entire sampled population. Table 5.5 accomplishes this comparison by providing the 
percentile distributions of the asset inequality across intra-genders. Considerable variations in 
asset ownership exist between the bottom 10th percentile and the upper 10th percentile. Asset 
ownership of male-headed households in the top 10th percentile is about four times higher than that 
of the bottom 10th percentile, while female asset ownership in the top 10th percentile is more than 
three times as large as the bottom 10th of the distribution.  
The asset disparity is even more profound between the top and bottom distribution relative to the 
median. For example, whereas the bottom 1 percentile deviates substantially from the median by 
as much as 8 times, the top 1 percentile deviate from the median by just 1.5 times. The top and 
bottom asset ownership disparities are enormous, with the top 1 percentile far outdistancing the 
bottom 1 percentile by about 12 times.            
  
Asset Inequality 
Locality All  Male  Female 
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Table 5.5: Percentiles Distribution of Assets by Gender. 
Asset Inequality 
 Percentiles All Male Female 
 1 0.37 0.37  0.39 
 5 0.91 0.91  0.91 
10 1.22 1.14  1.25 
25 2.15 2.15       2.11 
50 2.96 2.98  2.96 
75 3.54 3.45  3.57 
90 4.05 3.99  4.17 
95 4.25 4.25  4.25 
99 4.33 4.33  4.34 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on 2010 FINSCOPE Data, Ghana. 
Table 5.6 also highlights the extent of disparities in rural and urban areas at selected percentiles of 
the asset distribution. The bottom 10th percentile of urban households’ asset ownership is 2.10 
while the corresponding asset ownership of rural dwellers is 0.78, indicating a very significant gap 
of 132 percent. The observed intra-spatial (intra-urban and intra-rural) differences are even more 
disturbing. The asset ownership gap between the bottom 10th and the upper 10th percentiles in the 
urban areas is a remarkable 225 percent, which is an indication that the gap between the urban 
non-poor and poor even among households in the informal sector is big and thus demands 
concerted efforts to bring it under control. The story of the rural non-poor and poor is much worse 
with the non-poor overwhelmingly outpacing the poor by 322 percent.  
Table 5.6: Distribution of Assets, Rural-Urban Divide 
                    Asset Inequality 
 Percentiles All Urban Rural 
 1 0.37  1.04  0.32 
 5 0.91  1.63  0.57 
10 1.22  2.10  0.78 
25 2.15  2.73  1.15 
50 2.96  3.20  1.91 
75 3.54  3.75  2.77 
90 4.05  4.25  3.31 
95 4.25  4.26  3.65 
99 4.33  4.35  4.00 
 
Source: Author’s computations based on 2010 FINSCOPE Data, Ghana. 
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5.6.4. The Effect of Microinsurance on Asset Inequality 
This section advances the analysis by investigating the influence of microinsurance on the levels of 
inequalities observed among low-income households. In particular, we determine whether 
commercial microinsurance and the government health insurance products can lower asset 
inequalities.  The computed asset inequality is presented in Table 5.7. The first part42 of Table 5.7 
deals with the influence of private microinsurance on asset inequality, while the second part refers 
to the effect of the government-based microinsurance on asset inequality. Column 2 shows the 
average asset Gini for gender, rural-urban divide and the ten administrative regions. Columns 3 
and 4 reveal the asset Gini for the uninsured and the insured respectively; while column 5 presents 
the differences between the asset Gini of the uninsured and the insured households. 
The total asset inequality (column 2) indicates no gender disparity among low-income households 
in asset holdings. This result suggests that among low-income households, female-headed 
households do not lag behind their male counterparts in asset ownership. Unsurprisingly, the result 
shows that rural households have twice as much asset inequality as urban households. This 
finding confirms the empirics (see e.g. Ravallion et al., 2007; Booysen et al., 2008; Echevin, 2011; 
Sahn & Stifel, 2003) that rural dwellers are unambiguously disadvantaged in terms of acquisition of 
critical assets for welfare enhancement. 
The regional trend indicates higher asset inequalities in Brong Ahafo, Upper East and West, with 
the Northern region having the highest asset inequality which is three times greater than that of 
Greater Accra region. Even among insured households, the trend observed in both Brong Ahafo 
and Northern regions is unusual. They are the only regions where insured households’ asset 
inequality is higher than both the regional averages and uninsured households. This unusual trend 
is observed for Brong Ahafo region in both the government and private microinsurance schemes 
and for Northern region in only the private schemes. The contextual issues of these regions may 
be the possible reasons underlying these unusual observations. They have the largest land size in 
Ghana. The geographical area of Northern and Brong Ahafo regions are 70 384 sq.km and 39 557 
sq.km respectively (GSS, 2013), which translates into 46.1 percent of the total land size of Ghana. 
Nevertheless, they are among the most least developed and poorest regions of the country, with 
little access to amenities to needed for asset build-up. This may imply that insurance matters, but 
in the absence of development or in the presence of development gaps which may limit asset 
availability, insurance may not do much to bridge the inequality gap.  
The Upper East region has the highest inequality gap between insured and uninsured households 
under both schemes. The asset inequality of uninsured households in the region is 26 percent 
                                               
42
 The definitions of the columns in the first part of Table 7 apply to the second part.  
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greater than that of insured households under the private microinsurance schemes. A similar trend 
of 16 percent is observed for the same region under the government scheme. 
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Table 5.7: Gini Coefficient of the Asset Index 
 Private Microinsurance Schemes Government Health Insurance Scheme 
Variables 
      Average 
         Gini Uninsured Insured (UNI-INS) 
     Average 
       Gini               Uninsured      Insured (UNI-INS) 
Asset Gini 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.03 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.04 
Gender 
Male 0.20 0.22 0.19 0.03 0.20 0.21 0.19 0.02 
Female 0.20 0.22 0.18 0.04 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.05 
Locality 
Urban 0.14 0.16 0.12 0.04 0.14 0.15 0.12 0.03 
Rural 0.27 0.29 0.26 0.03 0.27 0.31 0.25 0.06 
Regions 
Western 0.22 0.24 0.21 0.03 0.22 0.26 0.19 0.07 
Central 0.20 0.24 0.17 0.07 0.20 0.24 0.15 0.09 
Greater Accra 0.11 0.13 0.10 0.03 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.01 
Volta 0.24 0.38 0.21 0.17 0.24 0.23 0.20 0.03 
Eastern 0.19 0.25 0.16 0.09 0.19 0.27 0.16 0.11 
Ashanti 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.01 0.13 0.15 0.13 0.02 
Brong Ahafo 0.25 0.20 0.29 -0.09 0.25 0.25 0.29 -0.04 
Northern 0.34 0.34 0.35 -0.01 0.34 0.39 0.30 0.09 
Upper East 0.29 0.47 0.21 0.26 0.29 0.38 0.22 0.16 
Upper West 0.25 0.32 0.25 0.07 0.25 0.38 0.25 0.13 
Total                                3.23                   3.82             3.02             0.80                     3.23                   3.78             2.91              0.87 
Note: UNI is Uninsured Households; INS is Insured Households. 
Source: Author’s computations based on the 2010 FINSCOPE data of Ghana 
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A comparison between average asset Gini and insured households indicate a consistent lower 
asset inequality among the insured across both genders, in the rural-urban setting and in eight of 
the ten regions. The overall asset Gini of insured households (under the private microinsurance 
schemes) is 21 percent less than the average asset Gini across all the variables. In contrast, the 
Gini inequality among the uninsured households (column 3) is persistently higher than the average 
asset inequality between genders and across all the geographical variables except in two regions. 
Indeed the combined asset inequality of the uninsured households is 59 percent higher than the 
average asset inequality across gender and locations. The asset inequality of uninsured female-
headed households is 4 percent higher than that of insured female-headed households. This trend 
is also observed in the government schemes among insured female-headed households and 
uninsured female-headed households. Similarly, the asset inequality of uninsured rural dwellers is 
greater than that of insured rural dwellers by 3 percent and 6 percent under the private and 
government schemes respectively.  
The general influence of the government health insurance scheme in lowering asset inequality is 
even more substantial than the private microinsurance. It has an asset inequality lower than the 
average asset inequality by 31 percent, compared to 21 percent for the private microinsurance. 
The regional breakdown indicates that, apart from Brong Ahafo, households with the government 
health insurance scheme have asset inequality levels below or equal to the average asset 
inequality index. With regard to gender, female-headed households under the government scheme 
have lower asset inequality than male-headed households. Interestingly, uninsured female-headed 
households have much higher asset inequality than both uninsured males and insured male-
headed households. This may imply that insured female-headed households are much better off 
than uninsured female-headed households.  
The overall trend in the results shows that insured households have relatively lower levels of asset 
inequality than the uninsured. This confirms the findings of Burkhauser and Simon (2010), Erksoy 
et al. (1995) and Countryman (1999). Insurance may not necessarily lead to direct purchases of 
more assets and hence reduce inequality, however, the indemnity cover enjoyed by the insured 
prevents asset losses and thus frees up other financial resources, such as savings, for more asset 
acquisitions. This relationship between insurance indemnity and asset loss prevention is the most 
important factor that reduces asset inequality among insured households as witnessed in the 
analysis above. 
5.7. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
Microinsurance is noted for its ability to enable low-income households to manage risks 
proactively, prevent asset loss and make a sustainable exit from poverty. In this study we have 
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assessed the influence of private and government microinsurance schemes on asset inequality 
among low-income households in Ghana.  
The results indicate that insured households have lower levels of asset inequality than uninsured 
households. Interestingly, insured female-headed households benefit more from both schemes 
than insured male-headed households, while uninsured female-headed households are worse off 
than their uninsured male counterparts. The geographical dimension shows that insured rural 
dwellers have lower asset inequality than the rural uninsured. However, the analyses of Northern 
and Brong Ahafo regions reveal that large developmental gaps may limit the effect of 
microinsurance on the asset inequality gap.  
The findings of this study require policy directions and actions that will encourage more low-income 
households to take up microinsurance schemes. For instance, microinsurance firms have been 
using the regulations of the “formal” insurance companies to regulate their activities. However, the 
unique nature of the microinsurance industry demands a separate policy and regulatory framework 
to operate effectively. A strong and robust regulatory framework that meets international standards 
will encourage more microinsurance firms to enter the market.  
Large scale extension of microinsurance to the urban poor and millions of poor people living in 
geographically disperse and remote rural areas entail a lot of efforts and high transaction costs. 
Indeed high transaction costs involved in reaching the lower end of the market have compelled 
most insurers to locate in the national capital and other large towns. A public policy that will reduce 
the cost of transactions may incentivize more insurers to extend microinsurance services to many 
remote areas. For example, the current rural banking policy that gives tax exemptions to rural 
banks in their first five years of establishment could be replicated in the microinsurance sector.  
Achieving depth and large scale extension in a cost-effective manner can also be done through the 
use of mobile phone technology.  The concept of mobile banking has proven to be cost effective in 
extending banking services to millions of poor households who were previously excluded from 
formal banking. A “mobile microinsurance” can be designed along the lines of the mobile banking 
concept to meet the specific needs of microinsurance transactions. Already two mobile companies 
have started bundling microinsurance with their services. A formal policy and regulatory backing 
will increase the confidence of the public in “mobile microinsurance” and possibly encourage other 
entities to venture into it. This will not only increase the uptake of microinsurance, but it will equip 
low-income households to protect their assets against risk, escape poverty and gradually bridge 
the asset inequality gap. Future studies may consider using panel data to analyse the dynamic 
influence of microinsurance on asset inequality.  
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CHAPTER 6  
DOES MICROCREDIT INCREASE HOUSEHOLD WELFARE IN THE 
ABSENCE OF MICROINSURANCE?43 
6.1. INTRODUCTION 
Micro financial services – microcredit, microsavings and microinsurance – can help households 
manage exposure to risks and improve household welfare through income and consumption 
smoothing, asset accumulation and women empowerment. Microcredit provides low-income 
households with funding in a timely manner to acquire essential assets and meet certain 
unexpected expenses. This has facilitated the growth of its customers in developing countries from 
16.5 million in 1997 to 154.8 million clients in 2007 representing 838.2 percent growth (Daley-
Harris, 2009). Microcredit, especially productive loans, has been found to increase per capita 
household income (Imai & Azam, 2010), enhances households’ multidimensional well-being and 
improves the living standards of rural folks (Adjei et al., 2009; Imai et al., 2010). 
Similarly, microinsurance is the defence of low-income households living and working in the 
informal sector against specific risks in exchange for regular premium payments proportionate to 
the probability and cost of the risk involved (Churchill, 2007). It is a risk transfer tool that helps low-
income households to escape poverty traps (Dercon, 2003) by protecting them against the 
financial consequences of life-cycle risks (Binnendijk et al., 2012). Combining microinsurance with 
microcredit or microsavings services may ensure that income and consumption smoothing is done 
with ease. It may eliminate asset pawning or liquidation at “give-away” prices and thus promotes 
financial stability among low-income households. These three micro financial services complete 
the risk management toolkit needed by low-income households to manage risk effectively and 
efficiently in order to improve their welfare outcomes. 
Although microcredit has a lot of potential for extending markets, increasing welfare and fostering 
socio-economic change, it presents a number of puzzles, many of which have not yet been 
resolved conclusively (Armendariz and Morduch, 2010). In particular the available empirical 
evidence about its impact on households’ welfare has been inconclusive and controversial. 
Whereas one group of researchers (such as Schuler et al., 1997; Pitt and Khandker, 1996) provide 
evidence of the beneficial socio-economic impact, others such as Adams and Von Pischke (1992) 
and Rogaly (1996) indicate otherwise.  
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 Under review at World Development. 
An extract from this paper was presented at the Economic Society of South Africa Biennial Conference, 25-
27 September, 2013, University of the Free State, Bloemfontein, South Africa. 
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The current study seeks to stimulate discussion into new ways of making microcredit a welfare 
enhancing instrument. This discussion may help researchers and policy makers to resolve the 
controversies generated among the three strands of the literature. Microcredit may be good, but its 
true potential to improve the welfare of the poor is best realized in combination with an appropriate 
microinsurance scheme. The trap of poverty is not only the lack of credit, but also life cycle and 
economic risks that threaten the very survival of the poor. Thus giving them credit without 
indemnifying them against risks may have little or no positive impact on them. Whereas 
microinsurance covers the health, funeral, fire, theft, drought and economic risks of the poor, 
microcredit enhances their income generating capacity through the financing of new machines, 
improved seeds for cultivation, improved animal breeds and expansion of microenterprises.  
In the event of risk the pay-out from microinsurance ensures that microcredit funds are not diverted 
to resolve the risky event. Hence advancing microcredit to the poor in combination with 
microinsurance will equip them to face the shackles of poverty head-on and make a permanent 
escape from poverty. The evidence emerging from this line of thought confirms that microcredit if 
combined with microinsurance can improve the well-being of the poor. For instance, Chakrabarty 
(2012) reports that microcredit in combination with microinsurance has a very strong effect in 
reducing child labour among extremely poor households in Bangladesh. 
Much of the attention of the studies on combined microfinance – microcredit in combination with 
microinsurance or microsavings – has been focused on microfinance institutions’ (MFIs) product 
diversification (see e.g. Caplan, 2008; Labie, 2009; Kwon, 2010) and on MFIs sustainability and 
productivity (Rossel-Cambier, 2012). The literature indicates that combined microfinance can be 
beneficial to MFIs in the form of reduced overhead costs resulting from integrated client 
administration, lower transaction cost, wider outreach and client loyalty (Morduch, 2004; ILO, 
2007). It also improves loan repayments rates (Bond and Rai, 2009) as well as the efficiency and 
productivity of MFIs (Rossel-Cambier, 2012).  
This study seeks to re-focus the research into combined microfinance on the clients rather than on 
MFIs in order to determine whether combined microfinance inure to the benefits of low-income 
households. In particular we ask: are combined microfinance products better than stand-alone 
products in improving the welfare of low-income households? To this extent, it is worth exploring 
whether the combination of microcredit with microinsurance either enhances the welfare of low-
income households or makes them even more vulnerable.  
We examine this research question through the use of an asset index instead of money metric 
income and consumption expenditure as a measure of welfare of low-income households. To 
control for selection bias and endogeneity we employed three empirical models: Heckman sample 
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selection, treatment effects and instrumental variable models to estimate the individual and the 
combined effects of microcredit and microinsurance on household welfare. 
This chapter is organized as follows: the review of the literature is captured in section 6.1, section 
6.2 provides an overview of the microfinance industry in Ghana; the methodology is in section 6.3, 
the results are presented and discussed in section 6.4 and the conclusion is presented in section 
6.5.  
6.2. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Microfinance exists to meet the needs of those households and microenterprises which have been 
excluded or segmented out of the formal financial market due to reasons such as clients lack of 
tangible collateral, perceived as highly risky due to informational opacity and the high transaction 
cost involved in intermediating for such low-income clients (Abor & Biekpe, 2006; Tagoe et al., 
2005). The extension of credit to low-income earners assists in the creation of households 
microenterprises, which helps to generate employment and extra income for poor households and 
villages (Bateman, 2010). The additional income generated enhances the welfare of households 
through improved nutrition and consumption, investment in household members’ education, and 
some modest investment in productive and households’ durable assets.  
According to Bateman (2010:25), “poverty is not simply a lack of income; it is also a lack of income 
at the time it is needed”. Hence for the poor, getting microcredit to smooth out certain key 
household consumption expenditures is a great relief afforded them by MFIs. For instance, during 
the lean or dry season, rural farmers are assisted by microloans to meet their households’ health 
and education expenditures. Such loans, which are then repaid during the harvesting period, 
enable poor farmers to compensate for the ups and downs of economic life and overcome 
vulnerability (Bateman, 2010). By aiding households to smooth out consumption of essential 
expenditures such as health and education, microfinance enhances the capacity of the poor to 
increase their skills and value on the job market, which is critical for sustainable poverty reduction. 
Despite acknowledging the potential welfare enhancing effect of microcredit services, Bateman 
(2010) provoked an intense debate about the ability of microfinance to lead to sustainable 
improvement in the welfare of poor households. He argued that the so-called welfare impact 
vehicles – income and employment generation, consumption smoothing, gender empowerment 
and a helper of the helpless (poorest) – through which microfinance is acclaimed to impact 
positively on the poor are all myths and “largely built on hype and on egregious half-truths”. He 
further posits quite strongly that “microfinance is largely antagonistic to sustainable economic and 
social development, and so also to sustainable poverty reduction. Put simply, microfinance does 
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not work” (Bateman, 2010:1). The crux of his argument is that microfinance is a poverty trap and 
an anti-development policy. 
6.2.1. The Empirical Literature 
The empirical literature concerning the microfinance industry is growing in leaps and bounds and 
so are the controversies regarding its capacity to equip the poor to escape the poverty trap. The 
evidence concerning its effects on welfare is very much inconclusive, ranging from the very radical 
position of Bateman (2010) that microfinance does not work as well as the near zero impact in 
Thailand (Cull et al., 2009) to the remarkable positive effects in Bangladesh (Imai & Azam, 2010). 
This section reviews three strands of the empirical literature: studies showing positive, negative 
and mixed/zero impacts of microcredit.  
On the positive side, Imai et al. (2010) used the nation-wide cross sectional data of India collected 
by the Small Industries Development Bank of India (SIDBI) on 5 260 clients and non-clients of 20 
MFIs affiliated to SIDBI. The authors used an index based on households’ food security and socio-
economic characteristics to rank households on five index-based ranking indicators ranging from 
the very poor households to households with surplus resources. They then employed the treatment 
effect model to estimate the effects of microfinance productive loans on household poverty 
alleviation. Propensity score matching and Tobit regression were used to augment and check the 
robustness of the results. Their findings indicate that microfinance productive loans have a 
significant positive influence on households’ welfare outcomes and that this positive impact is more 
profound in rural areas than in urban centres.  
In a similar study Imai and Azam (2010) used four series of national panel data of the Bangladesh 
Rural Employment Support Foundation (PKSF) collected on 3 000 participants and non-
participants households of 13 MFIs across Bangladesh.  The study reports that access to MFIs’ 
productive loans has a significant increasing impact on households’ per capita income, but access 
to general loans does not. The paper further indicates that the analysis of each series of the panel 
data shows a reducing trend of the strength of microfinance to equip households to reduce poverty: 
that is, the capacity of microfinance to reduce poverty, even though positive, is at a reducing rate. 
The authors thus conclude by calling for the re-focusing of microfinance on its primary objective of 
reducing poverty and the need to monitor loans utilization. 
A similar study in Ghana on a cross-section survey of 547 households was conducted by Adjei et 
al. (2009) to evaluate how the products of one microfinance institution – Sinapi Aba Trust (SAT) – 
facilitates asset build-up among the program participants. In particular, the study assessed how 
access to loans and loan amount influenced the tendency of participants to save money and to join 
a welfare scheme. In addition, the impacts of access to loans and loan amount on clients’ human 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
117 
 
 
capital and physical capital was evaluated. The study reports that participation in the SAT program 
enhances clients’ savings culture and increases enrolment in the welfare scheme, which in turn 
reduces clients’ vulnerability to crisis. It further indicates that clients are better equipped by SAT to 
provide better education and health care for their households and to acquire durable assets.  
The distributional impact of the financial system with and without the microfinance industry of 
Bangladesh was evaluated by Mahjabeen (2008). The social accounting matrix data of Bangladesh 
for the period 1999 to 2000 was analysed through the basic and extended version of general 
equilibrium techniques by the author to ascertain the real impacts of MFIs. The evidence provided 
by the study indicates that microfinance has a positive impact on households’ income and 
expenditure levels, decreases inequalities and improves welfare. This finding lends support to 
earlier studies about Bangladesh (Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Khandker, 2005) that microfinance is a 
potent developmental tool and has the potential to lift the poor from poverty trap, reduce economic 
inequalities and facilitate the rapid attainment of the millennium development goals. 
Other studies on microfinance and women empowerment (Pitt et al., 2006; Pitt et al., 2003; Pitt et 
al., 1999; Pitt & Khandker, 1998; Sharma & Zeller, 1997; Hulme & Mosley, 1996) have indicated 
that microfinance programs enhance female participants’: (i) business acumen and decision 
making skills; (ii) financial and economic resourcefulness; (iii) formation of social capital networks; 
and (iv) better parenting control in the education, nutrition and health of households members.  
Female borrowers have also been noted as credit-worthy and thus their participation in a 
microcredit program improves the productivity and self-sustainability of MFIs (Sharma & Zeller, 
1997; Hulme & Mosley, 1996). Similarly, Afrane (2002) provides evidence from quantitative and 
qualitative studies on two microfinance schemes from Ghana and South Africa that microcredit 
empowers women to growth their businesses and even perform better than men in enterprise 
development. He further indicates that microcredit improves the financial independence, self-worth 
and confidence of women. 
Despite the general positive impacts of microfinance on households’ welfare, some studies found 
that MFIs have either negative or no impacts at all on households’ poverty reducing efforts. Adams 
and Von Pischke (1992) argue that microcredit cannot help the poor to escape poverty nor can it 
improve the economic welfare of the vulnerable. Two studies which have heightened the debate on 
the welfare enhancing effects of microfinance are that of Pitt and Khandker (1998) and Morduch 
(1998) on Bangladesh. Whereas Pitt and Khandker (1998) report that microfinance has a positive 
marginal impact on households’ consumption, Morduch (1998) finds an inverse impact of 
microfinance on consumption.     
Morduch’s (1998) analysis further reveals that the educational outcomes of program participating 
households are in fact below that of the control group. The difference between these two studies is 
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probably due to the selection of the control group since this has been the major hindrance to 
effective impact evaluation. As Morduch admits, although the control group do not have access to 
formal microfinance credit, they are nevertheless served by NGOs and other informal lenders. This 
might have blurred the actual differences between the control group and the treatment group. 
Although Coleman (1999) did extremely well to correct selection bias, endogenous program 
placement and the control group deficiencies, the results reveals that microfinance has no impact 
on households’ poverty reducing efforts. In particular the findings show that: (i) rural banks have a 
significant adverse effect on men’s healthcare expenditure; (ii) some of the women have been 
trapped in a vicious cycle of high interest debt because they borrow from moneylenders to service 
the village bank loans; and (iii) the loans are not being invested in any productive venture. 
Coleman attributed some of the findings to the small loan size and context-specific issues.  
Similarly, Annim, Dasmani and Armah (2011:1) report from an investigation into the effect of credit 
on household food consumption that “access to credit does not contribute to the smoothening of 
household consumption”. Therefore the authors, among others recommend the bundling of 
insurance with credit in order to enhance the benefits that households derive from credit. 
Another group of studies produce mixed results on the welfare effects of microfinance. For 
example, Kondo et al. (2008) indicate that whereas access to loans has a significant positive effect 
on income and expenditures of richer households, its influence on poorer households is 
retrogressive. The link between household asset accumulations, human capital investments and 
micro financial services was also found to be non-existent. Coleman (2006) undertook a survey of 
444 households in 14 villages in northeast Thailand between 1995-96 to assess the outreach and 
the true beneficiaries of micro financial services. Eight villages out of the 14 were randomly 
selected as treatment villages and, after controlling for program placement bias as well as 
participants’ selection bias, weighted logit regression was used for the econometric estimation. The 
findings were mixed. Whereas the well to-do participants, especially the village committee 
members, derived significant positive impacts, the impact on the ordinary members was negligible.  
Makina and Malobola (2004) report from their evaluation of the Khula Enterprise Finance Limited of 
South Africa that microfinance has a significant positive influence on clients’ welfare, women’s 
economic empowerment and on microenterprises’ access to finance. However, the study also 
indicates that the desired impact on poor rural communities is minimal. This is an indication that 
microfinance may not necessarily be for the “very poor” communities as it is originally meant to be. 
In a cross-country study Hulme and Mosley (1996) also found that the positive impact of 
microfinance is much more substantial to richer clients than the ultra-poor.  
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6.3. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MICROFINANCE INDUSTRY IN GHANA 
Urban areas dominate most sub-Saharan Africa financial markets (Mpuga, 2004) to the detriment 
of rural folks and microenterprises which remain excluded from the formal financial sector 
(Hofmeister, 1999). Much of the efforts to extend formal financial services to the excluded have 
come from MFIs through the support of the international development community. Anecdotal 
evidence indicates that the journey of the microfinance industry in Ghana began in the Northern 
Region in 1955 with the establishment of a credit union by Roman Catholic Church missionaries 
from Canada (Bank of Ghana, 2007; Nanor, 2008). This microfinance idea spread to other parts of 
the country and, together with the susu and rotating savings and credit concepts, the rural financial 
architecture was laid.  
Financial sector reforms and certain key regulations, such as the PNDC Law 328 that allowed the 
operations of different variant of MFIs, have facilitated the evolution and growth of the microfinance 
industry tremendously. Firms in the microfinance industry are licensed and regulated by the Bank 
of Ghana (BoG). As at March 2013, the BoG had licensed 133 rural and community banks (RCBs), 
144 savings and loans companies (SLCs), 24 moneylenders and 3 financial NGOs (FNGOs) (see 
Table 6.1). 
Table 6.1: Types and Number of Registered MFIs in Ghana 
Type of MFI Number Registered 
     Formal MFIs 
Rural and community banks 133 
Savings and loans companies 144 
     Semi-Formal MFIs 
Credit Unions 380 
Financial NGOs 3 
      Informal MFIs 
Traditional money lenders 24 
Source: BoG, 2007; ARB Apex Bank, 2012 
 
MFIs are licensed into three business categories: formal MFIs, semi-formal MFIs and informal 
MFIs (Bank of Ghana, 2007). Examples of the formal MFIs are rural and community banks (RCBs), 
and savings and loans companies (SLCs). The formal MFIs accept deposits and make loans. They 
provide financial intermediation to rural communities, create a culture of formal banking among 
rural dwellers and facilitate the financing of rural microenterprises (Bank of Ghana, 2006). For 
example, RCBs provide the largest financial intermediation to rural communities and their branch 
network is about 50 percent of the banking outreach in Ghana (IFAD, 2008).  
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The semi-formal MFIs are mutual or member-based financial societies. They provide savings and 
credit products to a defined community such as a trade union, church or any recognized society. In 
most cases the clients are also the owners and hence such MFIs normally do not offered financial 
services to the general public. Examples of the semi-formal MFIs are credit unions, financial NGOs 
and cooperatives. Although the credit unions are under the general supervision of the BoG, they 
are registered and regulated by the Credit Unions Association of Ghana. They are registered as 
workplace-based, faith-based or community-based credit unions. The informal MFIs are the 
traditional moneylenders, susu collectors, and the rotating, savings and credit associations 
(ROSCAs) (Bank of Ghana, 2007).  
The MFI sector is faced with enormous challenges which can broadly be decomposed into four: (1) 
inadequate regulatory and supervisory structures resulting in the setting up of Ponzi schemes and 
mushrooming44 of MFIs across the country; (2) very weak governance and risk management 
structures in most MFIs; (3) low levels of skills and lack of professionalism among most managers 
of MFIs; (4) low levels of equity capital (Nanor, 2008). Addressing these challenges will unleash 
the immense potential of MFIs to increase outreach and extend formal financial services to the 
poor and the “missing middle”.   
6.4. THE METHODOLOGY 
6.4.1. The Data 
The household survey on access and usage of financial services collected by Finmark Trust in 
2010 for Ghana was used for this study. The sampling technique involved stratified multi-stage 
random sampling comprising households in geographically enumerated rural and urban settings in 
all ten regions of the country. Face-to-face interviews and semi-structured questionnaires were 
used to gather the data from 3 643 households. The survey contains very rich information on 
households’ demographic features, economic conditions, social backgrounds, asset and income 
levels, access to social amenities, financial knowledge and risk management, perception about 
financial institutions, remittances and access to credit, and insurance and savings products.  
In terms of access to financial services, the dataset can be broadly classified into three categories: 
(1) access to formal financial services such as commercial banks; (2) access to other formal 
financial services (such as microfinance firms, insurance firms, savings and loans companies, rural 
and community banks) and informal financial services (such as savings clubs, susu, ROSCAS); 
and (3) no access at all. For the purposes of this study we extracted the data set concerning 
households’ usage of informal financial services and other formal financial services. In all 800 
households were drawn for the empirical investigation.  
                                               
44
 The Bank of Ghana has closed down some of these MFIs. 
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6.4.2. The Profile and Characteristics of the Sampled Households 
A chi-square45 test on the profile and economic characteristics of households using microcredit 
(HH_Credit) and those without microcredit (HH_No Credit) is reported in Table 6.2. The chi-square 
distribution indicates that apart from gender and income levels, the two groups of households do 
not differ statistically from each other in age, family size, education, housing, location, economic 
activity and access to financial services. Whereas the income of HH_Credit is concentrated in the 
medium quintile (GHS401-GHS1000), households without microcredit are within the bottom and 
upper quintiles of the income bracket. 
Table 6.2: Chi-Square Test on the Profile of Microcredit participants and Non-participants 
Variable HH_Credit (%)
C
  HH_No Credit (%)
C
  Chi-Square (χ
2
.050) 
Resp. Age
T
 (mean years) 39.568 38.744 -0.8245 (0.234)
T  
Resp. Gender   4.0880 (0.043)**   
Male 51.71 43.98 
Female 48.29 56.02 
Resp. Marital Status   1.7085 (0.191)   
Married 57.88 52.89 
Others 42.12 44.11 
Resp. Education Level   0.7988 (0.671)   
No formal Education 9.20 10.24 
Primary Education 41.38 43.67 
Secondary and above 49.43 46.08 
Household Income   6.8700 (0.032)** 
0 – GHS400 63.12 71.88 
GHS401 – GHS1000 31.18 21.09 
Above GHS1000 5.70 7.03 
HH Size
T
 (mean size) 3.79 3.79 -0.0049 (0.490)
T  
House Ownership    1.4629 (0.481)   
Rented 36.00 31.63 
Family Owned 45.71 49.10 
Occupied without payment 18.29 19.28 
Location   2.6316 (0.105)   
Urban 71.14 65.36 
Rural 28.86 34.64 
Economic Activity   1.2227 (0.269)   
Farming Enterprise 33.14 29.22 
Non-Farming Enterprises        66.86   70.78 
Proximity to Financial Ins   1.3151 (0.251)   
10 – 30 minute walk   70.40   65.38 
Above 30 minute walk 29.60   34.62 
Remittances    2.4247 (0.119)  
Do not Receive Remittance 37.28   43.16 
Receive Remittances 62.72   56.84 
Note: ** indicate 5 percent significance level; 
C
 indicates that the addition for each variable is by columns;   
T
indicates 
T-test instead of Chi-square. 
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2010 FINSCOPE Data of Ghana. 
 
6.4.3. The Estimation Techniques 
This study seeks to determine whether access to microcredit without microinsurance might 
increase household welfare. The sample population is divided into three: (1) households using 
microcredit, but not microinsurance; (2) households using microcredit and microinsurance; and (3) 
                                               
45
 The chi-square and the t-test were used for the categorical and continuous variables respectively. 
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households without microcredit or microinsurance. The microfinance programs under this study 
were not assigned randomly, hence the estimation technique is confined to a sample population in 
which all households have access to microfinance services (microcredit and microinsurance), but 
some decided not to take up these financial products. The non-randomization of the products 
creates selection bias and endogeneity problems associated with the uptake of microfinance 
programs. Hence the estimation is done to account for selection bias and endogeneity problems by 
using the following techniques: Heckman sample selection method, treatment effect model and 
instrumental variable modelling. 
6.4.3.1. The Heckman Sample Selection Model 
Heckman’s (1974, 1978 and 1979) model for sample selection is a two-step technique for 
evaluating nonrandomized programs. It is used to correct selection bias. The first step involves the 
estimation of a probit function on the determinants of the uptake of microcredit46. The probit model 
for microcredit is a binary variable which takes the value of one (1) if household i has taken up 
microcredit otherwise zero (0). This is given in the following set up as: 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 = {
1 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖 ℎ𝑎𝑠 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡               
           
 0 𝑖𝑓 ℎ𝑜𝑢𝑠𝑒ℎ𝑜𝑙𝑑 𝑖 𝑛𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑟 ℎ𝑎𝑑 𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑟𝑜𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡
     
        6.1 
The above set up is given as: 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 𝑧𝑖𝛿 +  𝜇𝑖                 6.2 
Thus   𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 1|𝑧𝑖) = 𝛷(𝑧𝑖𝛿)   and 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 0|𝑧𝑖) = 1 − 𝛷(𝑧𝑖𝛿)     
 
Where zi is a vector of exogenous variables determining treatment (the uptake of microcredit) and 
𝚽(∙) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function. The parameters of the probit function 
are then used to calculate the inverse Mills ratio (hazard lambda) which is then included in the 
outcome equation as an additional independent variable (Janzen and Carter, 2013; Lin, 2007). The 
inverse Mills ratio accounts for possible selection bias and omitted variables or the unexplained 
variations in the error term, and is given as: 
𝜆𝑖 =
𝜙(𝑧𝑖?̂?)
Φ(𝑧𝑖δ̂)
                  6.3 
 
Where 𝝀𝒊 is the inverse Mills ratio, 𝝓 is standard normal density function, and 𝚽 is as defined in the 
probit model above. The second step equation (that is, the effect of microcredit on household 
welfare) is then estimated with the inverse Mills ratio as an additional independent variable. 
𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 =  𝛽0 + 𝛽1𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 + 𝛽2𝜆𝑖 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖          6.4 
                                               
46
 The estimations of the microinsurance model follow the same procedure. 
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Where 𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 is the household welfare indicator; 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 is the uptake of microcredit; 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑖is a 
vector of control variables such as education, age, marital status, rural-urban setting, income and 
economic activity; and the error terms (𝜇𝑖;  𝜀𝑖) of equations (6.2) and (6.4) are both bivariate normal 
with mean zero.  
6.4.3.2. The Treatment Effect Model 
The treatment effect model performs the estimation for both the program participants and non-
participants simultaneously. The selection and outcome equations are indicated in (6.5) and (6.6) 
respectively. 
𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 1 𝑖𝑓 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 0 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒   
Thus  𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖
∗ = 𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖 ,             6.5 
𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 +  𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖            6.6 
 
Where µi and ɛi are the error terms which are bivariate normal with zero mean. Since CREDITi is 
an endogenous binary variable, the treatment effect model uses the observed characteristics of the 
participants and the non-participants for the estimation of the parameters of β and also control for 
selection bias due to non-ignorable placement of microfinance. Substituting equation (6.5) into 
equation (6.6) gives the outcomes models for both the participants and the non-participants. 
When          𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖
∗ > 0, 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 1: 𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + (𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖)𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖     6.7 
And when    𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖
∗ ≤ 0, 𝐶𝑅𝐸𝐷𝐼𝑇𝑖 = 0: 𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖         6.8 
 
Where the  𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + (𝑧𝑖𝛿 + 𝜇𝑖)𝛾 + 𝜀𝑖 is the participants outcome model while the non-
participants outcome model is 𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 =  𝑥𝑖𝛽 + 𝜀𝑖. These two models are estimated simultaneously.   
6.4.3.3. Instrumental Variable Model (IV Model)  
An instrumental variable model is included in this study to help us capture certain unobserved 
features such as entrepreneur passion, fear or motivation which are likely not to be captured by 
either the Heckman or treatment effect models. It controls for the endogeneity problems associated 
with the uptake of microfinance products, and also serves as a check on the robustness of the 
results. In order to resolve the problem of endogeneity bias, the IV model requires an observed 
variable that is (1) strongly correlated with the demand for microcredit; but (2) uncorrelated with the 
error term. We chose customers’ identity card, bank account and proximity to a financial company. 
Following the theoretical exposition of Wooldridge (2002) about IV’s two-stage least squares, we 
employed these instruments to estimate the influence of microcredit on household welfare.   
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6.4.4. The Construction of the Asset Index 
The ownership of assets such as radio, television, mobile phone, refrigerator, electricity, toilet, and 
piped water, as well as the type of materials used for the floor and roofing of a house can enhance 
the well-being of household members. For instance whereas piped water, flush toilet and a cement 
floor may improve household welfare, drinking from surface water (stream, lake, river), using a pit 
latrine or defecating in the bush or open field, and using clay to floor a house may expose the 
household to deadly diseases such as cholera, guinea worm, bilharzia and snake bites. This 
compromises the health status of households, reduces their productive hours, increases their 
hospital bills and lowers their well-being. Hence the level of households’ wealth or accumulated 
assets has been used as the measure of welfare in this study. We created an asset index as a 
composite welfare indicator through multiple correspondence analysis.   
Asset index has been used in the mainstream poverty literature to measure poverty levels (see e.g. 
Booysen et al., 2008; Harttgen et al., 2013; Filmer & Scott, 2012; Echevin, 2011; Sahn & Stifel, 
2000; Njong & Ningaye, 2008). This study adds a new innovation to its usage by employing it in the 
financial literature to measure household welfare. We used twelve private household assets and 
access to water and electricity for the creation of the asset index. The index, WELFi, is a function of 
specific underlying variables Pij, such that Pij represents household i’s ownership or lack of 
asset/property j (Johnston and Abreu, 2013; Booysen et al., 2008). 
𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 = 𝑓{𝑃𝑖𝑗}                6.9 
This is expanded as: 𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 = 𝑃𝑖1 + 𝑃𝑖2 +  … +  𝑃𝑖𝑚          6.10 
 
Where Pij is a binary or categorical variable and takes the value 1 if household i owns asset j, and 
0 if otherwise. Following the methods of Benźecri (1973), Asselin (2009), Booysen et al. (2008), 
Echevin (2011) and van Kerm (1998) the weights of the individual assets were then computed 
using multiple correspondence analysis. The basic form of the asset index is given as: 
𝑎𝑖 =  ∑ 𝐹1𝑘
𝑘
𝑘=1 𝑑𝑘𝑖              6.11 
 
The ith household asset index is αi, dki is the kth value of the categorical variables (with k=1… K) 
indicating the households’ assets included in the index construction. F1k is the MCA weights 
generated for the analysis. The extended form of the asset index for this study is given as: 
𝑊𝐸𝐿𝐹𝑖 =  𝑃𝑖1𝑊1 +  𝑃𝑖2𝑊2 + ⋯ 𝑃𝑖𝑗𝑊𝑗            6.12 
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Where WELFi is the welfare composite index of household i, the response of household i to 
category/asset j is represented by Pij and Wj is the MCA weight for dimension one applied to 
category j (Booysen et al., 2008).  
6.5. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
6.5.1. Uses of the Microcredit  
It is expected that borrowing to finance productive ventures will grow household income and 
enhance their wealth. Also, borrowing to invest in household members’ education propels their 
human capital development which can have long-term effects on sustainable poverty alleviation. 
The descriptive statistics in Table 6.3 indicates that about 53 percent of the microcredit is 
channelled into productive economic activities and human capital investment. Whereas this may 
indicate proper utilization of microcredit, the 30.27 percent and 5.4 percent spent on consumption 
and servicing of old debts may not grow the assets of households in the long run. The over-
reliance on debt to finance consumption expenditure can tie households up into the negative 
effects of credit cycles. 
Table 6.3: Uses of the Microcredit 
Purpose Frequency Total Percentage (%) 
Consumption Expenditure  89 30.27% 
1. Daily expenses 39 
2. Emergency 24 
3. Social (wedding) 8 
4. Rent   5 
5. Motorcycle/car 6 
6. Household assets 7 
Housing Expenditure  34 11.57% 
1. Purchase land   5 
2. Build a house 14 
3. House renovation 15 
Business Expenditure  107 36.40% 
1. Start-up capital 20 
2. Agric inputs 29 
3. Business expansion 58 
Human Capital  48 16.32% 
     Education 48 
Others  16 5.44% 
1. Pay old debts 13 
2. Other investment 3 
Total 294 100% 
Source: Authors’ computation based on the 2010 FINSCOPE Data of Ghana. 
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The empirical estimations cover households using (1) only microcredit, (2) only microinsurance and 
(3) those using both microcredit and microinsurance. The results have been reported in Table 6.5. 
The results of the probit model to obtain the coefficients for the inverse Mills ratio needed for the 
correction of selection bias is reported in Table 6.4. The characteristics of households (except 
income) have no significant effect on the uptake of microcredit, rather some institutional factors 
and the availability of microcredit substitutes seem to influence the demand for microcredit. For 
instance financial deepening, measured by the percentage of the population banked, has a very 
strong positive effect on the uptake of microcredit. This lends support to the finance literature (e.g. 
see King & Levine, 1993; Knoop, 2013) that financial development facilitates increased credit 
access to households and economic entities.  
The other significant institutional factors are convenience of banking hours, customers’ 
identification card, remittances and savings. The results reveal that customers’ identification card is 
the only valid instrument for the estimation of the IV model, hence proximity to a financial institution 
and bank account were dropped from the estimation of the IV model. As predicted by financial 
theory, access to substitutes such as borrowing from family and friends as well as trade credit have 
significant negative effects on the demand for microcredit. 
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Table 6.4: The Probit Model Result for Microcredit 
Microcredit Coefficient   Std. Error                 P-Value 
HH Characteristics 
Marital 0.0681 0.1332 0.609 
Total_HH Size 0.0449 0.0300 0.134 
HH Size_15yrs  -0.0123 0.0527 0.815 
Education -0.0439 0.0340 0.197 
Age 0.0176 0.0240 0.464 
Age Square -0.0002 0.0002 0.365 
Gender -0.0534  0.1273 0.675 
Farming -0.0533 0.1456 0.714 
Receive No Income -0.3056 0.1732 0.078* 
Rural -0.2186 0.1425 0.125 
 
Interactions with 
Financial Institutions 
Require_Fin_Inst -0.0063 0.0135 0.636 
Proxim._Fin_Inst. -0.0039 0.0065  0.550 
Trust_Fin_Inst -0.0201 0.0224 0.369 
Banking Hours  0.0660 0.0214 0.002*** 
Bank Account  0.3742 0.2661 0.160 
Identity Card  0.6166 0.1903 0.001*** 
Savings  0.8239 0.4684 0.079* 
Remittance  0.3049 0.1315 0.020** 
Population Banked  0.5581 0.1985 0.005*** 
 
Microcredit Substitutes 
Tradecredit -2.2258 0.4733 0.000*** 
Borrow_Family_Friends -1.2082 0.1112 0.000*** 
Borrow_Employer -0.0631 0.1664 0.705  
Constant 7.7928 1.9683 0.000*** 
  Observations 638 
  Prob >Chi2 0.000 Pseudo R-Square = 0.34 
Note: ***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10 significance levels respectively. 
Source: Authors’ computation based on 2010 Finscope data of Ghana. 
The empirical estimation shows that selection bias as captured by the inverse Mills ratio is 
insignificant, thus our sample is not biased. The Heckman and treatment effect models indicate 
that microcredit has no significant influence on households’ asset accumulation. Although its effect 
under the IV is positive, a comparison of its significance level with that of the combined products 
under the same IV indicates a weak percentage of 5 as against 1 percent for the combined 
products. Together the results show that households using only microcredit do not derive much 
benefit from microcredit in terms of asset build-up. This result seems to confirm the fears of 
Bateman (2010) and the empirical findings of Coleman (1999), Morduch (1998), and Adams and 
Von Pischke (1992).  
Nevertheless, households using both microcredit and microinsurance derive positive and 
significant benefits from both products in terms of asset accumulation.  The positive and significant 
benefits that households derived by combining microcredit and microinsurance may be attributed 
to two reasons: (1) the insurance indemnity and (2) utilization of the credit for the intended 
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purpose. Microinsurance47 being a risk management tool, indemnifies policyholders against certain 
risks at a fee over a period of time. For instance, credit life protects households against the 
liquidation of assets to repay loans; health insurance prevents the tendency of diverting approved 
loans to pay for hospital bills; and property insurance (e.g. fire policy) enables households to avoid 
the tendency of falling on approved loans to rebuild after a fire.  
The opportunity cost of poor health and economic shocks are quite unbearable for the poor 
(Chakrabarty, 2012), thus in the absence of insurance, either microcredit or mostly assets are 
depleted to cope with risky event (Smith, 1998). Hence advancing microcredit to the poor may not 
lead to build-up of more assets unless it is combined with an appropriate microinsurance product. 
The use of microinsurance enables households to avoid the misapplication of microcredit funds, 
and complements microcredit by equipping households to avoid moral hazards in the utilization of 
microcredit funds. This finding lends support to similar findings by Chakrabarty (2012) which 
indicate that the strength of microcredit to reduce child labour among the extremely poor is realized 
through combination with an appropriate microinsurance policy.  
 
                                               
47
 The microinsurance products covered in this study are life, property, health, funeral, education and 
investment plans. 
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Table 6.5: The Estimations of Microcredit and Microinsurance48  
Variables 
Microinsurance Only Microcredit Only Microcredit and Microinsurance Together 
 Heckman Treatment IV  Heckman Treatment IV  Heckman Treatment IV 
Microinsurance  0.0710 0.1842 0.1909 
 (0.339) (0.048)** (0.050)** 
Microcredit      0.0026 0.0182 0.9779 
     (0.969) (0.850) (0.022)** 
Insure_Credit               0.1523   0.3175 0.5085  
         (0.041)**  (0.014)** (0.006)*** 
Inv.Mills Ratio -0.0589    -0.0619  -0.0389 -0.0037  -0.0125 -0.1295 
 (0.333) (0.350)  (0.509) (0.956)    (0.811)   (0.135) 
Not Married -0.0938 -0.0981 -0.0936 -0.0607 -0.0651 -0.0852 -0.1020  -0.1038 -0.1075 
 (0.117) (0.097)* (0.119) (0.023)* (0.004)***  (0.003)***  (0.099)* (0.090)* (0.078)* 
Education 0.1772 0.1775 0.1770 0.1822 0.1835 0.1769  0.1815  0.1771 0.1716 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
T_HH_Size -0.0605 -0.0610 -0.0615 -0.0575 -0.0590 -0.0662  -0.0602 -0.0629 -0.0668 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)** 
HH Size≥15yrs    0.0706 0.0731 0.0712 0.0647 0.0679 0.0663  0.0691   0.0703       0.0753 
  (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** (0.011)** (0.006)*** (0.027)**   (0.007)***  (0.005)***  (0.003)*** 
Resp.Age -0.0077 -0.0078 -0.0073 -0.0049  -0.0033 -0.0193  -0.0071 -0.0076 -0.0100 
  (0.490) (0.479) (0.511) (0.657) (0.757) (0.180)   (0.537)  (0.502)  (0.380) 
Resp.Age Sq 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002  0.0000   0.0000 0.0001 
  (0.442) (0.427) (0.461) (0.463) (0.532) (0.110)  (0.466)  (0.448)  (0.354) 
Gender 0.0788 0.0744 0.0776 0.1194 0.1116 0.1770   0.0879   0.0778   0.0620
 (0.164) (0.187) (0.171) (0.046)** (0.051)* (0.017)**  (0.135)  (0.181)   (0.286) 
Income 0.0670 0.0730 0.0742 0.0698 0.0512 0.1683   0.0800   0.0950   0.1123 
 (0.394) (0.350) (0.348) (0.390) (0.515) (0.114)   (0.325)  (0.240)   (0.173) 
Tradecredit 0.1907 0.1917 0.1954 0.2142 0.1960 0.5105   0.2148   0.2295   0.2488 
 (0.006)*** (0.000)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.010)** (0.002)***  (0.005)***   (0.002)***  (0.001)*** 
Rura -0.7697 -0.7719 -0.7695 -0.7546 -0.7706 -0.6766  -0.7639  -0.7676  -0.7632 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***   (0.000)***   (0.000)*** 
Non-Farming 0.4313 0.4331 0.4320 0.4266 0.4350 0.4589   0.4167   0.4151    0.4255 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)***   (0.000)***    (0.000)*** 
Constant 1.1197 1.0066 1.3421 0.9653 0.9544 -0.1512   0.8203   0.6864    1.0102 
  (0.002)*** (0.004)*** (0.002)*** (0.007)*** (0.008)*** (0.848)  (0.035)**  (0.083)*    (0.028)** 
Observations 667 667 667 638  663 671 638 638  667 
Adj.R.sq. 0.51 Wald=724.25 Adj.R.sq=0.51  Adj.R.sq=0.51 Wald=761.35 Adj.R.sq=0.30 Adj.R.sq=0.51 Wald=686.50 Adj.R.sq.= 0.49 
Prob>F  0.000 P>Chi2=0.000 P>F=0.000 P>F=0.000  P>Chi2=0.000  P>F=0.000 P>F=0.000 P>Chi2=0..000 P>F=0.000 
Note: The P-values are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
 
                                               
48
 In order to ensure consistency of results and heteroskedastic consistent estimates, robust standard errors have been performed on the variables. The results of the robust standard 
errors do not statistically differ from what is reported here. See Table C.1 in Appendix C for the results of the robust standard errors. 
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6.6. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
The study has assessed the welfare enhancing ability of microcredit with or without 
microinsurance. In particular we asked: does microcredit increase households’ welfare in the 
absence of microinsurance? The empirical analyses under Heckman, treatment effect and IV 
models indicate a weak association between microcredit and household welfare. However it 
improves households’ well-being if combined with microinsurance.  
Microcredit may be good, but its real benefits to the poor are best realized if the poverty trapping 
risks such as poor health, fire, flood, drought and income shocks which are major obstacles to the 
breaking of the poverty cycle are managed with appropriate microinsurance schemes. This finding 
underscores the need to advance microcredit and microinsurance to the poor as a single package 
instead of separate products. To the extent that microfinance is inextricably linked to households’ 
welfare, combining microcredit and microinsurance will equip the poor to achieve steady asset 
accumulation and make sustainable exit from poverty.  
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CHAPTER 7  
THE CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1. INTRODUCTION 
This research is a collection of essays which have examined the welfare benefits of 
microinsurance from the perspective of Ghana. Specifically the research sought to evaluate the 
impact of microinsurance on household asset accumulation, and tested whether microinsurance is 
a viable alternative for coping with risk and for smoothing consumption. The thesis also examined 
the asset inequality levels of insured and uninsured households and then tested whether 
microinsurance has any effect on the levels of inequality. Finally it tested whether households gain 
positive synergy by combining microinsurance and microcredit. 
Using data on household living standards from the 2010 FINSCOPE survey, the impact evaluation 
was undertaken through Heckman sample selection, treatment effects model and instrumental 
variable modelling. Each of these methods provides a unique benefit to the whole impact 
estimations. For instance, both the Heckman and treatment models control for selection bias, 
however whereas the Heckman model uses the observed variables of only the insured to 
undertake the estimations, the treatment effect model uses the observed variables of both insured 
and uninsured households. The instrumental variable model controls for endogeneity bias by using 
the unobserved characteristics of both the insured and the uninsured for the empirical estimations. 
Together the three models provide results which are consistent and reliable. 
On the whole the study makes a unique contribution to the literature in three main ways. First, 
income has been used quite extensively in welfare economics to measure the level of wealth and 
welfare. However, incomes, particularly of informal sector workers, are known to be seasonal and 
suffer from mis-measurement and recall bias (Moser & Felton, 2007; McKenzie, 2004). The 
accuracy of household income is also hindered by households’ reluctance to divulge sensitive 
information concerning their income and expenditure levels. In order to overcome these challenges 
associated with income and expenditure data, this study used an asset index created through 
multiple correspondence analyses to measure the welfare levels of low-income households. 
Although asset indexes have been used in the mainstream welfare economics, this study is one of 
the pioneers in the application of the concept in the microinsurance field. 
Second, the study initiates a new dimension to the debate and controversies in the microfinance 
literature by asking whether households using microcredit in combination with microinsurance 
derive more significant welfare benefits than those using only microcredit schemes. Third, 
microinsurance schemes have been on the Ghanaian market for more than a decade, however 
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there has not been any empirical investigation into their impact on household welfare. This 
research thus addresses this urgent need by providing valuable empirical knowledge needed not 
only for the growth and development of the sector, but most importantly for improving the welfare 
of low-income households. The information is also very timely and an important input to the 
National Insurance Commission’s intention to amend the policy guidelines on microinsurance in 
order to make it more relevant to the conditions of low-income households.  
7.2. SUMMARY OF THE FINDINGS 
The impact of microinsurance on asset accumulation presented in Table 3.8 indicates that insured 
households derived positive significant gains from microinsurance through the protection of their 
assets against risks. The indemnity cover under microinsurance empowers low-income households 
to engage in high risk high yielding ventures necessary for the accumulation of essential assets. 
More importantly, the results indicate that the pay-out received if an insurable risk occurs prevents 
asset pawning. This implies that microinsurance protects households against asset liquidation 
during times of emergency. 
The empirical evidence presented in Table 4.3 also reveals that households undertake better 
consumption smoothing through the use of microinsurance schemes. Specifically, insured 
households are on average 19-22 percent less likely to forgo daily meals when faced with an 
income shock. Sacrificing the quality and quantity of food can have pernicious and irreversible 
consequences on the health of household members, especially children. To the extent that 
microinsurance eliminates the tendency to cut meals, it promotes healthy living necessary for 
household development. 
With respect to the level of asset inequality within and between the insured and the uninsured 
households, the analysis under the Gini index shows that insured households have lower levels of 
asset inequality. More importantly, insured female-headed households have lower inequality than 
insured male-headed households. But uninsured female-headed households are worse off than 
both uninsured and insured male-headed households. The geographical dimension shows that 
insured rural dwellers have lower asset inequality than the rural uninsured. However, the analyses 
of Northern and Brong Ahafo regions reveal that large developmental gaps may limit the effect of 
microinsurance in closing the asset inequality gap. 
Finally, the study examined the scenarios where some households use only microcredit while 
others use microcredit in combination with microinsurance. The findings suggest a weak influence 
of microcredit on household welfare. However households using microcredit in combination with 
microinsurance derive significant gains in terms of welfare improvement. Microcredit may be good, 
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but its real benefits to the poor are best realised if the poverty trapping risks are covered with 
microinsurance. 
In all the findings of the four empirical papers corroborate each other by confirming the theoretical 
underpinnings that indeed microinsurance improves the welfare of low-income households.   
7.3. CONCLUSION 
The combined evidence reveals quite strongly that microinsurance is a very good risk management 
instrument for improving the welfare of low-income households through asset retention, proper 
consumption smoothing, reduction in asset inequality and the derivation of positive synergies from 
microcredit. 
7.4. RECOMMENDATIONS 
The thesis recommends some policy interventions necessary for welfare enhancement through 
microinsurance schemes. The welfare benefits of microinsurance can be widened to cover more 
low-income households if the barriers to the uptake of microinsurance are eliminated. Barriers such 
as lack of substantive legislative backing need to be addressed expeditiously to encourage more 
insurance firms to enter the microinsurance sector. Of the 44 life and non-life insurance companies 
in Ghana only 11 are providing microinsurance schemes to the informal sector. Addressing the 
regulation obstacles may incentivize many more insurers to enter this largely untapped segment of 
the insurance industry.  
There is also a need to upscale microinsurance to enable low-income households to participate 
and benefit to a larger extent. The key issue is to ensure a design that reduces transaction costs 
and makes it relatively less expensive to enhance significant participation. Achieving depth and 
large scale extension in a cost effective manner can be done through the use of mobile phone 
technology.  The concept of mobile banking has proven to be cost effective in extending banking 
services to millions of poor households who were previously excluded from formal banking at a low 
transaction cost. “Mobile microinsurance” can be designed along the lines of the mobile banking 
concept to meet the specific needs of microinsurance transactions at a lower cost, and also result 
in a lower cost of premium and greater accessibility and depth. Already two mobile companies 
have started bundling microinsurance with their services. A formal public policy and regulatory 
backing by the NIC and key stakeholders such as the National Communication Authority will 
increase the confidence of the public in “mobile microinsurance” and possibly encourage other 
entities to venture into it. This will not only increase the uptake of microinsurance, but it will also 
equip low-income households to protect their assets against risk, escape consumption poverty and 
gradually bridge the asset inequality gap.  
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The upscaling of microinsurance amongst low-income households can also be enhanced by 
increasing the density and spread of microinsurance providers. The NIC can encourage more 
insurers to enter the microinsurance market by setting a different initial regulatory capital for 
microinsurance providers. Currently the regulatory capital is set at US$5 million for every insurance 
company irrespective of class of business or size. Requiring all insurers, either life, non-life or 
microinsurance providers, to start with the same capital may discourage some insurers from 
entering the microinsurance sector and will also not help in increasing the scale of uptake from low 
income households. Therefore to encourage more insurers to enter the microinsurance sector, the 
NIC can use its regulatory powers to lower the regulatory capital for prospective microinsurers. 
This will reduce the entry cost of microinsurance and increase the number of providers who can 
provide these services at a lower premium and thereby attract more low income households. The 
regulatory capital incentive can also be structured to be more favourable to institutions willing to 
locate in rural and semi-urban areas with high densities of low-income households. Such 
incentives can encourage significant entry into the industry and also help spread the provision of 
microinsurance at a relatively lower setup cost to low-income households and result in higher 
uptake.  
In addition microinsurance can be a better enabler for reduction in asset inequality if institutional 
and developmental gaps are dealt with. Institutional and developmental deficits, such as 
inadequate hospitals and insurance companies in Brong Ahafo and the three Northern regions 
have reduced the influence of microinsurance, especially the national health insurance scheme, on 
asset inequality. It is therefore imperative for the government to initiate policies that will bridge the 
developmental gaps and increase the access of microinsurance services in these regions.  
Microfinance providers can add more to clients’ value if they exploit the positive synergies between 
microcredit and microinsurance by designing products which tie the two products into a single 
scheme. This requires going beyond the usual credit life products into products that provide credit 
as well as cover health, fire, drought, theft and disability. To the extent that microfinance is 
inextricably linked to households’ welfare, combining microcredit and microinsurance will equip the 
poor to achieve steady asset accumulation and make a sustainable exit from poverty.  
Sometimes welfare intervention programs suffer major setbacks when the recipients encounter 
risky events such as crop failure, fires and other shocks. These uninsured shocks can draw the 
recipients who may otherwise be above the poverty line back into poverty, thereby erasing any 
meaningful gains made under the welfare intervention. It is therefore essential that the 
beneficiaries of welfare programs are properly insured against the very risk that impoverishes 
them. This demands a policy that will integrate microinsurance into the government’s strategy on 
poverty reduction. Integrating microinsurance into the government poverty reduction strategy will 
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promote a sustainable reduction in poverty and facilitate a systematic empowerment of low-income 
households to achieve welfare improvements. 
Future studies may consider using panel data (where such data is available) to analyse the 
dynamic influence of microinsurance on household welfare. The availability of panel data may also 
allow the application of other impact methods such as difference-in-difference to estimate the 
before and after effects of microinsurance on household welfare. 
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APPENDIX A:  
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS: ASSET ACCUMULATION 
Table A.1: Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors: Asset Accumulation 
Variables Heckman  IV 
Microinsurance  0.0712 0.1899 
    (0.355)  (0.053)** 
Microcredit    -0.0035  -0.0081 
 (0.950) (0.886) 
Inv.Mills ratio -0.0589 
  (0.331) 
Not Married   -0.0938 -0.0935 
 (0.112)  (0.114) 
Education  0.1772   0.1771 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
T_HH_Size  -0.0605 -0.0614 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
HH Size≥15  0.0706  0.0712 
 (0.006)*** (0.005)*** 
Resp.Age   -0.0076  -0.0072 
  (0.502) (0.526) 
Resp.Age Sq  0.0001  0.0001 
 (0.457) (0.478) 
Male 0.0786 0.0771 
 (0.162) (0.172) 
Income 0.0666 0.0732 
 (0.422) (0.374) 
Tradecredit  0.1895 0.1927 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Rural  -0.7700   -0.7703 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Non-Farming     0.4312 0.4318 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Constant 1.1240 1.3546 
 (0.002)*** (0.001)*** 
Observations   667   667 
Adj. R-Squ. 0.52  0.52 
P>F   0.000    P>F=0.000 
Note: ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively.  
Source: Author’s computation based on the 2010 Finscope data of Ghana. 
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APPENDIX B:  
SELECTION BIAS TEST 
Table B.1: The Selection Bias Test, Heckman Model 
Asset Index Coeff Std. Error P-Value 
Microinsurance 0.0712 0.0743 0.338 
Inverse Mills Ratio -0.0589 0.0609 0.333 
Microcredit -0.0035 0.0572 0.951 
Not Married -0.0938 0.0598 0.118 
Male 0.0786 0.0567 0.166 
Resp. Education Level  0.1772 0.0145 0.000*** 
Resp. Age  -0.0076 0.0112 0.495 
Resp. Age Square 0.0001 0.0001 0.446 
Total HH Size  -0.0605 0.0148 0.000*** 
HH Size ≥ 15 Yrs 0.0706 0.0249 0.005*** 
Income 0.0666 0.0788 0.166 
Trade Credit  0.1895 0.0720 0.009*** 
Non-Farming 0.4313 0.0665 0.000*** 
Rural -0.7700  0.0643 0.000*** 
Constant 1.1240 0.3728 0.003*** 
Observations 676  
Adj. R-Square 0.51 Prob >F = 0.000 
***, ** and * represent 1, 5 and 10 significance levels respectively. 
Source: Author’s computation based on 2010 Finscope data of Ghana. 
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APPENDIX C:  
ROBUST STANDARD ERRORS: MICROCREDIT AND MICROINSURANCE 
Table C.1: Heteroskedasticity Robust Standard Errors: Microcredit and Microinsurance  
Variables 
Microinsurance Only Microcredit Only Microcredit and Microinsurance Together 
 Heckman      IV  Heckman IV  Heckman  IV 
Microinsure Only 0.0710 0.1909 
 (0.354) (0.050)** 
Microcredit Only   0.0026 0.9779 
   (0.968) (0.020)** 
Insure_Credit           0.1523 0.5085 
     (0.037)**  (0.006)*** 
Inv.Mills Ratio -0.0589     -0.0389  -0.0125 
 (0.331)  (0.442)  (0.776) 
Not Married -0.0938 -0.0936 -0.0607 -0.0852 -0.1020 -0.1075 
  (0.112) (0.114 (0.020)** (0.005)*** (0.093)* (0.074)* 
Education 0.1772 0.1770 0.1822 0.1769 0.1815 0.1716 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
T_HH_Size -0.0605 -0.0615 -0.0575 -0.0662 -0.0602 -0.0668 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
HH Size≥15yrs 0.0706 0.0712 0.0647 0.0663 0.0691 0.0753 
 (0.006)*** (0.005)*** (0.015)** (0.027)**   (0.009)***  (0.003)*** 
Resp.Age -0.0077 -0.0073 -0.0049 -0.0193 -0.0071 -0.0100 
 (0.498) (0.518) (0.665) (0.193) (0.542) (0.387) 
Resp.Age Sq       0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0002 0.0000  0.0001 
 (0.453) (0.471) (0.472) (0.115) (0.474) (0.365) 
Gender 0.0788 0.0776 0.1194 0.1770  0.0879 0.0620 
 (0.161) (0.170) (0.041)** (0.014)** (0.129) (0.285) 
Income 0.0670 0.0742 0.0698 0.1683  0.0800 0.1123 
 (0.418) (0.366) (0.418) (0.126) (0.353) (0.192) 
Tradecredit          0.1907 0.1954 0.2142 0.5105 0.2148 0.2488 
 (0.003)*** (0.002)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.000)*** 
Rural                   -0.7697 -0.7695 -0.7546 -0.6766 -0.7639 -0.7632 
 (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** 
Non-Farming      0.4313 0.4320 0.4266 0.4589 0.4167 0.4255 
  (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)*** (0.000)***   (0.000)*** 
Constant 1.1197 1.3421 0.9653 -0.1512  0.8203 1.0102 
 (0.001)*** (0.002)*** (0.005)*** (0.846) (0.027)**   (0.026)** 
Observations  667 667 638  671 638 667 
R.sq.    0.52 R.sq=0.52 R.sq=0.52 R.sq=0.31 R.sq=0.52 R.sq.= 0.50 
Prob>F 0.000 P>F=0.000   P>F=0.000 P>F=0.000 P>F=0.000 P>F=0.000 
The P-values are in parenthesis. ***, ** and * indicate 1%, 5% and 10% significance levels respectively. 
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